本文選題：高速鐵路 + 民航　； 參考：《中國海洋大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來，隨著中國高速鐵路事業(yè)的迅猛發(fā)展，，高速鐵路在我國的產(chǎn)生和發(fā)展給民眾出行帶來新的選擇的同時，與傳統(tǒng)運輸方式，比如航空運輸?shù)日归_了激烈的市場爭奪戰(zhàn)，并且以其自身優(yōu)勢吸引了相當一部分市場客流，尤其是在中短途距離運輸中表現(xiàn)的極其明顯。2009年3月份，春秋航空公司鄭州至上海航線在與高鐵競爭了17個月后，被迫停飛；武廣高鐵全線后，武漢到宜昌、襄陽以及宜昌到恩施等航線，相繼宣布停飛。但是中國高鐵境況也不容樂觀，至2011年6月份，中國已運營的5條高鐵線虧損嚴重。我國高速鐵路前期投資巨大、各項運營成本持續(xù)走高，又在2011年7月發(fā)生了重大動車追尾事故，我國高速鐵路管理體制與運營體系缺憾由此引起了全社會的關(guān)注。 民航作為中長距離客運的主要運輸方式，經(jīng)過幾十年的發(fā)展已經(jīng)擁有了成熟的運營體系和相對穩(wěn)定的客源，并且各大航空公司針對高速鐵路的來勢洶洶，都進行了充分的戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整和部署，采取了降價、縮短登機時間等措施，而且民航相較于其他交通方式而言具有純運行速度快、票價制定靈活、可跨越所有天然屏障等特點，有效的遏制了高速鐵路的威脅。但是，隨著高速鐵路的各項管理制度的逐漸完善、旅客對高速鐵路的認識逐漸趨于理性以及高鐵所具有的獨特政治優(yōu)勢，使得民航未來發(fā)展危機重重。 根據(jù)目前我國高速鐵路與民航的競爭情況，本文首先討論了高速鐵路與民航的主要競爭距離范圍。即存在某個臨界距離，在這個臨界距離之下，旅客乘坐高速鐵路耗費的總時間小于乘坐飛機的總時間，且高鐵票價小于機票價格，此時高速鐵路占據(jù)競爭的絕對優(yōu)勢地位。同時存在另一個臨界距離，在這個臨界距離之上，選擇民航的總旅行時間小于高鐵，且高鐵票價與民航機票所差無幾，此時民航占據(jù)競爭的絕對優(yōu)勢地位，這兩個臨界距離之間，便是高速鐵路與民航的主要競爭距離范圍；然后將出行方式的特性進行合理的量化，計算旅客選擇不同出行方式時得到的期望支付，建立旅客出行效益模型，又利用LOGIT模型，建立客運分擔率模型；最后建立高速鐵路與民航的競爭博弈模型，高速鐵路與民航的總利潤等于其總營業(yè)收入與總成本之差，并得到高速鐵路與民航的最終博弈均衡。 通過研究，獲得了以下研究成果與研究結(jié)論。 旅客出行效益模型與客運分擔率模型表明，高速鐵路在主要競爭范圍內(nèi)占據(jù)著優(yōu)勢地位，但是優(yōu)勢并不明顯，尤其是在運輸?shù)�，民航機票折扣力度加大，有力的爭奪了大量客源，高速鐵路上座率持續(xù)走低，再加之其高昂的運營成本，其運營狀況令人堪憂。 在中長距離運輸市場中，高速鐵路與民航的競爭關(guān)系是一個明顯的雙寡頭博弈關(guān)系。根據(jù)典型的雙寡頭博弈模型，以價格為競爭手段，建立了高速鐵路與民航的雙寡頭競爭博弈模型。然后以京滬高鐵為例進行實證研究，求得目前中國高速鐵路與民航實現(xiàn)各自效益最大化和博弈均衡的價格體系。實證研究的最終結(jié)果表明，民航的單位運價率均低于目前的運行價格，高速鐵路價格高于目前的運行價格，說明目前我國京滬高鐵價格管理體系更加合理，但是目前的高速鐵路還沒有公布標準的價格制定規(guī)范，各條高速鐵路線路價格相差較大，例如武廣高鐵與京滬高鐵的單位運價率就存在著較大不同。長此以往，高速鐵路的發(fā)展也必將走入困境。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of the high speed railway in China, high speed railway has brought new choices to the public travel in China, while it has launched a fierce market competition with the traditional transport mode, such as air transportation, and has attracted a considerable number of market passenger flows with its own advantages, especially in the middle and short distance. During the distance transportation, it was very obvious that in March.2009 year, the Zhengzhou to Shanghai route of spring and Autumn Airlines was forced to stop after 17 months of competition with the high speed rail. After the full line of Wuhan Guangzhou high speed railway, Wuhan to Yichang, Xiangyang and Yichang to Enshi announced the suspension of flight. But the situation of China's high speed rail was not optimistic, until June 2011, China The 5 high iron lines that have been operated are badly lost. The high speed railway in our country has a huge initial investment, and the operating costs continue to go high. In July 2011, a major car rear end accident occurred. The defects of our high speed railway management system and operation system have caused the attention of the whole society.
