本文關(guān)鍵詞：用友網(wǎng)絡(luò)股權(quán)激勵方案評價研究　出處：《江蘇大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股權(quán)激勵 市場反應(yīng) 激勵效果 契約要素

【摘要】：從2005年證監(jiān)會發(fā)布《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法》到2016年底,我國共有1000余家上市公司推出了股權(quán)激勵計劃,涉及的股權(quán)激勵方案多達(dá)1300多套。近幾年,實施股權(quán)激勵的上市公司更是呈現(xiàn)出爆發(fā)式的增長。為何如此多的公司熱衷于推出股權(quán)激勵計劃?一方面,現(xiàn)代社會已經(jīng)從傳統(tǒng)的人力資源時代邁入了人力資本時代,人力資本對于企業(yè)的發(fā)展越來越重要。股權(quán)激勵計劃的實施可以使得企業(yè)在人力資本的爭奪中占據(jù)有利地位,股權(quán)激勵已經(jīng)成為企業(yè)留住內(nèi)部人才,吸引外部人才的有效手段。另一方面,股權(quán)激勵計劃將企業(yè)高管、核心員工這些激勵對象的核心利益與公司的價值捆綁在一起,激勵對象獲得高額收益的前提就是其必須努力為公司工作以提高公司的業(yè)績,使得公司的股價可以上漲。從《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法》發(fā)布至今,我國的股權(quán)激勵實踐已經(jīng)經(jīng)過了十一年的時間。股權(quán)激勵契約要素設(shè)計存在哪些問題?股權(quán)激勵激勵的效果又如何?國內(nèi)學(xué)者進(jìn)行了很多探索。在股權(quán)激勵契約要素設(shè)計方面,研究表明大多數(shù)企業(yè)一直存在諸如業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)單一,激勵有效期過短等問題;而在股權(quán)激勵的激勵效果方面,實證研究對于股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系仍未得出一致的結(jié)論。不同企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵計劃的契約要素設(shè)計不同,股權(quán)激勵對企業(yè)業(yè)績的提升程度也有所不同。因此,對具體企業(yè)案例的研究就顯得尤為重要。本文選擇用友網(wǎng)絡(luò)的三次股權(quán)激勵方案為研究對象。這三次股權(quán)激勵方案實施階段基本上涵蓋了《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法》發(fā)布以來的我國股權(quán)激勵實踐的整個階段,可以說是我國股權(quán)激勵實踐的一個縮影。本文首先從短期市場反應(yīng)、股權(quán)激勵計劃的激勵效果和股權(quán)激勵計劃契約要素的設(shè)計三個方面對國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了梳理,之后對股權(quán)激勵的基礎(chǔ)理論進(jìn)行了介紹。然后,通過事件研究法研究三次股權(quán)激勵方案所造成的短期市場反應(yīng),以及通過對股權(quán)激勵計劃實施前后業(yè)績的比較和運用以行業(yè)為配對樣本的配對樣本法分析三次股權(quán)激勵方案所產(chǎn)生的長期激勵效果,最后對用友網(wǎng)絡(luò)的三次股權(quán)激勵方案的契約要素進(jìn)行了分析并提出了一些建議。通過研究發(fā)現(xiàn):在短期市場反應(yīng)研究方面,證券市場對于第一次股權(quán)激勵方案反應(yīng)較差,而對第二次和第三次股權(quán)激勵方案反應(yīng)較好;在激勵方案的激勵效果研究方面,三次激勵方案均起到了一定的激勵效果,尤其在股權(quán)激勵方案實施的第一年激勵效果較好,之后的年度激勵效果不明顯;在股權(quán)激勵方案的契約要素研究方面,存在激勵對象選擇相對合理、授予總量相對合適、激勵模式與公司戰(zhàn)略相匹配的好現(xiàn)象,但也存在授予股票分配不公平、業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)單一并且偏低、行權(quán)價格不科學(xué)的問題。
[Abstract]:From 2005 to end of 2016, more than 1, 000 listed companies in China have launched equity incentive plans. There are more than 1,300 equity incentive schemes involved. In recent years, listed companies implementing equity incentives have shown explosive growth. Why are so many companies keen to launch equity incentive plans? On the one hand, the modern society has entered the era of human capital from the traditional era of human resources. Human capital is becoming more and more important for the development of enterprises. The implementation of equity incentive plan can make enterprises occupy a favorable position in the competition for human capital. Equity incentive has become an enterprise to retain internal talents. On the other hand, equity incentive schemes bind the core interests of executives and core employees to the value of the company. The premise of the incentive object to obtain high returns is that it must work hard for the company to improve the performance of the company, so that the stock price of the company can rise. It has been eleven years since the practice of equity incentive in China. What are the problems in the design of the elements of equity incentive contract? What is the effect of equity incentive? Domestic scholars have made a lot of explorations. In the aspect of the design of equity incentive contract, the research shows that most enterprises always have problems such as single performance evaluation index, too short incentive period and so on. In the incentive effect of equity incentive, the empirical study on the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance has not reached a consistent conclusion. Different enterprises have different design of contract elements of equity incentive plan. The degree of promotion of equity incentive to enterprise performance is also different. It is very important to study the specific enterprise case. This paper chooses the three-stage equity incentive scheme of the friend network as the research object. The implementation stage of the three equity incentive schemes basically covers the "equity incentive tube" of the listed company. The whole stage of China's equity incentive practice since its publication. It can be said to be a microcosm of the practice of equity incentive in China. Firstly, this paper starts with the short-term market reaction. The incentive effect of the equity incentive plan and the design of the contract elements of the equity incentive plan are combed through the literature at home and abroad, and then the basic theory of equity incentive is introduced. The short-term market reaction caused by the three-stage equity incentive scheme is studied by the method of event research. And through the comparison of the performance before and after the implementation of the equity incentive plan and the use of the matching sample method to analyze the long-term incentive effect of the third equity incentive plan. At last, the paper analyzes the contract elements of the three times equity incentive scheme of friends network, and puts forward some suggestions. Through the research, we find that: in the research of short-term market response. The stock market has a poor response to the first equity incentive scheme, but a better response to the second and third equity incentive schemes. In the study of incentive effect, three incentive schemes have played a certain incentive effect, especially in the first year of the equity incentive plan implementation of the incentive effect is better, and the annual incentive effect is not obvious; In the research of contract elements of equity incentive scheme, there is a good phenomenon that the choice of incentive object is relatively reasonable, the total amount of incentive is relatively appropriate, and the incentive mode matches the company strategy, but there is also unfair distribution of the grant stock. The performance appraisal index is single and low, the exercise price is not scientific question.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92;F49

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