京津冀機場協(xié)作機制構建
發(fā)布時間:2018-12-12 21:26
【摘要】:民航“十二五”規(guī)劃提出,十二五期間,京津冀地區(qū)將興建首都第二機場、衡水機場、張家口機場以及承德機場,地區(qū)內機場的密度將大大增加。通過數(shù)據(jù)分析可知,雖然首都機場目前已趨于飽和,但是,地區(qū)內其他機場普遍業(yè)務不足,無法實現(xiàn)機場規(guī)模經(jīng)濟,導致區(qū)域內機場持續(xù)虧損。同時,由于京津冀地區(qū)內機場距離較近,業(yè)務趨同度大,導致機場間低水平競爭激烈,不利于地區(qū)內整個民航運輸業(yè)的良性發(fā)展。如果進一步增加機場密度,上述情況將進一步惡化,因此建立京津冀機場間的協(xié)作機制,實現(xiàn)錯位經(jīng)營,尤為重要。 本文在分析京津冀機場運營環(huán)境和運營現(xiàn)狀以及機場運營特征的基礎之上,設計了機場收益函數(shù)和博弈的策略組合,建立了完全信息靜態(tài)博弈結構及其重復博弈模型,求解了重復博弈納什均衡及其均衡條件,提出了實現(xiàn)機場協(xié)作的變量取值范圍,,并設計相應的政策機制。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),京津冀機場業(yè)務分布不均,航線重疊率較高;業(yè)務飽和度較高的首都機場經(jīng)營業(yè)績不佳,實現(xiàn)京津冀機場的業(yè)務整合尤為必要。然而,當前機場所在當?shù)卣雠_了許多機場擴建規(guī)劃,依據(jù)博弈模型分析可知,這將加劇機場間的惡性競爭,將機場發(fā)展推向“囚徒困境”。本文所建立的重復博弈模型及其分析結果顯示出,地方政府對機場的負補貼導致協(xié)作的概率下降,旅客對舒適度的敏感性越強,單位航線邊際收益越高,協(xié)作概率越大。由此可見,減少地方政府對機場運營的行政干預,減少區(qū)域的機場密度有利于三地機場協(xié)作。
[Abstract]:According to the 12th Five-Year Plan of Civil Aviation, the Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei regions will build the capital second airport, Hengshui airport, Zhangjiakou airport and Chengde airport during the 12th Five-Year Plan period. The density of airports in the region will increase greatly. Through the data analysis, although the capital airport has been saturated, but other airports in the region are generally inadequate business, unable to realize the airport economies of scale, resulting in regional airports continue to lose money. At the same time, due to the proximity of the airports in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the large degree of business convergence, the low level competition among the airports is fierce, which is not conducive to the healthy development of the entire civil aviation transportation industry in the region. If the airport density is further increased, the above situation will be further aggravated, so it is particularly important to establish a cooperative mechanism between Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei airports and to realize dislocation management. Based on the analysis of the operating environment and operation status of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei airport and the characteristics of airport operation, this paper designs the airport income function and the strategy combination of the game, and establishes the static game structure of complete information and its repeated game model. The Nash equilibrium and its equilibrium conditions of repeated game are solved, and the range of variables to realize airport cooperation is proposed, and the corresponding policy mechanism is designed. It is found that the business distribution of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei airport is uneven, the overlap rate of routes is high, and the business performance of the capital airport with high business saturation is not good, so it is necessary to realize the business integration of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei airport. However, the local government has issued a lot of airport expansion plans. According to the game model analysis, this will aggravate the vicious competition among airports and push the airport development to the "prisoner's dilemma". The repeated game model established in this paper and its analysis results show that the negative subsidy of the local government to the airport leads to the decrease of the probability of cooperation. The stronger the sensitivity of passengers to comfort, the higher the marginal income per unit route and the greater the probability of cooperation. It can be seen that reducing the administrative intervention of the local government to the airport operation and reducing the regional airport density are beneficial to the cooperation of the three airports.
【學位授予單位】:河北工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2012
【分類號】:F562.6;F224
本文編號:2375270
[Abstract]:According to the 12th Five-Year Plan of Civil Aviation, the Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei regions will build the capital second airport, Hengshui airport, Zhangjiakou airport and Chengde airport during the 12th Five-Year Plan period. The density of airports in the region will increase greatly. Through the data analysis, although the capital airport has been saturated, but other airports in the region are generally inadequate business, unable to realize the airport economies of scale, resulting in regional airports continue to lose money. At the same time, due to the proximity of the airports in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the large degree of business convergence, the low level competition among the airports is fierce, which is not conducive to the healthy development of the entire civil aviation transportation industry in the region. If the airport density is further increased, the above situation will be further aggravated, so it is particularly important to establish a cooperative mechanism between Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei airports and to realize dislocation management. Based on the analysis of the operating environment and operation status of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei airport and the characteristics of airport operation, this paper designs the airport income function and the strategy combination of the game, and establishes the static game structure of complete information and its repeated game model. The Nash equilibrium and its equilibrium conditions of repeated game are solved, and the range of variables to realize airport cooperation is proposed, and the corresponding policy mechanism is designed. It is found that the business distribution of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei airport is uneven, the overlap rate of routes is high, and the business performance of the capital airport with high business saturation is not good, so it is necessary to realize the business integration of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei airport. However, the local government has issued a lot of airport expansion plans. According to the game model analysis, this will aggravate the vicious competition among airports and push the airport development to the "prisoner's dilemma". The repeated game model established in this paper and its analysis results show that the negative subsidy of the local government to the airport leads to the decrease of the probability of cooperation. The stronger the sensitivity of passengers to comfort, the higher the marginal income per unit route and the greater the probability of cooperation. It can be seen that reducing the administrative intervention of the local government to the airport operation and reducing the regional airport density are beneficial to the cooperation of the three airports.
【學位授予單位】:河北工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2012
【分類號】:F562.6;F224
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