本文選題：特許經(jīng)營(yíng) + 委托代理　； 參考：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：特許經(jīng)營(yíng)模式以其低投入、低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、快速擴(kuò)張等優(yōu)勢(shì)贏得了全球各行業(yè)企業(yè)的青睞,也受到了學(xué)術(shù)界的廣泛關(guān)注。在常見(jiàn)的特許經(jīng)營(yíng)關(guān)系中,加盟商除了產(chǎn)品銷售之外,往往面臨著多項(xiàng)任務(wù),如廣告宣傳、售后服務(wù)等等,然而,這種多任務(wù)特性卻尚未得到深入討論。本文從委托代理理論角度出發(fā),對(duì)特許經(jīng)營(yíng)模式進(jìn)行分析。 近幾十年來(lái),委托代理問(wèn)題一直都是十分熱門的研究方向。大量的文獻(xiàn)對(duì)其理論與應(yīng)用進(jìn)行了廣泛的探討。而特許經(jīng)營(yíng)模式正是一種典型的委托代理關(guān)系。在諸多對(duì)委托代理模型的拓展研究中,多任務(wù)委托代理問(wèn)題是主要的拓展方向之 這也成為本文研究多任務(wù)特許經(jīng)營(yíng)問(wèn)題的主要理論依據(jù)。 同時(shí),在多任務(wù)情境下,加盟商需要執(zhí)行的各項(xiàng)任務(wù)當(dāng)中,部分任務(wù)(如售后服務(wù))的努力水平是難以被觀測(cè)、度量以及核實(shí)的,從而成為加盟商的私有信息。這種信息的不對(duì)稱性也是委托代理關(guān)系的基本特征,對(duì)于信息甄別與激勵(lì)機(jī)制的討論也就成為該類問(wèn)題的核心議題。 因此,基于委托代理理論,本文將多任務(wù)委托代理問(wèn)題與信息甄別問(wèn)題同時(shí)引入特許經(jīng)營(yíng)情景之中,考慮逆向選擇與道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)兩方面內(nèi)容。本文將加盟商面臨的多項(xiàng)任務(wù)提煉為銷售性與維護(hù)性兩個(gè)方面,并且假設(shè)加盟商在維護(hù)性任務(wù)上的努力水平為其私有信息,無(wú)法核實(shí),進(jìn)而討論了特許商的最優(yōu)甄別與激勵(lì)機(jī)制。通過(guò)嚴(yán)格的數(shù)學(xué)推導(dǎo)和理論分析,本文分析了特許商的最優(yōu)甄別式菜單合同應(yīng)該如何設(shè)計(jì)以及應(yīng)該滿足何種條件,指出最終的合同為分段式的。同時(shí)本文也討論了加盟商所面臨的主觀風(fēng)險(xiǎn)將會(huì)對(duì)最終的合同款項(xiàng)產(chǎn)生哪些影響。
[Abstract]:Because of its advantages of low investment, low risk and rapid expansion, franchise has won the favor of enterprises in various industries around the world, and has also been widely concerned by the academic community. In common franchising relationships, franchisees often face many tasks besides product sales, such as advertising, after-sales service and so on. However, this multi-task characteristic has not been discussed in depth. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the franchise mode. In recent decades, the principal-agent problem has been a very hot research direction. A large number of literature on its theory and application were widely discussed. The franchise mode is a typical principal-agent relationship. In many researches on the expansion of the principal-agent model, the multi-task principal-agent problem is the main extension direction, which has become the main theoretical basis for the study of multi-task franchising in this paper. At the same time, in the multi-task situation, the level of effort of some tasks (such as after-sales service) is difficult to be observed, measured and verified, so it becomes the private information of the franchisee. The asymmetry of information is also the basic characteristic of principal-agent relationship, and the discussion of information discrimination and incentive mechanism has become the core issue of this kind of problem. Therefore, based on the principal-agent theory, this paper introduces the multi-task principal-agent problem and the information screening problem into the franchising situation at the same time, considering the adverse selection and moral hazard. In this paper, many tasks faced by franchisees are refined into two aspects: sales and maintainability, and it is assumed that the level of effort of franchisees in maintenance tasks is their private information, which cannot be verified. Furthermore, the optimal screening and incentive mechanism of franchisor is discussed. Through strict mathematical derivation and theoretical analysis, this paper analyzes how the franchisor's optimal screening menu contract should be designed and what conditions should be met, and points out that the final contract is segmented. At the same time, this paper also discusses how the subjective risks faced by franchisees will affect the final contract payment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F717.6;F224

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