【摘要】：董事會(huì)作為現(xiàn)代公司法人治理的核心已經(jīng)被學(xué)者們所公認(rèn)，它的出現(xiàn)對于解決公司制公司因所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)相分離所產(chǎn)生的委托代理問題起到關(guān)鍵作用。董事會(huì)通過兩大職能的實(shí)現(xiàn)來發(fā)揮其作用的，這兩大職能分別是戰(zhàn)略決策以及監(jiān)督管理。戰(zhàn)略決策是指通過發(fā)揮董事會(huì)各成員的優(yōu)勢來制定關(guān)乎公司長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展的科學(xué)決策；監(jiān)督管理是指代表股東的利益來聘任公司日常經(jīng)營的管理層人員，同時(shí)對其行為進(jìn)行監(jiān)督、考核。在目前我國對上市公司投資者相關(guān)的法律法規(guī)以及證券市場并不完善的情況下，要想提高公司的經(jīng)營效率、完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，發(fā)揮董事會(huì)這種內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的作用就顯得尤為重要。 關(guān)于董事會(huì)特征對公司經(jīng)營績效的影響問題，國內(nèi)外學(xué)者進(jìn)行了較為深入的理論與實(shí)證研究，公司界也進(jìn)行了深入的實(shí)踐探索與創(chuàng)新。本文首先對國內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于此方面的研究成果進(jìn)行了綜述，以利于了解研究的進(jìn)度。其次，系統(tǒng)地概述了相關(guān)理論，如公司治理相關(guān)理論、董事會(huì)特征相關(guān)理論、公司經(jīng)營績效評價(jià)理論等等。再次，根據(jù)對創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場及其上市公司的相關(guān)性分析，通過選取創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的樣本數(shù)據(jù)，對創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司董事會(huì)特征與經(jīng)營績效關(guān)系進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)如下結(jié)論：董事會(huì)規(guī)模與公司經(jīng)營績效存在二次曲線關(guān)系，即倒“U”型關(guān)系；董事會(huì)穩(wěn)定性與公司以前年度的績效具有顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，以前年度董事會(huì)穩(wěn)定性低的公司在后續(xù)的年度內(nèi)其績效會(huì)越來越差；董事會(huì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)結(jié)構(gòu)的設(shè)置與公司經(jīng)營績效并不存在顯著相關(guān)關(guān)系；董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性與公司經(jīng)營績效不存在顯著相關(guān)關(guān)系；年度內(nèi)董事會(huì)會(huì)議頻次與公司經(jīng)營績效顯著負(fù)相關(guān)；董事會(huì)成員的持股比例、董事前三名薪酬總額都與公司經(jīng)營績效顯著正相關(guān)；董事會(huì)成員的平均年齡與公司經(jīng)營績效顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，董事會(huì)成員男性所占比例與公司經(jīng)營績效顯著正相關(guān)，而董事長的學(xué)歷背景、董事會(huì)成員中碩士及以上學(xué)歷人數(shù)所占比例與公司經(jīng)營績效不存在顯著相關(guān)關(guān)系。最后，在分析以上研究結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上，提出了進(jìn)一步完善董事會(huì)治理結(jié)構(gòu)的相關(guān)建議，以利于公司經(jīng)營績效的提高。相關(guān)建議如下：選擇適當(dāng)?shù)亩聲?huì)規(guī)模，并保持其穩(wěn)定性；建立董事長與總經(jīng)理兩職分離的董事會(huì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)結(jié)構(gòu)；完善獨(dú)立董事制度以充分發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的作用；合理安排董事會(huì)會(huì)議的頻次，提高董事會(huì)工作的效率；完善董事激勵(lì)制度；全面提高董事會(huì)成員的素質(zhì)水平。
[Abstract]:As the core of modern corporate governance, the board of directors has been recognized by scholars. Its appearance plays a key role in solving the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of ownership and management rights. The board of directors exerts its function through the realization of two functions, which are strategic decision and supervision and management. Strategic decision refers to the scientific decision about the long-term development of the company by giving full play to the advantages of the members of the board of directors. Supervision and management refers to the appointment of management personnel who represent the interests of shareholders, and the supervision and assessment of their behavior. At present, when the laws and regulations related to the investors of listed companies and the securities market are not perfect in our country, if we want to improve the management efficiency of the companies and improve the corporate governance structure, It is particularly important to give play to the role of the internal governance mechanism of the board of directors. As to the influence of board characteristics on corporate performance, scholars at home and abroad have carried out more in-depth theoretical and empirical research, and the corporate sector has also carried out in-depth practical exploration and innovation. This paper first summarizes the research results of domestic and foreign scholars in order to understand the progress of the research. Secondly, the related theories, such as the theory of corporate governance, the theory of the characteristics of the board of directors, the theory of corporate performance evaluation and so on, are systematically summarized. Thirdly, according to the correlation analysis of gem market and listed companies, through selecting the sample data of gem listed companies, the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and operating performance of gem listed companies is analyzed empirically. The conclusions are as follows: the relationship between the size of the board of directors and the operating performance of the company is conic, that is, the inverted "U" type relationship; There is a significant positive correlation between the stability of the board of directors and the performance of the company in the previous year. The performance of the company with the low stability of the board of directors in the previous year will become worse and worse in the following year. There is no significant correlation between the establishment of the board of directors' leadership structure and the company's operating performance; there is no significant correlation between the independence of the board of directors and the company's operating performance; the frequency of the directors' meetings in the year is negatively correlated with the company's operating performance. The shareholding ratio of the board members and the total compensation of the top three directors are significantly positively correlated with the company's operating performance; The average age of board members was negatively correlated with company performance, and the proportion of male board members was positively correlated with company performance, while the academic background of the chairman. There is no significant correlation between the proportion of board members with master's degree or above and the company's operating performance. Finally, on the basis of analyzing the above conclusions, the paper puts forward some suggestions on how to improve the governance structure of the board of directors in order to improve the performance of the company. The relevant suggestions are as follows: choosing appropriate board size and maintaining its stability; establishing the board of directors' leadership structure with the separation of chairman and general manager; perfecting the independent director system to give full play to its due role; Reasonable arrangement of the frequency of board meetings to improve the efficiency of the board of directors; improve the incentive system of directors; improve the quality of board members in an all-round way.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F271;F275

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