子公司自主權(quán)與母公司高管激勵(lì)有效性關(guān)系研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-25 08:18
【摘要】：股東基于公司業(yè)績(jī)對(duì)高管進(jìn)行激勵(lì),以緩解股東與管理層之間的委托代理問題。而我國(guó)上市公司母子公司股權(quán)投資程度日益增加,母公司強(qiáng)化資源配置職能、弱化生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng),整體業(yè)績(jī)?cè)絹?lái)越依賴于子公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況。由于子公司獨(dú)立法人的地位以及業(yè)務(wù)、地域的差異,母公司高管難以直接決定下層子公司經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況。因此,在以企業(yè)整體業(yè)績(jī)作為評(píng)價(jià)基礎(chǔ)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制下,母子公司長(zhǎng)期股權(quán)投資程度增加的業(yè)務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)和子公司自主權(quán)增加的權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu),將導(dǎo)致上市公司高管身處總部,其激勵(lì)的決定與效果愈來(lái)愈受非其行為直接決定的下層子公司經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況的影響。故有的高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制對(duì)于同時(shí)具有高股權(quán)投資程度和大子公司自主權(quán)的企業(yè)的適用性值得探討。 現(xiàn)有高管激勵(lì)研究大多從母子公司的合并整體出發(fā),研究公司規(guī)模、治理結(jié)構(gòu)及管理層任期等因素對(duì)高管激勵(lì)的影響,對(duì)于公司內(nèi)部業(yè)務(wù)及權(quán)力分布如何影響高管激勵(lì)尚缺乏探討。公司業(yè)務(wù)逐漸下沉到子公司后,公司生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)決策的部分自主權(quán)也由母公司高管逐漸轉(zhuǎn)移到子公司高管手中。因此,本文以識(shí)別的公司業(yè)務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整背景下經(jīng)營(yíng)決策權(quán)分配特征為切入點(diǎn),從委托代理視角,就長(zhǎng)期股權(quán)投資程度增加的趨勢(shì)下,子公司自主權(quán)大小是否會(huì)影響高管激勵(lì)的有效性的問題展開研究。 根據(jù)激勵(lì)契約理論,有效的高管激勵(lì)應(yīng)與高管可控制的結(jié)果掛鉤。業(yè)務(wù)下沉后,母公司高管對(duì)企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的影響力受子公司高管自主權(quán)大小的影響,相應(yīng)的,以合并業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)此類企業(yè)母公司高管表現(xiàn)的準(zhǔn)確度也依賴于企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)決策權(quán)的集中度。而業(yè)績(jī)基礎(chǔ)的信息有效性直接左右了激勵(lì)制度對(duì)高管行為的激勵(lì)效果。另一方面,業(yè)務(wù)下沉后,母公司高管主要從事企業(yè)資本的配置,而配置效率較經(jīng)營(yíng)決策的好壞需要更長(zhǎng)時(shí)間得以顯現(xiàn),致使針對(duì)母公司高管的長(zhǎng)、短期激勵(lì)的有效性發(fā)生變化。激勵(lì)機(jī)制的(長(zhǎng)短期)結(jié)構(gòu)安排需要重新考慮。基于以上分析,研究將從盈余持續(xù)性角度,分別研究子公司自主權(quán)對(duì)母公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)有效性的影響。 本文使用2008-2011年滬深兩市A股非金融類上市公司樣本,考察企業(yè)自主權(quán)分配特征對(duì)母公司高管激勵(lì)有效性的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)在母子公司長(zhǎng)期股權(quán)投資程度較高的情形下,相對(duì)于子公司自主權(quán)小的公司,子公司自主權(quán)大的公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)有效性較差；(2)當(dāng)上市公司對(duì)子公司股權(quán)投資程度較高時(shí),對(duì)于子公司自主權(quán)小與自主權(quán)大的公司,股權(quán)激勵(lì)均是有效性的,且子公司自主權(quán)小的公司與子公司自主權(quán)大的公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)有效性沒有顯著差異。(3)在長(zhǎng)期股權(quán)投資程度低的情形下,子公司自主權(quán)的大小對(duì)于高管薪酬激勵(lì)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)的有效性沒有顯著影響。研究揭示了下層子公司業(yè)績(jī)影響力對(duì)上市公司高管長(zhǎng)短期激勵(lì)機(jī)制有效性的不同作用。 與前人研究不同：①現(xiàn)有的高管激勵(lì)決定因素研究大多從企業(yè)整體出發(fā),研究財(cái)務(wù)及治理狀況對(duì)高管激勵(lì)的影響；沒有考慮到內(nèi)部不同業(yè)務(wù)分布特征的公司高管激勵(lì)效用的異質(zhì)性。本文深入企業(yè)內(nèi)部,以激勵(lì)業(yè)績(jī)基礎(chǔ)選擇的基本原則為分析的切入點(diǎn),研究業(yè)務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)變化背景下決策權(quán)的分配對(duì)高管激勵(lì)有效性產(chǎn)生的內(nèi)生性影響,探究母子公司股權(quán)控制趨勢(shì)下企業(yè)高管激勵(lì)的特點(diǎn)。②由于分部數(shù)據(jù)的缺乏,國(guó)內(nèi)已有的集團(tuán)化研究多以上市公司為集團(tuán)分部,研究集團(tuán)內(nèi)部資本市場(chǎng)的存在性與效率。以上市公司為總部、研究高管激勵(lì)對(duì)多元化投資企業(yè)內(nèi)部資本市場(chǎng)效率影響的文獻(xiàn)停留于理論模型推導(dǎo)層面,缺乏大樣本的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。本文通過比較合并、母公司經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的盈余持續(xù)性差異的方式,間接衡量高管激勵(lì)對(duì)多元化股權(quán)投資企業(yè)價(jià)值的促進(jìn)作用,拓展了集團(tuán)企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)研究。 本文研究的意義在于,從業(yè)務(wù)在母子公司間的分布及權(quán)力分配特征視角豐富了高管激勵(lì)有效性研究,并對(duì)高管激勵(lì)的制定提供了參考：在母子公司股權(quán)投資程度增加的趨勢(shì)下,子公司自主權(quán)大的公司簡(jiǎn)單沿用基于合并業(yè)績(jī)的薪酬激勵(lì)方式不能對(duì)母公司高管的產(chǎn)生激勵(lì)作用。股權(quán)投資程度高且子公司自主權(quán)大的公司應(yīng)當(dāng)增加母公司高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制中股權(quán)激勵(lì)的比重,減少薪酬激勵(lì)的比重。
