網(wǎng)約車沖擊下打車公司策略選擇與社會福利分析
發(fā)布時間：2018-10-08 07:34
【摘要】：在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)日新月異發(fā)展的今天,隨著智能手機的普及,如“滴滴出行”、“易到用車”等新興網(wǎng)約車軟件也順應(yīng)科技潮流迅速興起。隨著網(wǎng)約車的飛速發(fā)展,傳統(tǒng)出租車公司的運營及政府對打車公司的監(jiān)管也受到了巨大的沖擊,本文主要研究在網(wǎng)約車的沖擊下所引起的打車公司的策略選擇及相應(yīng)的社會福利分析,并使用規(guī)范的經(jīng)濟學(xué)分析方法探尋其背后蘊含的邏輯。分析的主要結(jié)果為:(1)在網(wǎng)約車未進入打車市場時,傳統(tǒng)出租車公司形成壟斷,出租車公司將打車價格定為消費者搭車的固定效用,攫取了全部的消費者剩余,并收取司機的全部收入,從而使自身利潤最大化;(2)網(wǎng)約車進入市場初期,采取低價格、高補貼的策略來搶奪打車市場,吸引了大量的客戶及司機進入網(wǎng)約車市場。在這一階段,由于網(wǎng)約車公司制定的打車價格低于出租車公司,且對司機的抽成比例也較低,使乘坐網(wǎng)約車的消費者福利與網(wǎng)約車司機的收入得到增加;(3)當(dāng)網(wǎng)約車公司已經(jīng)吸引到足夠多的客戶群體后,采取漲價的混同價格策略,比進入市場時直接采用混同價格策略的利潤要大,故而網(wǎng)約車公司進入市場的首要目標就是要掠奪市場;(4)網(wǎng)約車公司實施漲價的混同價格策略后,與出租車原始的壟斷定價相等,市場中的利潤也與傳統(tǒng)出租車公司壟斷市場時相等,只是在網(wǎng)約車公司與出租車公司之間進行瓜分而己。打車價格回復(fù)到壟斷市場時的價格,網(wǎng)約車公司對司機進行完全抽成,出租車公司也將司機的收入全部攫取,消費者福利與司機利潤受到損害;(5)在面對網(wǎng)約車的沖擊時,出租車公司長久以來的壟斷已經(jīng)不能再繼續(xù),客戶群體的流失,使得繼續(xù)定制壟斷價格無利可圖,出租車公司有降低打車價格跟隨網(wǎng)約車公司定價的激勵。本文的創(chuàng)新點:(1)研究視角上的改進:本文從傳統(tǒng)出租車公司與網(wǎng)約車公司兩者之間互相競爭的關(guān)系著手,探討了新進入市場的網(wǎng)約車對傳統(tǒng)出租車公司的沖擊及它們之間博弈的經(jīng)濟邏輯;(2)分析工具上的改進:本文運用了規(guī)范的經(jīng)濟學(xué)博弈模型,試圖尋找網(wǎng)約車與傳統(tǒng)出租車公司之間的競爭均衡點。根據(jù)上述研究結(jié)果,提出主要建議:(1)逐步放開傳統(tǒng)出租車的總量和價格管控,將由政府管控逐步向市場自主調(diào)節(jié)過渡;(2)各地對網(wǎng)約車的限制過多,應(yīng)放松管制,從而讓網(wǎng)約車與出租車之間能更好的競爭。隨著市場經(jīng)濟的深化發(fā)展,政府更多是應(yīng)該放權(quán)于市場,讓市場能夠自由競爭,從而進一步實現(xiàn)資源的有效配置。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet technology, with the popularity of smart phones, such as "DiDi", "easy to get cars" and other new network ride-sharing software is also in line with the rapid rise of science and technology. With the rapid development of Internet ride-sharing, the operation of traditional taxi companies and the government's regulation of taxi hailing companies have also been greatly impacted. This paper mainly studies the strategy choice and the corresponding social welfare analysis of the ride-hailing company caused by the impact of the network ride-hailing, and uses the normative economic analysis method to explore the logic behind the ride-hailing company. The main results are as follows: (1) when ride-hailing is not in the market, the traditional taxi companies form a monopoly, and the taxi companies determine the fixed utility of ride-hailing, and grab all the rest of the consumers. And collect all the income of drivers, so as to maximize their own profits; (2) the early stage of the market, take low prices, high subsidy strategy to seize the taxi market, attracted a large number of customers and drivers into the market. At this stage, because the ride-hailing company set a lower price than the taxi company, and the proportion of drivers is also lower, Increased consumer welfare and income for ride-sharing drivers; (3) when ride-hailing companies have attracted enough customers, they have adopted a mix of price increases. It is more profitable than when entering the market by adopting the mixed price strategy directly. Therefore, the primary goal of the net car-hailing company to enter the market is to plunder the market. (4) after the implementation of the mixed pricing strategy of the net car-hailing company, The profit in the market is equal to that of the traditional taxi company when the taxi company monopolizes the market. It is only shared between the taxi company and the taxi company. The taxi price returned to the price at which the market was monopolized. The ride-hailing company completely pumped out the driver, and the taxi company also grabbed the driver's income completely. Consumer welfare and the driver's profit were damaged. (5) in the face of the impact of the ride-sharing network, The long monopoly of taxi companies can no longer continue, the loss of customers, making it unprofitable to continue to customize monopoly prices, taxi companies have the incentive to reduce the price of ride-hailing companies. The innovations of this paper are as follows: (1) the improvement of the research perspective: this paper starts with the competitive relationship between the traditional taxi companies and the ride-sharing companies. This paper discusses the impact of the new entering market on the traditional taxi companies and the economic logic of the game between them. (2) the improvement of the analysis tools: this paper uses the normative economic game model, This paper tries to find a competitive equilibrium point between ride-sharing and traditional taxi companies. Based on the results of the above study, the following suggestions are put forward: (1) gradually liberalizing the total amount and price control of traditional taxis will be gradually transferred from government control to market autonomy; (2) there are too many restrictions on ride-sharing in various places, so the regulations should be relaxed. So that the network can be better competition between car and taxi. With the deepening development of the market economy, the government should devolve more power to the market so that the market can compete freely, so as to realize the effective allocation of resources.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F572.6;F724.6
