【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化趨勢的日益加深，以及各國金融市場發(fā)展不均衡等問題的存在，企業(yè)尋求境外交叉上市的動機(jī)與渴求越來越強(qiáng)烈。境外交叉上市由此產(chǎn)生，至今仍方興未艾，而且成為學(xué)術(shù)研究領(lǐng)域的一大主題。國外學(xué)者對于境外交叉上市的研究由來已久而且理論成果頗豐，如投資者認(rèn)知假說、市場分割假說、流動性假說和投資者保護(hù)假說等。隨著研究的不斷深入，人們對于投資者保護(hù)問題的關(guān)注日益增多。在以往文獻(xiàn)中，學(xué)者大多從境內(nèi)外法律制度差異的視角進(jìn)行研究，經(jīng)濟(jì)層面的研究相對較少。因此，本課題基于投資者保護(hù)視角，從企業(yè)的資本配置行為入手，結(jié)合交叉上市前后企業(yè)所面臨法律環(huán)境的變化及其對公司治理機(jī)制的影響，深入分析交叉上市對企業(yè)非效率投資行為的影響。考察A+H交叉上市是否發(fā)揮了其治理效應(yīng)，有效制約了上市公司的非效率投資行為，提高了對投資者的保護(hù)程度。 本課題首先就交叉上市和中小投資者做了界定，對交叉上市和非效率投資的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的回顧與梳理；隨后比較了香港與內(nèi)地法律制度環(huán)境的差異以及這些差異對兩地公司治理機(jī)制的影響；然后基于控股股東對控制權(quán)私有收益的追求，構(gòu)建數(shù)理模型并得到一條投資決策無差異曲線，研究交叉上市對企業(yè)投資決策的影響�；谝陨侠碚摶A(chǔ)，提出了交叉上市可以有效制約企業(yè)非效率投資行為的一系列假設(shè)，借鑒并改進(jìn)了Vogt(1994)模型、搜集整理數(shù)據(jù)、回歸分析、并根據(jù)研究結(jié)論提出了一些政策建議。 本課題理論分析表明：交叉上市可以有效制約因控股股東對控制權(quán)私有收益的追求，而導(dǎo)致的非理性過度投資行為。實證分析表明：(1)A+H交叉上市公司投資現(xiàn)金流敏感性低于純A股公司；(2)A+H交叉上市可以在一定程度上有效制約企業(yè)過度投資的非效率行為；(3)隨著自由現(xiàn)金流的增加，投資支出與現(xiàn)金流之間的敏感性也不斷增強(qiáng)，企業(yè)過度投資的程度也越來越大，，交叉上市對過度投資的制約作用呈現(xiàn)增強(qiáng)的趨勢，但是并不顯著，現(xiàn)階段交叉上市對企業(yè)因現(xiàn)金流過剩導(dǎo)致的過度投資行為的制約作用仍然有限，尚有較大的提升空間；(4)隨著股權(quán)集中度的增加，投資支出與現(xiàn)金流之間的敏感性不斷降低，企業(yè)過度投資的程度也越來越小，而且交叉上市對過度投資的制約作用，并未隨著股權(quán)集中度的增加呈現(xiàn)某種規(guī)律性變動。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of the trend of economic globalization and the existence of unbalanced development of financial markets in various countries, the motivation and desire of enterprises to seek cross-listing abroad is becoming stronger and stronger. Cross-listing has emerged from this, still in the ascendant, and has become a major subject of academic research. Foreign scholars have been studying cross-listing overseas for a long time and have a lot of theoretical achievements, such as investor cognition hypothesis, market segmentation hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis and investor protection hypothesis. With the deepening of the research, people pay more and more attention to investor protection. In the previous literature, scholars mostly studied from the perspective of the differences of domestic and foreign legal systems, but relatively few on the economic level. Therefore, based on the perspective of investor protection, from the perspective of corporate capital allocation behavior, combined with the cross-listing before and after the changes in the legal environment faced by enterprises and their impact on corporate governance mechanism, Deeply analyze the influence of cross-listing on the non-efficient investment behavior of enterprises. Whether A-H cross-listing exerts its governance effect effectively restricts the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies and improves the degree of investor protection. This paper first defines cross-listing and small and medium-sized investors, and reviews and combs the related literature of cross-listing and inefficient investment in detail. Then it compares the differences between the legal systems of Hong Kong and the mainland and the impact of these differences on the corporate governance mechanism of the two places. Then, based on the controlling shareholder's pursuit of private income of control right, the mathematical model is constructed and a non-differential curve of investment decision is obtained, and the influence of cross-listing on enterprise investment decision is studied. Based on the above theoretical basis, this paper puts forward a series of hypotheses that cross-listing can effectively restrict the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises, and improves the Vogt (1994) model, collects and collates the data, and analyzes the results of regression analysis. According to the conclusions of the study, some policy suggestions are put forward. The theoretical analysis shows that cross-listing can effectively restrict the irrational over-investment behavior caused by controlling shareholders' pursuit of private income of control. The empirical analysis shows that: (1) the sensitivity of) A H cross-listed companies to investment cash flow is lower than that of pure A-share companies; (2) A H cross-listing can effectively restrict the inefficient behavior of over-investment of enterprises to some extent; (3) with the increase of free cash flow, the sensitivity between investment expenditure and cash flow is increasing, and the degree of overinvestment is increasing. However, the cross-listing still has a limited effect on the over-investment behavior caused by excess cash flow at this stage, and there is still much room for improvement. (4) with the increase of equity concentration, the sensitivity between investment expenditure and cash flow is decreasing, the degree of overinvestment is becoming smaller and smaller, and cross-listing restricts over-investment. It does not show some regular change with the increase of ownership concentration.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F271;F275;F832.51

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