本文關(guān)鍵詞： 內(nèi)河港口 內(nèi)河承運(yùn)人 港口費(fèi)率折扣 航次補(bǔ)貼 收益共享　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：廣東省具有天然的內(nèi)河水網(wǎng)優(yōu)勢(shì),但是多年來內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸在綜合交通運(yùn)輸體系中的地位都未能得到提升,內(nèi)陸物資未能達(dá)到“宜水走水”的要求,究其原因,是內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸服務(wù)鏈的競爭力不足。眾所周知,盡管內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸具有費(fèi)用低廉的天然優(yōu)勢(shì),但是服務(wù)時(shí)間-旦超出貨主的接受范圍,這種優(yōu)勢(shì)將蕩然無存,這也正是內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸發(fā)展的瓶頸所在。廣東省內(nèi)河運(yùn)距較短,水上運(yùn)輸時(shí)間不長,大部分的時(shí)間花費(fèi)在等待上,通過調(diào)研得知,這主要是由于掛靠港口的航次密度不足所致。因此,如何合理設(shè)置掛靠港口的航次密度,是提升內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸服務(wù)鏈競爭力的關(guān)鍵。本文以產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈中的契約理論為基礎(chǔ),以內(nèi)河港口和內(nèi)河承運(yùn)人作為研究對(duì)象,對(duì)二者之間航次博弈問題進(jìn)行定量分析,主張以內(nèi)河港口企業(yè)為主導(dǎo)在內(nèi)河港航企業(yè)之間建立合理的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)港航服務(wù)能力的協(xié)調(diào)和盈利能力的“雙贏”,最終提升整條內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸服務(wù)鏈的競爭力。論文的結(jié)果旨在為內(nèi)河港口企業(yè)和內(nèi)河承運(yùn)人的決策提供參考和指引。 本文假設(shè)了兩種情況：(內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸)需求服從隨機(jī)分布和(內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸)需求具有航次依賴性。分別在這兩種情況下運(yùn)用兩方合作博弈和主從博弈的思想定量研究了航次成本信息對(duì)稱時(shí)港口費(fèi)率折扣(Handling Charge Discount Contract,簡稱HC)、航次補(bǔ)貼(Voyage Subsidy Contract,簡稱VS)、收益共享(Revenue Sharing Contract,簡稱RS)三種契約的最優(yōu)參數(shù)設(shè)置,并且以內(nèi)河港口利潤、承運(yùn)人利潤和港航總利潤為指標(biāo)比較了三種契約的協(xié)調(diào)效果。 除此之外,本文在隨機(jī)需求的情況下還重點(diǎn)研究了內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸需求隨機(jī)性的大小以及港口和承運(yùn)人的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡程度對(duì)契約協(xié)調(diào)效果的影響,通過云浮新港的實(shí)例分析可知：當(dāng)港口企業(yè)經(jīng)營人和內(nèi)河承運(yùn)人均為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性時(shí),需求的隨機(jī)性越大,則契約的協(xié)調(diào)效果越明顯；當(dāng)港口企業(yè)經(jīng)營人和內(nèi)河承運(yùn)人均為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡型時(shí),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避程度較高的-方從協(xié)調(diào)中獲得的利潤較低,且此時(shí)的港航聯(lián)合利潤比風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性情況下要小。 本文在需求具有航次依賴性的情況下著重考慮了航次成本信息的不對(duì)稱對(duì)契約協(xié)調(diào)效果的影響,建立了航次成本信息不對(duì)稱時(shí)三種契約的協(xié)調(diào)模型。通過代入云浮新港的相關(guān)參數(shù)可知：在航次成本信息不對(duì)稱的情況下,收益共享契約和港口費(fèi)率折扣契約均優(yōu)于航次補(bǔ)貼契約。 最后,本文從港口成本和航次成本的細(xì)化、航次對(duì)運(yùn)量影響的時(shí)滯性、江海聯(lián)運(yùn)中的多方博弈三個(gè)方面闡述了論文后續(xù)的研究方向。
[Abstract]:Guangdong Province has the advantage of natural inland water network, but the status of inland river transportation in the integrated transportation system has not been promoted for many years, and inland materials and materials have not met the requirement of "suitable water flow". It is the lack of competitiveness of the inland waterway transport service chain. It is well known that, although inland waterway transportation has the natural advantage of low cost, it will disappear if the service hours are beyond the scope of the cargo owner's acceptance. This is precisely where the bottleneck lies in the development of inland river transport. Guangdong Province has a relatively short distance between inland waterways and a short time for water transportation. Most of the time is spent on waiting. Through research, we know that, This is mainly due to the insufficient number of voyages connected to the port. Therefore, how to reasonably set the voyage density of the port is the key to enhance the competitiveness of the inland river transport service chain. This paper is based on the contract theory in the product supply chain. Taking inland port and inland carrier as the object of study, this paper makes quantitative analysis on the problem of voyage game between the two, and advocates to establish a reasonable incentive mechanism between inland port and inland shipping enterprise, which is dominated by inland port enterprise. Thus, the coordination of port and shipping service capacity and the "win-win" of profitability are realized, and the competitiveness of the whole inland river transport service chain is finally enhanced. The results of this paper are intended to provide reference and guidance for inland port enterprises and inland river carriers to make decisions. In this paper, we assume that there are two kinds of cases: the stochastic distribution of the demand for service and the dependence of the demand on the voyage. In these two cases, we use the thought of the game of cooperation between two parties and the game of master and slave respectively. In this paper, the optimal parameter setting of three kinds of contracts, namely Port rate discount handling Charge Discount contract, Voyage Subsidy contract, Revenue Sharing contract (RS) with symmetrical voyage cost information, is presented. Based on the inland port profit, carrier profit and total port profit, the coordination effect of the three contracts is compared. In addition, in the case of random demand, this paper also focuses on the impact of the randomness of inland water transport demand and the risk aversion of port and carrier on the effectiveness of contract coordination. Through the case study of Yunfu New Port, we can know that when the port enterprise operator and the inland river carrier are both risk-neutral, the greater the randomness of demand, the more obvious the coordination effect of the contract is. When both the operator of port enterprise and the inland carrier are risk-averse, the party with higher degree of risk aversion gets lower profit from coordination, and the joint profit of port and navigation is smaller than that of risk neutral. In this paper, under the condition that the demand is dependent on voyage, the influence of the asymmetry of voyage cost information on the effect of contract coordination is considered. This paper establishes the coordination model of three kinds of contracts when the voyage cost information is asymmetrical. By replacing the relevant parameters of Yunfu Newport, we can know that under the condition of asymmetric voyage cost information, Revenue sharing contract and port rate discount contract are superior to voyage subsidy contract. Finally, this paper elaborates the future research direction of this paper from three aspects: the refinement of port cost and voyage cost, the delay of voyage to the volume, and the multi-party game in river and sea transport.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F552;F272.92

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