【摘要】：管理層代理成本的高低會直接影響到公司所有者和債權(quán)人以及其他利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)益，是影響企業(yè)資源有效配置和經(jīng)濟(jì)良性發(fā)展的重要因素之一。國內(nèi)外關(guān)于如何緩解代理沖突、降低管理層代理成本的研究雖然很多，但是已有研究大多只關(guān)注公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的影響，忽視了公司外部治理機(jī)制可能對管理層代理成本產(chǎn)生的作用，結(jié)合公司內(nèi)外部治理機(jī)制進(jìn)行研究的就更較之甚少。因此，本文試圖以公司內(nèi)外部治理機(jī)制為視角，實證研究內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量與媒體監(jiān)督及兩者的相互關(guān)系對管理層代理成本的影響，以期為如何有效降低管理成代理成本提供新的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)。 本文以委托代理與代理成本理論、信息不對稱理論和利益相關(guān)者共同治理理論為基礎(chǔ)，從理論上分析了內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量、媒體監(jiān)督以及二者的相互關(guān)系對公司管理層代理成本的影響。在此基礎(chǔ)上，以2008至2011年5745家A股上市公司為樣本，建立了多元線性回歸模型，在控制了媒體監(jiān)督樣本自選擇偏差后，分別考察了內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量、媒體監(jiān)督及二者間的相互關(guān)系對管理層代理成本的影響，并對媒體監(jiān)督性質(zhì)做了進(jìn)一步研究。實證結(jié)果表明：（1）內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量越高，公司管理層代理成本越低，即高質(zhì)量的內(nèi)部控制具有降低管理層代理成本的作用；（2）媒體監(jiān)督具有發(fā)揮公司外部治理、降低管理層代理成本的作用，但是在不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)背景下，媒體報道性質(zhì)對管理層代理成本具有不同的影響。具體來看，在國有企業(yè)中，媒體報道（負(fù)面報道和非負(fù)面報道）具有監(jiān)督公司治理、降低管理層代理成本的作用，但是對于非國有企業(yè)，，僅是媒體負(fù)面報道具有監(jiān)督治理的作用；（3）高質(zhì)量的內(nèi)部控制與媒體監(jiān)督在降低管理層代理成本上存在著互補(bǔ)關(guān)系，高質(zhì)量的內(nèi)部控制與媒體監(jiān)督的共同治理對降低管理層代理成本、保護(hù)投資者利益具有更顯著的作用。 最后根據(jù)理論分析與實證結(jié)論，本文從強(qiáng)化對內(nèi)部控制的認(rèn)識，提高內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量、重視媒體監(jiān)督的治理作用，提高公司治理水平兩方面對如何更有效的降低管理層代理成本提出相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:The cost of management agency will directly affect the rights and interests of the owners, creditors and other stakeholders. It is one of the important factors that affect the effective allocation of resources and the benign development of the economy. Although there are a lot of researches on how to mitigate agency conflict and reduce the cost of management agency, most of the studies have focused on the influence of the internal governance mechanism of the company. It ignores the effect of the external governance mechanism on the agency cost of the management, and the research on the internal and external governance mechanism of the company is even less than that of the internal and external governance mechanism of the company. Therefore, from the perspective of internal and external governance mechanism, this paper attempts to empirically study the impact of internal control quality, media supervision and their relationship on management agency costs. In order to provide new empirical evidence for how to effectively reduce the cost of management agent. Based on the principal-agent and agency cost theory, information asymmetry theory and stakeholder governance theory, this paper theoretically analyzes the quality of internal control. The influence of media supervision and their relationship on agency cost of management. On this basis, taking 5745 A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2011 as samples, a multivariate linear regression model is established. After controlling the self-selection deviation of media supervision samples, the internal control quality is investigated respectively. The influence of media supervision and the relationship between them on the agency cost of management is also discussed, and the nature of media supervision is further studied. The empirical results show that: (1) the higher the quality of internal control, the lower the agency cost of management, that is, the higher the quality of internal control is, the lower the cost of management agency is; (2) the media supervision has the function of bringing into play the external governance of the company. Under the background of different property rights, the nature of media report has different influence on management agency cost. Specifically, in state-owned enterprises, media reports (negative reports and non-negative reports) have the function of supervising corporate governance and reducing agency costs of management, but for non-state-owned enterprises, (3) High quality internal control and media supervision have complementary relationship in reducing the cost of management agency. The joint governance of high quality internal control and media supervision plays a more significant role in reducing the agency cost of management and protecting the interests of investors. Finally, according to the theoretical analysis and empirical conclusions, this paper focuses on strengthening the understanding of internal control, improving the quality of internal control, and attaching importance to the governance role of media supervision. To improve the level of corporate governance two aspects of how to more effectively reduce the cost of management agency policy recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：G206;F275;F832.51

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