基于制衡機(jī)制的城市交通企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)優(yōu)化研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-07 18:57
【摘要】：進(jìn)入后股權(quán)分置時(shí)代，我國(guó)公司治理水平不斷提高，2011年公司治理指數(shù)已達(dá)60.28的最高水平。作為公司治理的重要組成部分，股東治理行為的研究成為實(shí)務(wù)界和學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)。隨著大股東數(shù)量的增多和中小股東參與程度的提高，越來越多的學(xué)者開始關(guān)注大股東之間的監(jiān)督制衡機(jī)制，于是股權(quán)制衡機(jī)制的建立成為提高企業(yè)績(jī)效水平和保護(hù)中小股東權(quán)益的重要手段。按照我國(guó)《交通運(yùn)輸“十二五”發(fā)展規(guī)劃》的戰(zhàn)略部署，未來五年交通企業(yè)將迎來一個(gè)“適度超前”發(fā)展的黃金時(shí)期。為順應(yīng)投資規(guī)模擴(kuò)大和融資體制改革的總體趨勢(shì)，交通企業(yè)應(yīng)逐步建立大股東之間的制衡監(jiān)督機(jī)制，提高企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理效率和價(jià)值績(jī)效水平。 鑒于此，本文在回顧股權(quán)制衡、公司治理等相關(guān)理論及國(guó)內(nèi)外研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上，立足于我國(guó)城市交通企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀，針對(duì)大股東的合謀與監(jiān)督行為進(jìn)行博弈分析，初步得出股權(quán)制衡機(jī)制有利于提高企業(yè)價(jià)值績(jī)效水平的結(jié)論。為進(jìn)一步研究股權(quán)制衡各主要變量對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值的影響，本文以2007年至2010年滬深兩市所有城市交通類上市公司為樣本，選取了主變量總資產(chǎn)收益率（ROA）和輔助變量?jī)糍Y產(chǎn)收益率（ROE）作為價(jià)值績(jī)效指標(biāo)，通過描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、多元線性回歸以及相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)，驗(yàn)證本文關(guān)于股權(quán)制衡度、第一大股東持股比例、股權(quán)均衡度、前兩大股東持股差異及股東性質(zhì)等變量與企業(yè)價(jià)值績(jī)效變量之間相關(guān)性的假設(shè)是否成立。 本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在城市交通行業(yè)中，股權(quán)制衡類企業(yè)績(jī)效好于股權(quán)集中類企業(yè)，股權(quán)集中類企業(yè)績(jī)效又好于股權(quán)分散類企業(yè)。同時(shí)，企業(yè)股權(quán)制衡度對(duì)價(jià)值績(jī)效水平有明顯的正相關(guān)作用。前五大股東的股權(quán)分布越是均衡，企業(yè)價(jià)值水平就越高。第一大股東持股比例的適當(dāng)降低可以促進(jìn)企業(yè)價(jià)值績(jī)效水平的提升。當(dāng)前兩位大股東的性質(zhì)一致時(shí)，企業(yè)價(jià)值績(jī)效的表現(xiàn)要優(yōu)于其不一致時(shí)。然而，前兩位大股東的持股差距對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值績(jī)效沒有表現(xiàn)出顯著影響。 結(jié)合實(shí)證結(jié)果，本文提出優(yōu)化我國(guó)交通行業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的對(duì)策建議，認(rèn)為實(shí)踐中應(yīng)當(dāng)從政府、企業(yè)和股東三個(gè)層面考慮建立股權(quán)制衡機(jī)制。監(jiān)督和制衡行為的實(shí)施，不僅要有效制約大股東的侵權(quán)行為，保護(hù)中小股東權(quán)益和企業(yè)整體利益不受侵害，，而且要實(shí)現(xiàn)交通行業(yè)治理水平的提升、投融資體制的改革以及政策法規(guī)的完善。股權(quán)制衡機(jī)制的建立和完善能夠使交通企業(yè)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)朝著更加科學(xué)合理的方向發(fā)展，最終促進(jìn)交通行業(yè)“十二五”戰(zhàn)略發(fā)展目標(biāo)的順利實(shí)現(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:After entering the period of split share ownership, the level of corporate governance in our country has been improved continuously, and the corporate governance index has reached the highest level of 60.28 in 2011. As an important part of corporate governance, the research of shareholder governance has become a hot spot in practice and academia. With the increase of the number of large shareholders and the increase of participation of small and medium shareholders, more and more scholars begin to pay attention to the mechanism of supervision and balance between large shareholders. Therefore, the establishment of equity balance mechanism has become an important means to improve the performance of enterprises and protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders. According to the strategic arrangement of "the 12th Five-Year Plan", the transportation enterprises will usher in a golden period of "moderately advanced" development in the next five years. In order to conform to the general trend of the expansion of investment scale and the reform of financing system, traffic enterprises should gradually establish a mechanism of checks and balances between major shareholders to improve the efficiency of management and the level of value performance of enterprises. In view of this, on the basis of reviewing the relevant theories of equity balance, corporate governance and domestic and foreign research results, based on the present situation of stock ownership structure of urban transportation enterprises in China, this paper analyzes the collusion and supervision behavior of large shareholders by game theory. The conclusion that equity balance mechanism is helpful to improve enterprise value performance level. In order to further study the influence of the main variables of equity balance on the enterprise value, this paper takes all the urban transportation listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2010 as samples. The main variable total return of assets (ROA) and the