本文選題：內(nèi)部控制信息披露 + 股權代理成本　； 參考：《集美大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,企業(yè)財務舞弊現(xiàn)象頻繁發(fā)生,嚴重的侵害了投資者債權人的利益。內(nèi)部控制信息的披露可以降低由于信息不對稱造成的不利影響,所以內(nèi)部控制信息披露的規(guī)范性受到許多國家的重視。美國、日本等發(fā)達國家相繼發(fā)布了相關法案,規(guī)范了內(nèi)部控制信息披露的范圍和深度。為順應資本市場利益相關者對內(nèi)部控制信息的強烈需求,2008年我國內(nèi)部控制標準委員會頒布了《企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制基本規(guī)范》和《配套指引》,要求我國滬深兩市主板上市公司,應于2012年開始提供內(nèi)部控制自我評價報告和內(nèi)部控制審計報告。企業(yè)委托代理問題由來已久,內(nèi)部控制信息作為重要的企業(yè)信息,加大其披露力度,可以幫助利益相關者做出投資決策,緩解資本市場的信息不對稱問題。新型披露制度下的內(nèi)部控制信息的披露對企業(yè)代理成本有怎樣的影響呢?對這一問題的深入研究,有利于拓展內(nèi)部控制信息披露經(jīng)濟后果研究范圍。本文共分為六章內(nèi)容,基于我國新的內(nèi)部控制信息披露制度背景下,探索內(nèi)部控制信息披露對企業(yè)代理成本的影響,為企業(yè)緩解委托代理問題注入新的活力。本文拓展了前人研究的不足,深入研究內(nèi)部控制信息及其五要素的披露對企業(yè)股權、債權代理成本的影響。一方面內(nèi)部控制信息披露可以降低信息不對稱程度,減少委托人信息搜集成本;另一方面,內(nèi)部控制信息的反饋,可以幫助企業(yè)完善內(nèi)部控制制度,實現(xiàn)內(nèi)部制衡,緩解委托代理問題。根據(jù)理論分析提出研究假設,選取替代指標進行回歸分析,最后得出以下結論:高水平的內(nèi)部控制信息披露對企業(yè)股權代理成本具有顯著抑制作用,其中五要素的披露對股權代理成本的影響作用程度不同,企業(yè)可以根據(jù)自身的情況,將資源合理分配到內(nèi)部控制制度建設中。由于債權人獲取信息的能力強于資本市場的個人投資者,所以內(nèi)部控制信息的披露對企業(yè)債務代理成本的抑制作用不強。進一步結合實際情況,本文提出以下政策建議:1.規(guī)范制定部門需進一步完善內(nèi)部控制信息披露規(guī)范標準;2.監(jiān)督管理部門需要健全內(nèi)部控制信息披露的監(jiān)督機制;3.第三方審計應完善企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制審計權責制度;4.企業(yè)管理層應提升對內(nèi)部控制制度建設的重視程度。
[Abstract]:In recent years, corporate financial fraud occurs frequently, which seriously infringes the interests of investors' creditors. The disclosure of internal control information can reduce the adverse effects caused by asymmetric information, so the standardization of internal control information disclosure has been attached great importance to by many countries. The United States, Japan and other developed countries have issued relevant laws to regulate the scope and depth of internal control information disclosure. In order to meet the strong demand of capital market stakeholders for internal control information, in 2008, the Internal Control Standards Committee of our country promulgated the basic norms of Enterprise Internal Control and the supporting guidelines, which required the listed companies on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. Internal control self-evaluation reports and internal control audit reports should be available in 2012. The principal-agent problem of enterprises has a long history. As an important enterprise information, internal control information can help stakeholders to make investment decisions and ease the information asymmetry in capital market. How does the disclosure of internal control information under the new disclosure system affect the agency cost of enterprises? The in-depth study on this issue is helpful to expand the scope of economic consequences of internal control information disclosure. This paper is divided into six chapters. Based on the new internal control information disclosure system in China, this paper explores the impact of internal control information disclosure on the agency cost of enterprises, and injects new vitality for enterprises to alleviate the principal-agent problem. This paper extends the shortcomings of previous studies and deeply studies the influence of internal control information and its five elements disclosure on corporate equity and creditor's rights agency cost. On the one hand, the disclosure of internal control information can reduce the degree of information asymmetry and reduce the cost of collecting information from clients; on the other hand, feedback of internal control information can help enterprises improve the internal control system and realize internal checks and balances. Ease the principal-agent problem. According to the theoretical analysis, this paper puts forward the research hypotheses, selects the substitution index to carry on the regression analysis, finally obtains the following conclusion: the high level internal control information disclosure has the remarkable suppression function to the enterprise stock right agency cost. The disclosure of five elements has different influence on the agency cost of equity. Enterprises can allocate resources to the construction of internal control system according to their own situation. Because creditors' ability to obtain information is stronger than that of individual investors in capital market, the disclosure of internal control information does not restrain corporate debt agency cost. Further combined with the actual situation, this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations: 1. 1. The standardization department needs to further perfect the standard standard of information disclosure of internal control. Supervision and management departments need to improve the internal control information disclosure supervision mechanism. Third party audit should perfect the audit authority and responsibility system of enterprise internal control. Enterprise management should enhance the degree of attention to the construction of internal control system.
【學位授予單位】：集美大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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