客專公司委托運(yùn)輸管理模式下交易價(jià)格研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-17 07:15
【摘要】：摘要：為了緩解我國(guó)運(yùn)能緊張和滿足旅客運(yùn)輸快速增長(zhǎng)的需求,國(guó)務(wù)院通過了《中長(zhǎng)期鐵路網(wǎng)規(guī)劃》,進(jìn)行了大規(guī)�？瓦\(yùn)專線建設(shè)。目前京滬、哈大、鄭西、滬寧、石太等客運(yùn)專線已經(jīng)投入運(yùn)營(yíng),進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大了路網(wǎng)覆蓋面和完善了我國(guó)綜合交通運(yùn)輸體系,促進(jìn)了相關(guān)地區(qū)間的交流�？瓦\(yùn)專線建成后需要快速投入運(yùn)營(yíng),產(chǎn)生經(jīng)濟(jì)效益以滿足投資者的投資需求,多數(shù)客運(yùn)專線均采取委托運(yùn)輸管理的模式。隨著委托運(yùn)輸管理模式的采用,在具體的實(shí)踐過程中存在提供服務(wù)項(xiàng)目和價(jià)格的不確定性,從而引發(fā)客專公司與鐵路局之間矛盾與沖突問題。因此,本文將研究客專公司委托運(yùn)輸管理模式下的交易價(jià)格,該研究不僅有利于解決現(xiàn)實(shí)中客運(yùn)專線委托運(yùn)輸產(chǎn)生的矛盾與沖突,而且對(duì)于客專公司相關(guān)成本控制具有一定的借鑒意義,對(duì)于日后采取委托運(yùn)輸管理模式的客專公司委托運(yùn)輸交易價(jià)格的確定提供理論基礎(chǔ)。 本文基于委托代理理論、利益相關(guān)者理論對(duì)客專公司委托運(yùn)輸管理的委托代理問題,及委托交易價(jià)格的利益相關(guān)者進(jìn)行了深入分析,通過借鑒海外鐵路運(yùn)營(yíng)及管理的成功經(jīng)驗(yàn),提出委托運(yùn)輸交易價(jià)格理論模型及交易價(jià)格的實(shí)現(xiàn)條件。 首先,從委托代理理論角度出發(fā),由于信息不對(duì)稱的存在,客專公司和鐵路局主要利益需求的不同,進(jìn)而產(chǎn)生委托代理問題,客專公司可以實(shí)施有效的激勵(lì)機(jī)制來解決委托代理中的代理問題。從利益相關(guān)者理論角度出發(fā),委托運(yùn)輸交易價(jià)格主要的利益相關(guān)者包括客專公司(委托方)、鐵路局(受托方)、中國(guó)鐵路總公司(原鐵道部)、政府(即交通部)以及客專公司的其他社會(huì)股東。這些利益相關(guān)者的利益需求在一定程度上可以影響委托運(yùn)輸交易價(jià)格的確定。 其次,本文經(jīng)過理論分析及借鑒海外國(guó)家與地區(qū)的經(jīng)驗(yàn),提出客運(yùn)專線委托運(yùn)輸交易價(jià)格是以客運(yùn)專線委托運(yùn)輸運(yùn)營(yíng)成本為基礎(chǔ),同時(shí)考慮中國(guó)鐵路總公司(原鐵道部)及客專公司民營(yíng)資本股東的利益需求,以保證鐵路建設(shè)和運(yùn)營(yíng)對(duì)民營(yíng)資本的吸引力來確定。根據(jù)此原則,構(gòu)建出了交易價(jià)格的理論模型,并分析了具體的實(shí)現(xiàn)條件。該研究的過程和結(jié)果將為中國(guó)鐵路順利引入社會(huì)資本和客專公司的發(fā)展及客運(yùn)專線的運(yùn)營(yíng)提供有力支撐。
[Abstract]:Abstract: in order to alleviate the shortage of transportation capacity and meet the demand of rapid growth of passenger transportation, the State Council adopted the medium and long term Railway Network Plan and carried out the large-scale passenger dedicated line construction. At present, Beijing-Shanghai, Hada, Zheng Xi, Huning, Shitai and other passenger dedicated lines have been put into operation, which has further expanded the coverage of the road network, improved the comprehensive transportation system of our country, and promoted the exchange between the relevant regions. After the completion of passenger dedicated line, it is necessary to put it into operation quickly and produce economic benefits to meet the investment needs of investors. Most passenger dedicated lines adopt the mode of entrusted transportation management. With the adoption of the entrusted transportation management mode, the uncertainty of service items and price in the concrete practice process leads to the contradiction and conflict between the company and the railway bureau. Therefore, this paper will study the transaction price under the mode of commissioned transport management, which is not only helpful to solve the contradictions and conflicts caused by commissioned transport of passenger dedicated lines in reality. Moreover, it has certain reference significance for the related cost control of the customer specialized company, and provides the theoretical basis for the pricing of the entrusted transport transaction of the customer specialized company that adopts the entrusted transportation management mode in the future. Based on the principal-agent theory and stakeholder theory, this paper analyzes the principal-agent problem of the entrusted transportation management of the customer specialized company and the stakeholders of the entrusted transaction price, and draws lessons from the successful experience of overseas railway operation and management. This paper puts forward the theoretical model of entrusted transport transaction price and the condition of realizing the transaction price. First of all, from the perspective of principal-agent theory, due to the existence of asymmetric information, the difference between the main interests needs of the customer specific company and the railway bureau, and then produce the principal-agent problem. Customer-specific companies can implement an effective incentive mechanism to solve the agency problem in principal-agent. From the perspective of stakeholder theory, The major stakeholders in the entrusted transport transaction price include the customer only Company, the Railway Administration, the China Railway Corporation (formerly the Ministry of Railways), the Government (that is, the Ministry of Communications), and other social shareholders of the customer only Company. The interest demand of these stakeholders can influence the pricing of entrusted transport transaction to some extent. Secondly, based on the theoretical analysis and the experience of overseas countries and regions, the paper puts forward that the transaction price of commission transportation of passenger dedicated line is based on the operating cost of commissioned transportation of passenger dedicated line. In order to ensure the attraction of railway construction and operation to private capital, the interests of private capital shareholders of China Railway Corporation (formerly the Ministry of Railways) and the special passenger company are taken into account in order to ensure the attraction of railway construction and operation to private capital. According to this principle, the theoretical model of transaction price is constructed, and the realization conditions are analyzed. The process and results of the study will provide a strong support for the development of the Chinese railway to introduce social capital and passenger dedicated companies and the operation of passenger dedicated lines.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F532.5