[Abstract]:Shareholders motivate executives on the basis of corporate performance to alleviate the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. However, the degree of equity investment between parent and subsidiary companies of Listed Companies in China is increasing day by day. The parent company strengthens the function of resource allocation, weakens production and operation activities, and the overall performance is increasingly dependent on the operating conditions of subsidiaries. Therefore, under the incentive mechanism based on the overall performance of the enterprise, the business structure and the power structure of the increase of the degree of long-term equity investment of the parent-subsidiary company and the autonomy of the subsidiary company will lead to the listed company. The decision and effect of executive incentive in headquarters are more and more influenced by the operating conditions of the lower subsidiaries which are not directly determined by their actions.
Existing researches on executive incentives mostly focus on the merger of parent-subsidiary companies, the impact of company size, governance structure and management tenure on executive incentives, and the impact of internal business and power distribution on executive incentives. Therefore, this paper takes the characteristics of management decision-making power distribution under the background of corporate business restructuring as the breakthrough point, from the perspective of principal-agent, as to whether the size of subsidiary autonomy will affect the effectiveness of executive incentives under the trend of increasing long-term equity investment. The problem is studied.
According to the incentive contract theory, effective executive incentives should be linked to the results of managerial control. After business sinks, the influence of parent executives on firm performance is affected by the size of autonomy of subsidiary executives. Correspondingly, the accuracy of evaluating parent Executives'performance by combining performance also depends on the decision-making power of the firm. On the other hand, after the business sinks, the parent company executives are mainly engaged in the allocation of corporate capital, and the allocation efficiency needs longer time than the quality of business decisions, resulting in long-term and short-term incentives for the parent company executives. The structure of incentive mechanism needs to be reconsidered. Based on the above analysis, we will study the influence of subsidiary autonomy on parent company executive compensation incentive and equity incentive effectiveness from the persistence of earnings.
Using the sample of A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2011, this paper investigates the effect of corporate autonomy distribution on the incentive effectiveness of parent-subsidiary executives. The effectiveness of incentive incentives is poor; (2) When the listed companies invest more in subsidiary equity, equity incentives are effective for companies with small autonomy and large autonomy, and there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of equity incentives between companies with small autonomy and those with large autonomy. (3) There is no significant difference in long-term equity incentives between companies with small autonomy and those with large autonomy. In the case of low investment level, the size of subsidiary autonomy has no significant effect on the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive and equity incentive.
Different from the previous studies: 1) Most of the existing research on the determinants of executive incentives is based on the whole enterprise, which studies the impact of financial and governance conditions on executive incentives; the heterogeneity of the incentive effectiveness of corporate executives does not take into account the different internal business distribution characteristics. Then, the paper studies the endogenous influence of the distribution of decision-making power on the effectiveness of executive incentives under the background of business structure changes, and explores the characteristics of executive incentives under the trend of parent-subsidiary equity control. 2. Due to the lack of branch data, most of the existing collectivization studies in China are listed companies as group branches, and research groups. The literature on the influence of executive incentives on the efficiency of the internal capital market of diversified investment firms based on the headquarters of listed companies remains at the theoretical model deduction level, lacking empirical evidence from large samples. Measuring the role of executive incentives in promoting the value of diversified equity investment enterprises has expanded the financial research of group enterprises.
