本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué)的區(qū)域運(yùn)輸多主體利益協(xié)調(diào)　出處：《計(jì)算機(jī)集成制造系統(tǒng)》2016年03期 　論文類(lèi)型：期刊論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 區(qū)域運(yùn)輸系統(tǒng) 系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué) 超載治理 政策 利益協(xié)調(diào)

【摘要】：為解決區(qū)域運(yùn)輸系統(tǒng)存在的貨主超載運(yùn)輸導(dǎo)致的與公路運(yùn)營(yíng)方的利益沖突問(wèn)題,建立了基于系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué)的政策評(píng)價(jià)模型。該模型進(jìn)一步考慮車(chē)輛嚴(yán)格限載和鐵路介入等政策對(duì)貨主時(shí)間成本的影響,通過(guò)模擬公路的貨流量、路面磨損、運(yùn)輸能力和運(yùn)輸時(shí)間等環(huán)節(jié)間的互動(dòng)與反饋,分析各主體利益的變化機(jī)理并給出有效策略,以協(xié)調(diào)各方利益。以曹妃甸至唐山的鐵礦石運(yùn)輸系統(tǒng)為例進(jìn)行仿真,結(jié)果表明:單純的限載政策造成的貨主運(yùn)輸成本和時(shí)間成本的增加大大高于公路運(yùn)營(yíng)方維護(hù)成本的降低,無(wú)法協(xié)調(diào)雙方利益;通過(guò)建設(shè)鐵路分流鐵礦石,當(dāng)鐵路等級(jí)達(dá)到Ⅱ級(jí)時(shí)能同時(shí)降低雙方成本,且雙方累計(jì)節(jié)省的成本大于鐵路建設(shè)投資,是公路嚴(yán)格限載下協(xié)調(diào)雙方利益的有效政策。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the problem of conflicts of interest between overloaded cargo owners and highway operators in the regional transport system. A policy evaluation model based on system dynamics is established, which further considers the influence of strict vehicle load restriction and railway intervention on the time cost of the cargo owner. The interaction and feedback between the links such as transportation capacity and transportation time are analyzed and effective strategies are given to coordinate the interests of all parties. The iron ore transportation system from Caofeidian to Tangshan is taken as an example. The results show that the increase of cargo owner's transportation cost and time cost is much higher than that of highway operator's maintenance cost, which can not coordinate the interests of both parties. By diverting iron ore from construction railway, the cost of both sides can be reduced when the railway grade reaches grade 鈪，

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