本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 高管薪酬 投資過(guò)度 投資不足　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文以代理理論和信息不對(duì)稱理論為基礎(chǔ)，結(jié)合我國(guó)上市公司“一股獨(dú)大”和薪酬管制的制度背景，將管理層與股東沖突、大股東與中小股東沖突納入一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的框架中，就股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、高管薪酬對(duì)投資過(guò)度和投資不足的影響進(jìn)行了理論分析，并以我國(guó)上市公司2007~2011年的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本，，運(yùn)用非平衡面板數(shù)據(jù)的回歸方法，實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、高管薪酬對(duì)上市公司投資決策的影響。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在我國(guó)上市公司中既存在投資過(guò)度的情形，也存在投資不足的問(wèn)題。股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)于企業(yè)的投資過(guò)度和投資不足的影響不同。第一大股東持股比例對(duì)于企業(yè)投資過(guò)度的影響總體來(lái)講并不顯著，但在非國(guó)有控股的上市公司中，第一大股東持股對(duì)企業(yè)投資過(guò)度影響顯著，并呈現(xiàn)“倒U”形的關(guān)系。就投資不足而言，第一大股東持股比例與投資不足之間存在著顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，即第一大股東持股比例越高，企業(yè)的投資不足問(wèn)題越小。但在非國(guó)有控股的上市公司中，這一關(guān)系并不顯著，這恰好與投資過(guò)度的回歸結(jié)果相對(duì)應(yīng)。 此外，作為解決管理層與股東沖突的高管薪酬激勵(lì)，對(duì)于企業(yè)投資過(guò)度和投資不足的影響也不同。首先，對(duì)于投資過(guò)度，總體而言，不當(dāng)高管薪酬激勵(lì)加劇了企業(yè)的投資過(guò)度。這在地方政府及一般國(guó)有企業(yè)控制上市公司、非國(guó)有控股的上市公司中表現(xiàn)顯著，高管薪酬契約失效導(dǎo)致了企業(yè)投資決策的代理問(wèn)題；而在中央及部委控制上市公司中，高管薪酬與企業(yè)投資過(guò)度關(guān)系并不顯著。就投資不足而言，總體上，上市公司高管薪酬與企業(yè)投資不足存在著顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。高管薪酬的提升，有助于緩解企業(yè)投資不足的問(wèn)題，有效的管理層薪酬激勵(lì)可以解決企業(yè)投資決策上的代理問(wèn)題。但對(duì)不同控股股東的上市公司影響存在著差異。對(duì)于中央及部委控制上市公司而言，高管薪酬與企業(yè)不足顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，但地方政府及一般國(guó)有企業(yè)控制上市公司其高管薪酬與企業(yè)投資不足負(fù)相關(guān)但不顯著，在非國(guó)有控股上市公司中，高管薪酬甚至與企業(yè)投資不足正相關(guān)但不顯著。 本文的研究對(duì)于理解上市公司薪酬激勵(lì)制度的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果具有一定意義，同時(shí)也為如何優(yōu)化上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、完善高管激勵(lì)約束和公司治理提供了一個(gè)有益的視角。
[Abstract]:On the basis of agency theory and information asymmetry theory, combined with the institutional background of "one share dominance" and salary regulation of listed companies in China, this paper conflicts management with shareholders. The conflict between major shareholders and minority shareholders is brought into a unified framework. The influence of ownership structure and executive compensation on overinvestment and underinvestment is analyzed theoretically. Taking the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2011 as a sample and using the regression method of non-equilibrium panel data, this paper empirically tests the influence of equity structure and executive compensation on the investment decisions of listed companies. It is found that there is overinvestment in listed companies in China. There is also the problem of underinvestment. The impact of ownership structure on the overinvestment and underinvestment of enterprises is different. However, in the non-state-owned holding listed companies, the largest shareholder stock ownership has a significant impact on the investment of enterprises, and presents a "inverted U" relationship. As far as underinvestment is concerned. There is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of the largest shareholder holding and the underinvestment, that is, the higher the proportion of the first largest shareholder, the smaller the problem of underinvestment. But in the non-state-controlled listed companies. The relationship is not significant, which corresponds to the regression result of excessive investment. In addition, as a solution to the conflict between management and shareholders, executive compensation incentives have different effects on overinvestment and underinvestment. First, for over-investment, overall. Improper executive compensation incentives have exacerbated the overinvestment of enterprises. This is evident in local governments and general state-owned enterprises which control listed companies and non-state-controlled listed companies. The failure of executive compensation contract leads to the agency problem of enterprise investment decision. In the central and ministerial control of listed companies, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate investment is not significant. In terms of insufficient investment, overall. There is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation and underinvestment in listed companies. The promotion of executive compensation helps to alleviate the problem of underinvestment. Effective management compensation incentive can solve the agency problem in the investment decision of enterprises. However, there are differences in the impact on the listed companies of different controlling shareholders. For the central government and the ministries to control the listed companies. Executive compensation is negatively correlated with the lack of enterprise, but the local government and general state-owned enterprises control the listed companies their executive compensation is negative correlation with the lack of enterprise investment, but not significant, in non-state-owned holding listed companies. Executive compensation is even positively correlated but not significant with underinvestment. The research in this paper has certain significance for understanding the economic consequences of the salary incentive system of listed companies, but also for how to optimize the equity structure of listed companies. Improving executive incentive and restraint and corporate governance provides a useful perspective.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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