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet technology, with the popularity of smart phones, such as "DiDi", "easy to get cars" and other new network ride-sharing software is also in line with the rapid rise of science and technology. With the rapid development of Internet ride-sharing, the operation of traditional taxi companies and the government's regulation of taxi hailing companies have also been greatly impacted. This paper mainly studies the strategy choice and the corresponding social welfare analysis of the ride-hailing company caused by the impact of the network ride-hailing, and uses the normative economic analysis method to explore the logic behind the ride-hailing company. The main results are as follows: (1) when ride-hailing is not in the market, the traditional taxi companies form a monopoly, and the taxi companies determine the fixed utility of ride-hailing, and grab all the rest of the consumers. And collect all the income of drivers, so as to maximize their own profits; (2) the early stage of the market, take low prices, high subsidy strategy to seize the taxi market, attracted a large number of customers and drivers into the market. At this stage, because the ride-hailing company set a lower price than the taxi company, and the proportion of drivers is also lower, Increased consumer welfare and income for ride-sharing drivers; (3) when ride-hailing companies have attracted enough customers, they have adopted a mix of price increases. It is more profitable than when entering the market by adopting the mixed price strategy directly. Therefore, the primary goal of the net car-hailing company to enter the market is to plunder the market. (4) after the implementation of the mixed pricing strategy of the net car-hailing company, The profit in the market is equal to that of the traditional taxi company when the taxi company monopolizes the market. It is only shared between the taxi company and the taxi company. The taxi price returned to the price at which the market was monopolized. The ride-hailing company completely pumped out the driver, and the taxi company also grabbed the driver's income completely. Consumer welfare and the driver's profit were damaged. (5) in the face of the impact of the ride-sharing network, The long monopoly of taxi companies can no longer continue, the loss of customers, making it unprofitable to continue to customize monopoly prices, taxi companies have the incentive to reduce the price of ride-hailing companies. The innovations of this paper are as follows: (1) the improvement of the research perspective: this paper starts with the competitive relationship between the traditional taxi companies and the ride-sharing companies. This paper discusses the impact of the new entering market on the traditional taxi companies and the economic logic of the game between them. (2) the improvement of the analysis tools: this paper uses the normative economic game model, This paper tries to find a competitive equilibrium point between ride-sharing and traditional taxi companies. Based on the results of the above study, the following suggestions are put forward: (1) gradually liberalizing the total amount and price control of traditional taxis will be gradually transferred from government control to market autonomy; (2) there are too many restrictions on ride-sharing in various places, so the regulations should be relaxed. So that the network can be better competition between car and taxi. With the deepening development of the market economy, the government should devolve more power to the market so that the market can compete freely, so as to realize the effective allocation of resources.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F572.6;F724.6
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8 于左;高s，
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