本文選題：股權激勵 + 上市公司��； 參考：《湘潭大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權與經營權互相分離使得管理層和股東之間的代理問題成為公司治理中的一個重要問題,股權激勵是解決代理問題的重要方式之一。在經濟發(fā)達的西方國家股權激勵運用相當廣泛,相比之下,我國上市公司股權激勵發(fā)展較為滯后。2006年股權分置改革完成為我國股權激勵實施掃清了障礙,股權激勵相關法律法規(guī)的逐漸完善,為我國上市公司股權激勵的實施提供了指引,股權激勵逐漸成為我國企業(yè)核心人才激勵機制的重要組成部分。但股權激勵的實施不是一帆風順的,有的企業(yè)股權激勵計劃在中途“夭折”,有的企業(yè)實施股權激勵后未帶來應有的效果。如何根據(jù)企業(yè)實際情況設計有效的激勵計劃是值得深入研究的。本文采用理論研究與案例分析相結合的方法,以J上市公司2014年股權激勵作為研究對象,從企業(yè)財務績效方面、公司股價方面及企業(yè)人才保留方面對J上市公司股權激勵實施效果進行了評價。在財務績效方面,J上市公司實施股權激勵后發(fā)展能力得到提高,營業(yè)收入與凈利潤實現(xiàn)了較快增長,但只在股權激勵前兩期比較明顯,股權激勵后一期營業(yè)收入增長率與凈利潤增長率放緩;營運能力得到提高;但未能有效改善企業(yè)盈利能力;說明股權激勵長期激勵效果有所不足。在公司股價方面,股權激勵后整體業(yè)績提升帶動了J上市公司股價上揚。從企業(yè)人才保留方面上看,股權激勵后大部分核心骨干得以保留。J上市公司股權激勵實施效果未能充分發(fā)揮與其股權激勵方案制定不科學是分不開的:公司業(yè)績考核指標單一且偏低,個人業(yè)績考核指標設置模糊,影響了股權激勵的激勵效果;偏低的授予價格會降低激勵對象工作的積極性;激勵有效期偏短以及解鎖比例設置不合理與股權激勵作為長期激勵機制相悖;未設有預留股份不利于企業(yè)對優(yōu)秀人才的吸引。針對其存在的問題本文提供了一些建議。希望通過本文的研究,能提升J上市公司股權激勵方案的合理性,使得企業(yè)更好地利用股權激勵促進長遠發(fā)展;同時也能為我國中小民營上市公司實施股權激勵提供借鑒。
[Abstract]:The separation of modern enterprise ownership and management makes the agency problem between management and shareholders become an important issue in corporate governance. Equity incentive is one of the important ways to solve the agency problem. Equity incentive is widely used in the developed western countries, but the development of equity incentive of listed companies in our country lags behind. The completion of the split share structure reform in 2006 cleared the way for the implementation of equity incentive in our country. The improvement of relevant laws and regulations on equity incentive has provided guidance for the implementation of equity incentive of listed companies in China. Equity incentive has gradually become an important part of the incentive mechanism of core talents in Chinese enterprises. However, the implementation of equity incentive is not smooth, some enterprises' equity incentive plan "aborted" in the middle of the way, and some enterprises have not brought due effect after the implementation of equity incentive. How to design an effective incentive plan according to the actual situation of enterprises is worthy of further study. This paper adopts the method of combining theoretical research and case analysis, taking the equity incentive of J listed company in 2014 as the research object, from the aspect of enterprise financial performance, The stock price and talent retention of J listed company are evaluated. In terms of financial performance, the development ability of J listed companies has been improved after the implementation of equity incentive, and the operating income and net profit have been rapidly increased, but only in the first two periods of equity incentive is more obvious. After equity incentive, the growth rate of operating income and net profit slowed down; the ability of operation was improved; but it failed to improve the profitability of enterprises effectively; it showed that the long-term incentive effect of equity incentive was insufficient. In terms of share prices, the overall performance after equity incentives led J-listed companies to rise in stock prices. From the point of view of the retention of talents in enterprises, After equity incentive most of the core backbone can retain .J listed company equity incentive implementation effect is not fully play and its equity incentive plan formulation is unscientific: the company performance evaluation index is single and low. The fuzzy setting of individual performance appraisal index affects the incentive effect of equity incentive, the low award price will reduce the enthusiasm of incentive object. The short period of incentive and the unreasonable setting of unlocking ratio are contrary to the stock right incentive as a long-term incentive mechanism; the absence of reserved shares is not conducive to attracting outstanding talents. Some suggestions are given in this paper for the existing problems. It is hoped that through the research in this paper, the rationality of the equity incentive scheme of J listed company can be enhanced, and the enterprise can make better use of equity incentive to promote the long-term development. At the same time, it can also provide reference for the implementation of equity incentive in small and medium-sized private listed companies in our country.
【學位授予單位】：湘潭大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92

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