auxiliary variable (ROE) are selected as value performance indicators. Through descriptive statistics, multivariate linear regression and correlation test, the paper verifies the equity balance degree in this paper. Whether the hypothesis of the correlation between the first shareholder's shareholding ratio, the equity equilibrium degree, the first two major shareholders' shareholding differences and the shareholder's nature and the enterprise value performance variable is true or not. This paper finds that in the urban transportation industry, the performance of equity balance enterprises is better than that of concentrated equity enterprises, and the performance of equity centralization enterprises is better than that of decentralized equity enterprises. At the same time, the degree of equity balance has a significant positive correlation to the level of value performance. The more balanced the equity distribution of the top five shareholders, the higher the level of enterprise value. A proper reduction in the proportion of the first largest shareholder can promote the improvement of the enterprise value performance level. When the nature of the two major shareholders is the same, the performance of enterprise value performance is better than its inconsistent performance. However, the stock holding gap between the first two major shareholders has no significant impact on corporate value performance. Combined with the empirical results, this paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to optimize the ownership structure of China's transportation industry, and holds that the equity balance mechanism should be considered in practice from three aspects: government, enterprise and shareholders. The implementation of supervision and checks and balances should not only effectively restrict the infringement of major shareholders, protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and the overall interests of enterprises, but also improve the level of governance in the transportation industry. The reform of investment and financing system and the perfection of policies and regulations. The establishment and perfection of equity balance mechanism can make the ownership structure of transportation enterprises develop in a more scientific and reasonable direction, and finally promote the smooth realization of the strategic development goal of the 12th Five-Year Plan of the transportation industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F572;F276.6;F224.32
本文編號(hào)：2317284
[Abstract]:After entering the period of split share ownership, the level of corporate governance in our country has been improved continuously, and the corporate governance index has reached the highest level of 60.28 in 2011. As an important part of corporate governance, the research of shareholder governance has become a hot spot in practice and academia. With the increase of the number of large shareholders and the increase of participation of small and medium shareholders, more and more scholars begin to pay attention to the mechanism of supervision and balance between large shareholders. Therefore, the establishment of equity balance mechanism has become an important means to improve the performance of enterprises and protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders. According to the strategic arrangement of "the 12th Five-Year Plan", the transportation enterprises will usher in a golden period of "moderately advanced" development in the next five years. In order to conform to the general trend of the expansion of investment scale and the reform of financing system, traffic enterprises should gradually establish a mechanism of checks and balances between major shareholders to improve the efficiency of management and the level of value performance of enterprises. In view of this, on the basis of reviewing the relevant theories of equity balance, corporate governance and domestic and foreign research results, based on the present situation of stock ownership structure of urban transportation enterprises in China, this paper analyzes the collusion and supervision behavior of large shareholders by game theory. The conclusion that equity balance mechanism is helpful to improve enterprise value performance level. In order to further study the influence of the main variables of equity balance on the enterprise value, this paper takes all the urban transportation listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2010 as samples. The main variable total return of assets (ROA) and the auxiliary variable (ROE) are selected as value performance indicators. Through descriptive statistics, multivariate linear regression and correlation test, the paper verifies the equity balance degree in this paper. Whether the hypothesis of the correlation between the first shareholder's shareholding ratio, the equity equilibrium degree, the first two major shareholders' shareholding differences and the shareholder's nature and the enterprise value performance variable is true or not. This paper finds that in the urban transportation industry, the performance of equity balance enterprises is better than that of concentrated equity enterprises, and the performance of equity centralization enterprises is better than that of decentralized equity enterprises. At the same time, the degree of equity balance has a significant positive correlation to the level of value performance. The more balanced the equity distribution of the top five shareholders, the higher the level of enterprise value. A proper reduction in the proportion of the first largest shareholder can promote the improvement of the enterprise value performance level. When the nature of the two major shareholders is the same, the performance of enterprise value performance is better than its inconsistent performance. However, the stock holding gap between the first two major shareholders has no significant impact on corporate value performance. Combined with the empirical results, this paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to optimize the ownership structure of China's transportation industry, and holds that the equity balance mechanism should be considered in practice from three aspects: government, enterprise and shareholders. The implementation of supervision and checks and balances should not only effectively restrict the infringement of major shareholders, protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and the overall interests of enterprises, but also improve the level of governance in the transportation industry. The reform of investment and financing system and the perfection of policies and regulations. The establishment and perfection of equity balance mechanism can make the ownership structure of transportation enterprises develop in a more scientific and reasonable direction, and finally promote the smooth realization of the strategic development goal of the 12th Five-Year Plan of the transportation industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F572;F276.6;F224.32
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 王俊秋;;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、隧道挖掘與公司價(jià)值的實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊(學(xué)術(shù)版);2006年08期
2 鄧怡;鄭循剛;;基于博弈論的股權(quán)制衡模型研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2010年26期
3 晏艷陽,劉振坤;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)的影響:假定與實(shí)證[J];財(cái)經(jīng)理論與實(shí)踐;2004年02期
4 張光榮;曾勇;;股權(quán)制衡可以改善公司治理嗎——基于公平與效率視角的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2008年08期
5 吳淑琨;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效的U型關(guān)系研究——1997～2000年上市公司的實(shí)證研究[J];中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2002年01期
6 馮根福,閆冰;公司股權(quán)的“市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)”類型與股東治理行為[J];中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2004年06期
7 鄧建平;曾勇;李金諾;;最終控制、權(quán)力制衡和公司價(jià)值研究[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2006年03期
8 安靈;劉星;白藝昕;;股權(quán)制衡、終極所有權(quán)性質(zhì)與上市企業(yè)非效率投資[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2008年02期
9 孫兆斌;;股權(quán)集中、股權(quán)制衡與上市公司的技術(shù)效率[J];管理世界;2006年07期
10 中山大學(xué)管理學(xué)院課題組;辛宇;徐莉萍;蔡祥;;控股股東性質(zhì)與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)安排——來自珠江三角洲地區(qū)非上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];管理世界;2008年06期
相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 劉偉;我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)制衡治理效果研究[D];重慶大學(xué);2008年
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前3條
1 張曉倩;我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)制衡與公司價(jià)值研究[D];湖南大學(xué);2006年
2 杜丹陽;我國(guó)銀行上市公司股權(quán)制衡研究[D];山東大學(xué);2009年
3 倪悅;合資鐵路公司股權(quán)制衡機(jī)制研究[D];北京交通大學(xué);2010年
本文編號(hào)：2317284
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/jtysjj/2317284.html
最近更新
教材專著