The significance of this study lies in that it enriches the research on the effectiveness of executive incentives from the perspective of the distribution of business between parent and subsidiary companies and power distribution characteristics, and provides a reference for the formulation of executive incentives: under the trend of increasing equity investment in parent and subsidiary companies, companies with large autonomy of subsidiary companies simply follow the salary incentive based on Merger Performance Incentives can not motivate the parent executives. Companies with high equity investment and large subsidiary autonomy should increase the proportion of equity incentives in parent Executives'incentive mechanism and reduce the proportion of incentive incentives.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92;F275
本文編號(hào)：2202307
[Abstract]:Shareholders motivate executives on the basis of corporate performance to alleviate the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. However, the degree of equity investment between parent and subsidiary companies of Listed Companies in China is increasing day by day. The parent company strengthens the function of resource allocation, weakens production and operation activities, and the overall performance is increasingly dependent on the operating conditions of subsidiaries. Therefore, under the incentive mechanism based on the overall performance of the enterprise, the business structure and the power structure of the increase of the degree of long-term equity investment of the parent-subsidiary company and the autonomy of the subsidiary company will lead to the listed company. The decision and effect of executive incentive in headquarters are more and more influenced by the operating conditions of the lower subsidiaries which are not directly determined by their actions.
Existing researches on executive incentives mostly focus on the merger of parent-subsidiary companies, the impact of company size, governance structure and management tenure on executive incentives, and the impact of internal business and power distribution on executive incentives. Therefore, this paper takes the characteristics of management decision-making power distribution under the background of corporate business restructuring as the breakthrough point, from the perspective of principal-agent, as to whether the size of subsidiary autonomy will affect the effectiveness of executive incentives under the trend of increasing long-term equity investment. The problem is studied.
According to the incentive contract theory, effective executive incentives should be linked to the results of managerial control. After business sinks, the influence of parent executives on firm performance is affected by the size of autonomy of subsidiary executives. Correspondingly, the accuracy of evaluating parent Executives'performance by combining performance also depends on the decision-making power of the firm. On the other hand, after the business sinks, the parent company executives are mainly engaged in the allocation of corporate capital, and the allocation efficiency needs longer time than the quality of business decisions, resulting in long-term and short-term incentives for the parent company executives. The structure of incentive mechanism needs to be reconsidered. Based on the above analysis, we will study the influence of subsidiary autonomy on parent company executive compensation incentive and equity incentive effectiveness from the persistence of earnings.
Using the sample of A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2011, this paper investigates the effect of corporate autonomy distribution on the incentive effectiveness of parent-subsidiary executives. The effectiveness of incentive incentives is poor; (2) When the listed companies invest more in subsidiary equity, equity incentives are effective for companies with small autonomy and large autonomy, and there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of equity incentives between companies with small autonomy and those with large autonomy. (3) There is no significant difference in long-term equity incentives between companies with small autonomy and those with large autonomy. In the case of low investment level, the size of subsidiary autonomy has no significant effect on the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive and equity incentive.
Different from the previous studies: 1) Most of the existing research on the determinants of executive incentives is based on the whole enterprise, which studies the impact of financial and governance conditions on executive incentives; the heterogeneity of the incentive effectiveness of corporate executives does not take into account the different internal business distribution characteristics. Then, the paper studies the endogenous influence of the distribution of decision-making power on the effectiveness of executive incentives under the background of business structure changes, and explores the characteristics of executive incentives under the trend of parent-subsidiary equity control. 2. Due to the lack of branch data, most of the existing collectivization studies in China are listed companies as group branches, and research groups. The literature on the influence of executive incentives on the efficiency of the internal capital market of diversified investment firms based on the headquarters of listed companies remains at the theoretical model deduction level, lacking empirical evidence from large samples. Measuring the role of executive incentives in promoting the value of diversified equity investment enterprises has expanded the financial research of group enterprises.
The significance of this study lies in that it enriches the research on the effectiveness of executive incentives from the perspective of the distribution of business between parent and subsidiary companies and power distribution characteristics, and provides a reference for the formulation of executive incentives: under the trend of increasing equity investment in parent and subsidiary companies, companies with large autonomy of subsidiary companies simply follow the salary incentive based on Merger Performance Incentives can not motivate the parent executives. Companies with high equity investment and large subsidiary autonomy should increase the proportion of equity incentives in parent Executives'incentive mechanism and reduce the proportion of incentive incentives.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92;F275
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