As the main transport mode of middle and long distance passenger transport, civil aviation has developed a mature operation system and relatively stable passenger source after decades of development, and the major airlines have carried out full strategic adjustment and deployment in view of the turbulence of high-speed railway, and have taken measures to reduce the price, shorten the boarding time and so on, and the civil aviation phase Compared with other modes of transportation, it has the characteristics of fast speed, flexible fare, and all natural barriers, which effectively contain the threat of high speed railway. However, with the gradual improvement of various management systems of high speed railway, the understanding of passengers to high speed railway gradually tends to rational and the unique politics of high speed railway. The superiority has made the civil aviation development crisis in the future.
According to the current competition between high speed railway and civil aviation in our country, the main competitive distance between high speed railway and civil aviation is discussed first, that is, there is a critical distance. Under this critical distance, the total time spent by passengers on high speed railway is less than the total time of the plane, and the high speed rail fare is less than the ticket price, and the high speed railway is higher than the ticket price. The speed railway occupies an absolute dominant position in the competition. At the same time, there is another critical distance. On this critical distance, the total travel time of the civil aviation is less than the high speed rail, and the price of the high speed rail is almost the same as that of the civil air ticket. At this time civil aviation occupies an absolute dominant position in the competition. Between these two critical distances, it is the owner of the high speed railway and the civil aviation. In order to compete with the range of distance, the characteristics of the travel mode are quantified, the expected payment for different travel modes are calculated, the model of passenger travel benefit is established, and the model of LOGIT is used to establish the model of passenger sharing rate. Finally, the competition game model of high speed railway and civil aviation is established, and the high-speed railway and civil aviation are established. The total profit is equal to the difference between total operating income and total cost, and the final game equilibrium between high-speed railway and civil aviation is obtained.
Through research, the following research results and conclusions are obtained.
The model of passenger travel benefit and the model of passenger transport share rate show that the high speed railway occupies the dominant position in the main competition range, but the advantage is not obvious, especially in the low season of transportation, the air ticket discount intensity is increased, a large number of passenger sources are vigorously contended, the high speed railway seat rate continues to be low, and the high operating cost is added to the high speed railway. The condition of the camp is worrying.
In the medium and long distance transportation market, the competitive relationship between high speed railway and civil aviation is an obvious dual oligopoly game relationship. According to the typical dual oligopoly game model, the dual oligopoly competition game model of high speed railway and civil aviation is set up with the price as the competitive means. Then the case of Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway is taken as an example to find the high China. The final result of the empirical study shows that the unit freight rate of the civil aviation is lower than the current operating price, the price of the high speed railway is higher than the current operating price. It shows that the price management system of Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway is more reasonable at present, but the current high speed railway There is no standard price formulation, and the prices of various high-speed railway lines vary greatly. For example, the unit freight rate of the Wuhan Guangzhou high railway and Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway is quite different.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F532;F562.6;F224.32

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