【摘要】：退市是上市公司由于未滿足交易所的上市標(biāo)準(zhǔn)而被終止上市的情形,即由一家上市公司變?yōu)榉巧鲜泄尽Ｍ耸锌煞种鲃有酝耸泻捅粍有酝耸�。主動性退市一般因合并、收購或私有化�?dǎo)致；被動性退市則是由于公司無法達(dá)到股票交易管理機(jī)構(gòu)對上市公司的要求。已有研究文獻(xiàn)表明退市存在顯著經(jīng)濟(jì)成本,包括降低股票價格、侵蝕流動性及增加波動性。中國證券監(jiān)督管理委員會負(fù)責(zé)制定股票首次公開上市和退市的法規(guī)和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。如果公司違反了某些小的規(guī)則,股票會被給予特別處理；如果公司嚴(yán)重違反了相關(guān)規(guī)則,這支股票會被給予退市風(fēng)險警示或者直接被交易所摘牌。中國證券監(jiān)督管理委員采用的退市過程讓中國的股票退市標(biāo)準(zhǔn)顯得尤為獨(dú)特。目前在中國有關(guān)被動性退市對經(jīng)濟(jì)影響的研究不多,所以這成為了作者研究的動機(jī)。 另外,雖然之前的文獻(xiàn)已經(jīng)就財務(wù)變量(例如：破產(chǎn)和收購)、公司治理變量與企業(yè)績效之間的關(guān)系做過研究,但對公司治理變量與股票被動性退市之間關(guān)系的研究不多。中國公司治理實(shí)踐與美國或者德國／日本的模式非常不同。因此,檢驗中國公司治理實(shí)踐對于退市的影響變得十分必要。這篇論文主要有兩個研究目的：檢驗中國市場退市事件的市場反應(yīng),并評估中國公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對退市的影響。 與中國退市規(guī)則相關(guān)的上市狀態(tài)變化事件包括：從正常到特別處理、正常到退市風(fēng)險警示、退市風(fēng)險警示到特別處理、退市風(fēng)險警示到正常、特別處理到正常、特別處理到退市風(fēng)險警示、以及被動性退市。為了檢驗退市事件的市場反應(yīng),我們選擇1990-2012年之間在上海和深圳上市的1281支“A股”股票為樣本,使用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的事件研究方法來衡量這些事件的平均異常收益,使用市場模型測算正常報酬并使用均值調(diào)整報酬模型進(jìn)行穩(wěn)健性檢驗。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),相對于正面事件公告,市場對負(fù)面事件公告的反應(yīng)更為敏感；就狀態(tài)之間轉(zhuǎn)換的市場反應(yīng)而言,正常與退市風(fēng)險警示之間轉(zhuǎn)換的市場反應(yīng)明顯強(qiáng)于正常與特別處理之間和(或)特別處理與退市風(fēng)險警示之間的市場反應(yīng)；退市公司股票價格平均下跌85%,股東承擔(dān)明顯的退市成本。上述與中國退市規(guī)則相關(guān)的各種事件經(jīng)濟(jì)成本的新的結(jié)論對投資者和監(jiān)管者具有一定的指導(dǎo)作用。 為了檢驗中國公司治理對被動性退市的影響,我們使用了1990-2012年之間所有被動性退市的上海和深圳證券交易所“A股”樣本,在控制行業(yè)和規(guī)模的基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建了退市和正常兩個配對樣本組,采用判別分析和Logistic回歸來檢驗在退市前三個不同時期董事會特征和股權(quán)特征對退市的影響：退市前三年、退市前兩年和退市前一年。我們使用下述董事會特征和股權(quán)特征變量來代表公司治理狀況：董事會規(guī)模、董事會活躍性、董事會獨(dú)立性、審計委員會、股東參與程度、內(nèi)部人持股和股權(quán)集中度。 我們發(fā)現(xiàn),股東參與程度和董事會獨(dú)立性在退市前一年顯著影響退市發(fā)生幾率；董事會活躍性在退市前連續(xù)兩年內(nèi)顯著影響；股權(quán)集中度在退市前三年和前兩年內(nèi)都顯著影響,內(nèi)部人持股在退市前所有三年內(nèi)都有顯著影響,而審計委員會和董事會規(guī)模對退市沒有影響。我們大致得出結(jié)論,在中國,相較于董事會特征,股權(quán)特征能更顯著地區(qū)分退市公司和正常公司。
[Abstract]:Delisting is a situation in which a listed company is terminated because it fails to meet the listing criteria of the exchange, i.e. it is changed from a listed company to a non-listed company. delisting can be divided into active delisting and passive delisting. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is responsible for formulating regulations and standards for the initial public offering and delisting of stocks. If a company violates certain minor rules, the stocks will be subject to the risk of being delisted. The delisting process adopted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission makes the delisting criteria of Chinese stocks particularly unique. Currently, there is no research on the economic impact of passive delisting in China. More, so this has become the motive of the author's research.
In addition, although previous literatures have studied the relationship between financial variables (e.g. bankruptcy and acquisition), corporate governance variables and corporate performance, little has been done on the relationship between corporate governance variables and passive delisting of stocks. It is necessary to examine the impact of Chinese corporate governance practices on delisting. This paper aims to examine the market response to delisting events in the Chinese market and assess the impact of Chinese corporate governance structure on delisting.
Listing status changes related to delisting rules in China include: from normal to special handling, normal to delisting risk warning, delisting risk warning to special handling, delisting risk warning to normal, special handling to normal, special handling to delisting risk warning, and passive delisting. We selected 1 281 A-share stocks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 1990 to 2012 as samples, used standard event research methods to measure the average abnormal returns of these events, used market models to measure normal returns and used mean-adjusted returns model to test the robustness. We found that, compared with positive event announcements, the market was open to the public. The response of the market to the announcement of negative events is more sensitive; as far as the market reaction to the transition between States is concerned, the market response to the transition between normal and delisting risk warnings is significantly stronger than that between normal and special treatment and/or between special treatment and delisting risk warnings; the average price of delisted stocks dropped by 85%, and shareholders accepted. These new conclusions of the economic costs of various events related to China's delisting rules have a guiding role for investors and regulators.
In order to test the effect of Chinese corporate governance on passive delisting, we use all passive delisting samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1990 to 2012 to construct two paired sample groups, delisting and normal, on the basis of industry and scale control. Discriminant analysis and Logistic regression are used to test the delisting. We use the following board characteristics and equity characteristics variables to represent corporate governance: board size, board activity, board independence, audit committee, shareholders'participation, and the extent of internal. Sector shareholding and ownership concentration.
We find that shareholder participation and board independence significantly affect the probability of delisting one year before delisting; board activity significantly affects delisting two consecutive years before delisting; ownership concentration significantly affects three years before delisting and two years before delisting; insider ownership significantly affects all three years before delisting, while auditing does. The size of the board and the board of directors has no effect on delisting. We generally conclude that in China, the shareholding characteristics are more prominent in distinguishing delisting companies from normal companies than the board characteristics.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F276.6;F832.51;F271

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本文編號：2180704