本文關(guān)鍵詞： 特許經(jīng)營 合約設(shè)計(jì) 廣告效應(yīng) 需求不確定 回購 監(jiān)督　出處：《湖南工業(yè)大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文通過運(yùn)用產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論、博弈論和委托代理理論,研究了廣告效應(yīng)相同(受許者同質(zhì))和廣告效應(yīng)不同(受許者異質(zhì))情況下的特許經(jīng)營合約設(shè)計(jì)、需求不確定下的回購契約的設(shè)計(jì)及特許者如何有效地對(duì)受許者搭便車行為進(jìn)行監(jiān)督等問題。 首先,針對(duì)特許經(jīng)營中的廣告效應(yīng),分別討論了廣告效應(yīng)相同(同質(zhì))和廣告效應(yīng)不同(異質(zhì))時(shí)的特許合約設(shè)計(jì)。分析結(jié)果表明:在一定條件下,特許者可通過設(shè)計(jì)最優(yōu)的特許合約促使特許者與受許者都提供承諾的廣告及服務(wù)水平,從而使整個(gè)特許經(jīng)營系統(tǒng)實(shí)現(xiàn)最大化利益。與受許者同質(zhì)的情形相比,特許者制定的使用費(fèi)率和廣告費(fèi)率的取值范圍不僅受自己成本效率及受許者成本效率的影響和價(jià)格敏感系數(shù)的影響,在受許者異質(zhì)時(shí),還受其所受廣告影響的差異程度的影響,因而特許者在制定這兩項(xiàng)費(fèi)率時(shí)要綜合考慮各方面的影響因素。 然后,針對(duì)需求不確定下特許經(jīng)營中特許者實(shí)施完全回購與無回購策略的情形,比較分析兩種情形下的批發(fā)價(jià)格、銷售策略、期望收益等。分析結(jié)果表明:在無回購情形下,在高需求時(shí),受許者的銷售策略是制定銷售價(jià)格將其所有的訂購量銷售出去;而在低需求時(shí),受許者的銷售策略受需求的隨機(jī)波動(dòng)大小的影響。在完全回購情形下,受許者在高需求和低需求時(shí)的銷售策略都是制定銷售價(jià)格以實(shí)現(xiàn)其利潤最大化的銷量。特許者在無回購策略下的期望收益大于完全回購,而完全回購策略下的產(chǎn)品銷售價(jià)格波動(dòng)幅度低于無回購策略。 再后,針對(duì)一個(gè)特許者和兩個(gè)位于同一市場中的受許者構(gòu)成的特許經(jīng)營體系,分析受許者的搭便車行為與特許者的監(jiān)督問題。分析結(jié)果表明:當(dāng)特許者不進(jìn)行監(jiān)督時(shí),如果兩個(gè)受許者提供的服務(wù)質(zhì)量水平具有較大的正外部性,則當(dāng)受許者提供服務(wù)質(zhì)量的成本位于一定的區(qū)間時(shí),且特許經(jīng)營體系持續(xù)時(shí)間較短時(shí),受許者將存在搭便車行為,從而導(dǎo)致雙方都不提供服務(wù)質(zhì)量。但當(dāng)特許經(jīng)營體系持續(xù)時(shí)間較長時(shí),如果未來收益對(duì)受許者來說較重要,則受許者可采用觸發(fā)策略阻止搭便車行為的發(fā)生。如果特許經(jīng)營體系持續(xù)時(shí)間較短,或者特許經(jīng)營體系持續(xù)時(shí)間雖然較長,但未來收益貼現(xiàn)率較小,則為了阻止搭便車行為,可能需要特許者對(duì)受許者的搭便車行為進(jìn)行監(jiān)督。
[Abstract]:Through the use of industry organization theory, game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper studies the franchise contract design under the same advertising effect (the same quality of the licensee) and the different advertising effect (heterogeneity of the licensee). The design of repurchase contract under uncertain demand and how the franchisor can effectively supervise the free rider behavior of the franchisee. Firstly, aiming at the advertising effect in franchise, we discuss the design of concession contract with the same advertising effect (homogeneity) and different advertising effect (heterogeneity) respectively. The results show that: under certain conditions. The franchisor can make the franchisor and the franchisee provide the promised advertising and service level by designing the optimal concession contract, so as to maximize the benefits of the whole franchise system and compare with the situation where the franchisee is of the same quality. The range of the use rate and advertising rate determined by franchisor is not only affected by its own cost efficiency and the cost efficiency of the licensee and the price sensitivity coefficient, but also by the heterogeneity of the licensee. It is also affected by the degree of difference in the influence of the advertisement, so the franchisor should consider all factors when setting the two rates. Then, in view of the situation that the franchisor implements the complete repurchase strategy and the non-repurchase strategy under the uncertain demand, the wholesale price and the sales strategy under the two situations are compared and analyzed. The results show that in the case of no repurchase and high demand, the licensee's sales strategy is to set the sales price to sell all the orders; In the case of low demand, the sales strategy of the licensee is affected by the random fluctuation of the demand, in the case of complete repurchase. The sales strategy of the franchisee in the case of high demand and low demand is to set the sales price to maximize its profit. The franchisor's expected income in the absence of the repurchase strategy is greater than that of the complete repurchase. The price fluctuation of products under complete repurchase strategy is lower than that without repurchase strategy. Then, a franchise system for one franchisor and two licensees in the same market. The results show that when the franchisor does not carry out supervision, if the quality of service provided by the two licensees has a greater positive externality. When the cost of providing quality of service is in a certain range and the duration of the franchise system is relatively short, the franchisee will have a free-rider behavior. As a result, neither party provides quality of service. But when the franchise system lasts longer, if the future benefits are more important to the licensee. If the duration of the franchise system is shorter, or the franchise system duration is longer, but the discount rate of future income is smaller. In order to prevent hitchhiker, franchisor may need to supervise the rider's hitchhiker.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號(hào)】：F721.7

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前9條

1 陳漢軍,余潤,劉春章;論特許經(jīng)營的收費(fèi)結(jié)構(gòu)[J];商業(yè)研究;2003年13期

2 龍勇,張球明;特許經(jīng)營體系的協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制研究[J];工業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì);2005年05期

3 木麗春;我國特許經(jīng)營發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀及對(duì)策[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問題探索;2003年07期

4 李明武;從中外特許經(jīng)營的差距談我國發(fā)展特許經(jīng)營的對(duì)策[J];荊門職業(yè)技術(shù)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2002年05期

5 華武,繆柏其;特許經(jīng)營的不完全契約分析[J];科技進(jìn)步與對(duì)策;2002年07期

6 郭新寶;;企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新“搭便車”現(xiàn)象分析[J];理論界;2006年S1期

7 張宏軍;;外部性理論發(fā)展的基本脈絡(luò)[J];生產(chǎn)力研究;2008年13期

8 閆濤;試論特許經(jīng)營的發(fā)展條件[J];商業(yè)時(shí)代;2003年15期

9 梅紅;;特許經(jīng)營中的委托代理問題研究[J];商業(yè)時(shí)代;2007年04期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 張球明;特許經(jīng)營中特許合約安排問題的研究[D];重慶大學(xué);2005年

2 劉明葳;中國特許經(jīng)營費(fèi)用結(jié)構(gòu)及其影響因素研究[D];清華大學(xué);2005年

3 林春;基于供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)理論的服裝業(yè)特許經(jīng)營合約研究[D];浙江大學(xué);2007年

，

本文編號(hào)：1486442