本文選題：糧食安全 + 渠道博弈��； 參考：《南京審計大學(xué)學(xué)報》2017年06期

【摘要】：中國是人口和糧食大國,促進(jìn)糧食生產(chǎn)、保證糧食安全是國之大事。由于市場利益主體之間存在博弈行為,收購價格由農(nóng)戶與糧食收購企業(yè)共同決定。采用納什議價模型表示議價過程,運用2006年至2014年的小麥價格數(shù)據(jù),研究農(nóng)戶和企業(yè)在糧食收購過程中的議價問題,從而判斷糧食最低收購價的政策效果。結(jié)果表明:政策確實能改變農(nóng)民的議價能力,保護(hù)農(nóng)民利益,但政策實施存在時滯;更重要的是,政策會導(dǎo)致農(nóng)戶議價能力從絕對劣勢到絕對優(yōu)勢的突變,造成農(nóng)戶憑借最低收購價獲得主導(dǎo)價格的能力,即政策扭曲了市場定價機(jī)制。最后,給出模型結(jié)果、實證結(jié)論和政策建議。
[Abstract]:China is a country with a large population and grain. It is a national priority to promote grain production and ensure food security. The purchase price is determined by farmers and grain purchasing enterprises because of the game behavior between the main bodies of market interests. The Nash bargaining model is used to represent the bargaining process, and the wheat price data from 2006 to 2014 are used to study the bargaining problem in the process of grain purchase by farmers and enterprises, so as to judge the policy effect of the lowest purchase price of grain. The results show that the policy can change the bargaining power of farmers and protect the interests of farmers, but there is a delay in the implementation of the policy, and more importantly, the policy will lead to the mutation of bargaining power of farmers from absolute inferiority to absolute superiority. The policy distorts the market pricing mechanism. Finally, the model results, empirical conclusions and policy recommendations are given.
【作者單位】： 南京審計大學(xué)政府審計學(xué)院;南京審計大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會科學(xué)基金項目(16BJY119)
【分類號】：F326.11
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本文編號：2104358