本文關鍵詞：基于系統(tǒng)動力學的區(qū)域運輸多主體利益協(xié)調　出處：《計算機集成制造系統(tǒng)》2016年03期 　論文類型：期刊論文

  更多相關文章： 區(qū)域運輸系統(tǒng) 系統(tǒng)動力學 超載治理 政策 利益協(xié)調

【摘要】：為解決區(qū)域運輸系統(tǒng)存在的貨主超載運輸導致的與公路運營方的利益沖突問題,建立了基于系統(tǒng)動力學的政策評價模型。該模型進一步考慮車輛嚴格限載和鐵路介入等政策對貨主時間成本的影響,通過模擬公路的貨流量、路面磨損、運輸能力和運輸時間等環(huán)節(jié)間的互動與反饋,分析各主體利益的變化機理并給出有效策略,以協(xié)調各方利益。以曹妃甸至唐山的鐵礦石運輸系統(tǒng)為例進行仿真,結果表明:單純的限載政策造成的貨主運輸成本和時間成本的增加大大高于公路運營方維護成本的降低,無法協(xié)調雙方利益;通過建設鐵路分流鐵礦石,當鐵路等級達到Ⅱ級時能同時降低雙方成本,且雙方累計節(jié)省的成本大于鐵路建設投資,是公路嚴格限載下協(xié)調雙方利益的有效政策。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the problem of conflicts of interest between overloaded cargo owners and highway operators in the regional transport system. A policy evaluation model based on system dynamics is established, which further considers the influence of strict vehicle load restriction and railway intervention on the time cost of the cargo owner. The interaction and feedback between the links such as transportation capacity and transportation time are analyzed and effective strategies are given to coordinate the interests of all parties. The iron ore transportation system from Caofeidian to Tangshan is taken as an example. The results show that the increase of cargo owner's transportation cost and time cost is much higher than that of highway operator's maintenance cost, which can not coordinate the interests of both parties. By diverting iron ore from construction railway, the cost of both sides can be reduced when the railway grade reaches grade 鈪，

本文編號：1376267