YH公司股權(quán)質(zhì)押前后大股東利益侵占程度變動(dòng)研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-18 07:42
【摘要】：在所有權(quán)高度集中的情況下，公司治理的研究重心已經(jīng)從股東與經(jīng)營者之間的委托代理問題轉(zhuǎn)移到大股東代理問題上了。由于股權(quán)的集中度高，大股東可以利用手中的控制權(quán)侵占上市公司利益，給上市公司帶來損失，因此研究上市公司大股東的行為具有相當(dāng)重要的意義。而在我國的上市公司中，股權(quán)質(zhì)押已經(jīng)成為了大股東的重要融資行為之一，2011年共發(fā)生A股質(zhì)押1620宗，2012年共發(fā)生A股質(zhì)押2014宗。股權(quán)質(zhì)押之后，大股東一方面依舊掌握著上市公司的控制權(quán)，另一方面質(zhì)押部分股權(quán)價(jià)值波動(dòng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移給了銀行，這樣就很可能給上市公司帶來風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此，本文以股權(quán)質(zhì)押為切入點(diǎn)，對YH公司的大股東行為進(jìn)行研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)YH公司存在的問題并且予以解決。 本文從委托代理理論和信號理論出發(fā)，對大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押前后的利益侵占成本進(jìn)行分析，，發(fā)現(xiàn)股權(quán)質(zhì)押會(huì)使大股東的利益侵占成本在一定條件下降低，從而很可能誘使大股東加劇對上市公司的利益侵占，或者成為大股東加劇利益侵占行為時(shí)轉(zhuǎn)嫁成本的有力手段。基于上述理論分析，本文以YH公司為研究對象，分析了YH公司大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押前后的利益侵占成本，然后從關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保、關(guān)聯(lián)交易和大股東非經(jīng)營性占款三個(gè)角度，就YH公司大股東XT集團(tuán)公司在股權(quán)質(zhì)押前后對上市公司的利益侵占程度進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的探討和分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)YH公司大股東的股權(quán)質(zhì)押行為能降低他的利益侵占成本，并且在股權(quán)質(zhì)押之后大股東顯著加大了對YH公司的利益侵占程度。接著，本文分析了YH公司大股東XT集團(tuán)公司利益侵占行為得以加劇的原因，即YH公司目前存在的相關(guān)問題，最后從充分重視YH公司大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押行為、完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、完善內(nèi)部控制制度和加大信息披露范圍四個(gè)方面為YH公司如何制約大股東加劇利益侵占這一行為提出了建議。
[Abstract]:In the case of high concentration of ownership, the focus of the research on corporate governance has shifted from the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers to that of large shareholders. Due to the high concentration of equity, large shareholders can use their control rights to encroach on the interests of listed companies and bring losses to listed companies, so it is of great significance to study the behavior of large shareholders of listed companies. Among the listed companies in China, equity pledge has become one of the most important financing behaviors of major shareholders. In 2011, 1620 cases of A shares were pledged, and in 2012 2014 cases of A shares were pledged. After the pledge, the majority shareholders still hold the control of the listed company on the one hand, and on the other hand, the risk of the fluctuation of the equity value of the pledge is transferred to the bank, which is likely to bring risks to the listed company. Therefore, this paper studies the behavior of large shareholders of YH Company and finds out the problems existing in YH Company and solves the problem. Based on the principal-agent theory and signal theory, this paper analyzes the cost of interest usurpation before and after the pledge of major shareholders' shares, and finds that the cost of interest usurpation of large shareholders will be reduced under certain conditions. Therefore, it is possible to induce the large shareholders to intensify the interest encroachment on the listed company, or to become a powerful means to pass on the cost when the large shareholder intensifies the behavior of interest encroachment. Based on the above theoretical analysis, this paper takes YH Company as the research object, analyzes the cost of interest encroachment before and after the pledge of large shareholders' equity in YH Company, and then from the three angles of related party guarantee, related party transaction and large shareholders' non-operating funds. This paper makes a detailed discussion and analysis on the extent of interest encroachment on listed companies by XT Group Company, a major shareholder of YH Company, before and after the stock pledge. It is found that the stock rights pledge behavior of the major shareholders of YH Company can reduce its cost of interest encroachment. And after the equity pledge, the major shareholders significantly increased the degree of interest encroachment on YH Company. Then, this paper analyzes the reasons why the behavior of interest encroachment on the large shareholders of YH Company XT Group has been aggravated, that is, the related problems existing in YH Company at present, and finally, from paying full attention to the pledge behavior of the major shareholders of YH Company, perfecting the corporate governance structure. Four aspects of perfecting the internal control system and increasing the scope of information disclosure provide suggestions on how to restrict the behavior of the major shareholders to aggravate the encroachment on the interests of YH Company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.72;F832.51;F406.7
[Abstract]:In the case of high concentration of ownership, the focus of the research on corporate governance has shifted from the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers to that of large shareholders. Due to the high concentration of equity, large shareholders can use their control rights to encroach on the interests of listed companies and bring losses to listed companies, so it is of great significance to study the behavior of large shareholders of listed companies. Among the listed companies in China, equity pledge has become one of the most important financing behaviors of major shareholders. In 2011, 1620 cases of A shares were pledged, and in 2012 2014 cases of A shares were pledged. After the pledge, the majority shareholders still hold the control of the listed company on the one hand, and on the other hand, the risk of the fluctuation of the equity value of the pledge is transferred to the bank, which is likely to bring risks to the listed company. Therefore, this paper studies the behavior of large shareholders of YH Company and finds out the problems existing in YH Company and solves the problem. Based on the principal-agent theory and signal theory, this paper analyzes the cost of interest usurpation before and after the pledge of major shareholders' shares, and finds that the cost of interest usurpation of large shareholders will be reduced under certain conditions. Therefore, it is possible to induce the large shareholders to intensify the interest encroachment on the listed company, or to become a powerful means to pass on the cost when the large shareholder intensifies the behavior of interest encroachment. Based on the above theoretical analysis, this paper takes YH Company as the research object, analyzes the cost of interest encroachment before and after the pledge of large shareholders' equity in YH Company, and then from the three angles of related party guarantee, related party transaction and large shareholders' non-operating funds. This paper makes a detailed discussion and analysis on the extent of interest encroachment on listed companies by XT Group Company, a major shareholder of YH Company, before and after the stock pledge. It is found that the stock rights pledge behavior of the major shareholders of YH Company can reduce its cost of interest encroachment. And after the equity pledge, the major shareholders significantly increased the degree of interest encroachment on YH Company. Then, this paper analyzes the reasons why the behavior of interest encroachment on the large shareholders of YH Company XT Group has been aggravated, that is, the related problems existing in YH Company at present, and finally, from paying full attention to the pledge behavior of the major shareholders of YH Company, perfecting the corporate governance structure. Four aspects of perfecting the internal control system and increasing the scope of information disclosure provide suggestions on how to restrict the behavior of the major shareholders to aggravate the encroachment on the interests of YH Company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.72;F832.51;F406.7
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 王茜;張鳴;;基于經(jīng)濟(jì)波動(dòng)的控股股東與股利政策關(guān)系研究——來自中國證券市場的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2009年12期
2 陳亞東,田s
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