本文編號(hào)：2245129
[Abstract]:Abstract: in order to alleviate the shortage of transportation capacity and meet the demand of rapid growth of passenger transportation, the State Council adopted the medium and long term Railway Network Plan and carried out the large-scale passenger dedicated line construction. At present, Beijing-Shanghai, Hada, Zheng Xi, Huning, Shitai and other passenger dedicated lines have been put into operation, which has further expanded the coverage of the road network, improved the comprehensive transportation system of our country, and promoted the exchange between the relevant regions. After the completion of passenger dedicated line, it is necessary to put it into operation quickly and produce economic benefits to meet the investment needs of investors. Most passenger dedicated lines adopt the mode of entrusted transportation management. With the adoption of the entrusted transportation management mode, the uncertainty of service items and price in the concrete practice process leads to the contradiction and conflict between the company and the railway bureau. Therefore, this paper will study the transaction price under the mode of commissioned transport management, which is not only helpful to solve the contradictions and conflicts caused by commissioned transport of passenger dedicated lines in reality. Moreover, it has certain reference significance for the related cost control of the customer specialized company, and provides the theoretical basis for the pricing of the entrusted transport transaction of the customer specialized company that adopts the entrusted transportation management mode in the future. Based on the principal-agent theory and stakeholder theory, this paper analyzes the principal-agent problem of the entrusted transportation management of the customer specialized company and the stakeholders of the entrusted transaction price, and draws lessons from the successful experience of overseas railway operation and management. This paper puts forward the theoretical model of entrusted transport transaction price and the condition of realizing the transaction price. First of all, from the perspective of principal-agent theory, due to the existence of asymmetric information, the difference between the main interests needs of the customer specific company and the railway bureau, and then produce the principal-agent problem. Customer-specific companies can implement an effective incentive mechanism to solve the agency problem in principal-agent. From the perspective of stakeholder theory, The major stakeholders in the entrusted transport transaction price include the customer only Company, the Railway Administration, the China Railway Corporation (formerly the Ministry of Railways), the Government (that is, the Ministry of Communications), and other social shareholders of the customer only Company. The interest demand of these stakeholders can influence the pricing of entrusted transport transaction to some extent. Secondly, based on the theoretical analysis and the experience of overseas countries and regions, the paper puts forward that the transaction price of commission transportation of passenger dedicated line is based on the operating cost of commissioned transportation of passenger dedicated line. In order to ensure the attraction of railway construction and operation to private capital, the interests of private capital shareholders of China Railway Corporation (formerly the Ministry of Railways) and the special passenger company are taken into account in order to ensure the attraction of railway construction and operation to private capital. According to this principle, the theoretical model of transaction price is constructed, and the realization conditions are analyzed. The process and results of the study will provide a strong support for the development of the Chinese railway to introduce social capital and passenger dedicated companies and the operation of passenger dedicated lines.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F532.5
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 宋亮亮;壟斷市場(chǎng)情況下企業(yè)中間產(chǎn)品的內(nèi)部轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)分析[J];科技和產(chǎn)業(yè);2005年07期
2 周明德;李文興;;鐵路客運(yùn)專線運(yùn)輸作業(yè)成本計(jì)算方法[J];管理現(xiàn)代化;2007年06期
3 任勇;李曉光;;委托代理理論:模型、對(duì)策及評(píng)析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問題;2007年07期
4 包秋萍;;論合資鐵路公司委托運(yùn)輸模式下的固定資產(chǎn)管理[J];內(nèi)蒙古科技與經(jīng)濟(jì);2011年05期
5 林志林;;高速鐵路運(yùn)營(yíng)成本的作業(yè)成本法測(cè)算[J];會(huì)計(jì)師;2012年05期
6 邱鎮(zhèn);;關(guān)于提高委托運(yùn)輸資產(chǎn)管理水平的幾點(diǎn)思考[J];科技致富向?qū)?2012年20期
7 李明輝;論轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)政策的選擇[J];山東財(cái)政學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2003年01期
8 張福利;白宇欣;達(dá)慶利;;下游市場(chǎng)存在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的企業(yè)集團(tuán)轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)研究[J];審計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2006年06期
9 李紅昌,林曉言,陳娟;日本新干線建設(shè)管理體制及其對(duì)我國(guó)的啟示[J];數(shù)量經(jīng)濟(jì)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2002年01期
10 楊瑜;王懷相;;高速鐵路運(yùn)輸綜合成本測(cè)算研究[J];鐵道工程學(xué)報(bào);2009年01期
，本文編號(hào)：2245129
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/jtysjj/2245129.html
最近更新
教材專著
