【摘要】：在所有權(quán)高度集中的情況下，公司治理的研究重心已經(jīng)從股東與經(jīng)營者之間的委托代理問題轉(zhuǎn)移到大股東代理問題上了。由于股權(quán)的集中度高，大股東可以利用手中的控制權(quán)侵占上市公司利益，給上市公司帶來損失，因此研究上市公司大股東的行為具有相當(dāng)重要的意義。而在我國的上市公司中，股權(quán)質(zhì)押已經(jīng)成為了大股東的重要融資行為之一，2011年共發(fā)生A股質(zhì)押1620宗，2012年共發(fā)生A股質(zhì)押2014宗。股權(quán)質(zhì)押之后，大股東一方面依舊掌握著上市公司的控制權(quán)，另一方面質(zhì)押部分股權(quán)價值波動的風(fēng)險轉(zhuǎn)移給了銀行，這樣就很可能給上市公司帶來風(fēng)險。因此，本文以股權(quán)質(zhì)押為切入點(diǎn)，對YH公司的大股東行為進(jìn)行研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)YH公司存在的問題并且予以解決。 本文從委托代理理論和信號理論出發(fā)，對大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押前后的利益侵占成本進(jìn)行分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)股權(quán)質(zhì)押會使大股東的利益侵占成本在一定條件下降低，從而很可能誘使大股東加劇對上市公司的利益侵占，或者成為大股東加劇利益侵占行為時轉(zhuǎn)嫁成本的有力手段�；谏鲜隼碚摲治觯疚囊訷H公司為研究對象，分析了YH公司大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押前后的利益侵占成本，然后從關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保、關(guān)聯(lián)交易和大股東非經(jīng)營性占款三個角度，就YH公司大股東XT集團(tuán)公司在股權(quán)質(zhì)押前后對上市公司的利益侵占程度進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的探討和分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)YH公司大股東的股權(quán)質(zhì)押行為能降低他的利益侵占成本，，并且在股權(quán)質(zhì)押之后大股東顯著加大了對YH公司的利益侵占程度。接著，本文分析了YH公司大股東XT集團(tuán)公司利益侵占行為得以加劇的原因，即YH公司目前存在的相關(guān)問題，最后從充分重視YH公司大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押行為、完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、完善內(nèi)部控制制度和加大信息披露范圍四個方面為YH公司如何制約大股東加劇利益侵占這一行為提出了建議。
[Abstract]:In the case of highly concentrated ownership, the focus of corporate governance research has shifted from the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers to the agency problem of major shareholders. The behavior of major shareholders is of great significance. In China's listed companies, equity pledge has become an important financing behavior of major shareholders. In 2011, there were 1620 A-share pledges, and in 2012, there were 2014 A-share pledges. The risk of the fluctuation of the value of the Pledged Shares is transferred to the banks, which may bring risks to the listed companies. Therefore, this paper takes the pledge of shares as the breakthrough point to study the behavior of the major shareholders of YH company, and finds out the problems existing in YH company and to solve them.
Based on the principal-agent theory and signal theory, this paper analyzes the cost of interest encroachment before and after the pledge of large shareholders'equity. It is found that the cost of interest encroachment of large shareholders will be reduced under certain conditions, which may induce the large shareholders to aggravate the benefit encroachment of listed companies or become the major shareholders to aggravate the benefit encroachment. Based on the above theoretical analysis, this paper takes YH company as the research object, analyzes the cost of interest encroachment before and after the pledge of the major shareholder's equity in YH company, and then from the three angles of related guarantee, related transaction and non-profit-making of the major shareholder, the large shareholder XT group company of YH company goes up before and after the pledge of equity. The degree of interest encroachment is discussed and analyzed in detail. It is found that the major shareholder's equity pledge can reduce his cost of interest encroachment, and after the equity pledge, the major shareholder's interest encroachment on YH company is significantly increased. Then, this paper analyzes the interest encroachment of XT Group, the major shareholder of YH company. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions on how to restrict the large shareholders to aggravate their interest encroachment from four aspects: paying full attention to the large shareholders'equity pledge, perfecting the corporate governance structure, perfecting the internal control system and enlarging the scope of information disclosure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.72;F832.51;F406.7

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本文編號：2188798