P2P借貸平臺上的行為博弈分析
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-31 16:47
【摘要】：作為最新一個挑戰(zhàn)傳統(tǒng)金融業(yè)的模式，以P2P借貸平臺為代表的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融在2013年撼動了中國金融市場，并重新引發(fā)了人們對于金融“脫媒”現(xiàn)象的關注。那么，P2P借貸平臺在“脫媒”的條件下，借貸交易能否順利、高效地實現(xiàn)呢？如何解決信息不對稱問題？本文以互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融的代表模式——P2P借貸模式為研究對象，探討了這一問題。 本文首先結合金融中介和金融“脫媒”理論，從交易成本和信息不對稱角度，挖掘了P2P借貸模式“去中介化”的核心屬性。分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，P2P借貸模式借助信息技術的發(fā)展，能夠通過廣泛而分散的交易產生規(guī)模效應降低交易成本，符合“脫媒”的理論體系，是典型的金融“脫媒”現(xiàn)象。隨后，在對P2P借貸平臺拍拍貸的案例研究中，系統(tǒng)描述了平臺上借貸雙方的行為特征，以及存在的借貸行為博弈關系，，借款人總是以更小的信息成本和貸款成本，滿足對短缺資金的需求；而投資人總是希望在低風險的基礎上投資更高利率的貸款項目。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，P2P借貸平臺上的信用體系指標，有助于在借貸行為博弈中構成均衡要素的條件。接下來，本文進一步引入了博弈理論，構建了不完全信息動態(tài)博弈模型，驗證了借貸行為博弈能夠達到均衡狀態(tài)。最后，本文采用拍拍貸平臺上的實際交易數(shù)據(jù)進行了實證分析，實證結果表明，“脫媒”條件下的P2P平臺能夠促成借貸交易與信息成本密切相關，體現(xiàn)了信息與資金在P2P平臺的匹配。同時考察了“關鍵要素指標”在促成借貸交易上發(fā)揮的作用。基于本文論證的金融“脫媒”條件下，由于借貸行為博弈帶來的市場有效性，提出了對P2P借貸模式給予規(guī)范和審慎監(jiān)管，創(chuàng)新金融市場和服務進一步激發(fā)普通大眾的金融熱情，完善個人征信體系信用數(shù)據(jù)的對接等政策建議。
[Abstract]:As the latest model to challenge the traditional financial industry, Internet finance, represented by P2P lending platform, shook the Chinese financial market in 2013, and aroused people's attention to the phenomenon of financial disintermediation. So the P2P lending platform in the "disintermediation" conditions, the loan transactions can be smooth, efficient implementation? How to solve the problem of information asymmetry? In this paper, the representative model of Internet finance, P2P lending model as the research object, discussed this problem. Based on the theory of financial intermediation and financial disintermediation, this paper first excavates the core attributes of P2P lending model "disintermediation" from the angle of transaction cost and information asymmetry. With the development of information technology, P2P lending mode can reduce transaction cost through extensive and dispersed transaction scale effect, which accords with the theoretical system of "disintermediation" and is a typical phenomenon of financial "disintermediation". Then, in the case study of PPDAI, a P2P lending platform, the author systematically describes the behavior characteristics of the two parties on the platform, and the existence of a game relationship of lending behavior. The borrower always has a smaller information cost and loan cost. Meet the demand for scarce funds; investors always want to invest in higher-interest loans on a low-risk basis. It is found that the credit system index on P2P lending platform is helpful to the condition of equilibrium elements in the game of lending behavior. Then, this paper further introduces the game theory, constructs the incomplete information dynamic game model, and verifies that the borrowing behavior game can reach the equilibrium state. Finally, this paper uses the actual transaction data on PPDAI platform for empirical analysis. The empirical results show that the P2P platform under the condition of "disintermediation" can promote the loan transaction and information cost closely related. It reflects the matching of information and funds in P2P platform. At the same time, the paper examines the role of key factor indicators in facilitating lending transactions. Based on the disintermediation of finance, and because of the market effectiveness brought by the game of lending behavior, this paper proposes to regulate and prudently supervise the P2P lending model, and to innovate the financial market and service to further stimulate the financial enthusiasm of the general public. Perfect personal credit system credit data docking and other policy recommendations.
【學位授予單位】：對外經濟貿易大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.4;F724.6
本文編號：2215573
[Abstract]:As the latest model to challenge the traditional financial industry, Internet finance, represented by P2P lending platform, shook the Chinese financial market in 2013, and aroused people's attention to the phenomenon of financial disintermediation. So the P2P lending platform in the "disintermediation" conditions, the loan transactions can be smooth, efficient implementation? How to solve the problem of information asymmetry? In this paper, the representative model of Internet finance, P2P lending model as the research object, discussed this problem. Based on the theory of financial intermediation and financial disintermediation, this paper first excavates the core attributes of P2P lending model "disintermediation" from the angle of transaction cost and information asymmetry. With the development of information technology, P2P lending mode can reduce transaction cost through extensive and dispersed transaction scale effect, which accords with the theoretical system of "disintermediation" and is a typical phenomenon of financial "disintermediation". Then, in the case study of PPDAI, a P2P lending platform, the author systematically describes the behavior characteristics of the two parties on the platform, and the existence of a game relationship of lending behavior. The borrower always has a smaller information cost and loan cost. Meet the demand for scarce funds; investors always want to invest in higher-interest loans on a low-risk basis. It is found that the credit system index on P2P lending platform is helpful to the condition of equilibrium elements in the game of lending behavior. Then, this paper further introduces the game theory, constructs the incomplete information dynamic game model, and verifies that the borrowing behavior game can reach the equilibrium state. Finally, this paper uses the actual transaction data on PPDAI platform for empirical analysis. The empirical results show that the P2P platform under the condition of "disintermediation" can promote the loan transaction and information cost closely related. It reflects the matching of information and funds in P2P platform. At the same time, the paper examines the role of key factor indicators in facilitating lending transactions. Based on the disintermediation of finance, and because of the market effectiveness brought by the game of lending behavior, this paper proposes to regulate and prudently supervise the P2P lending model, and to innovate the financial market and service to further stimulate the financial enthusiasm of the general public. Perfect personal credit system credit data docking and other policy recommendations.
【學位授予單位】：對外經濟貿易大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.4;F724.6
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