本文關(guān)鍵詞：宏觀環(huán)境和高管超額薪酬對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的影響研究　出處：《安徽大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：經(jīng)濟(jì)信息在宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)管理中起到至關(guān)重要的作用,是利益相關(guān)者與企業(yè)溝通的橋梁,是企業(yè)與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手相抗衡的重要手段,是政府進(jìn)行宏觀調(diào)控不可或缺的決策依據(jù)。市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展和完善越來(lái)越離不開(kāi)經(jīng)濟(jì)信息的支撐和導(dǎo)向,而信息質(zhì)量是保障企業(yè)治理機(jī)制設(shè)置合理性、資源配置有效性的重要前提。會(huì)計(jì)信息作為經(jīng)濟(jì)信息中的重要組成部分,在資本市場(chǎng)運(yùn)行中具有舉足輕重的地位。然而,隨著證券市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展,眾多上市公司紛紛曝出會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量丑聞,會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量也因此成為社會(huì)各界人士討論的熱門(mén)話題。盡管證監(jiān)會(huì)等管理機(jī)構(gòu)不斷提出完善會(huì)計(jì)信息披露的方式、方法,規(guī)范和約束會(huì)計(jì)信息造假行為,但這并沒(méi)有從根源上解決會(huì)計(jì)信息失真的問(wèn)題。會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量與公司內(nèi)外部因素息息相關(guān),內(nèi)部因素中,高層管理人員的專業(yè)水平和道德素養(yǎng)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息的真實(shí)性和可靠性具有重大的直接影響;外部因素中,作為企業(yè)賴以生存的宏觀環(huán)境不容忽視。因此本文將我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型時(shí)期的外部宏觀環(huán)境與作為公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制重要的組成部分——高管薪酬、超額薪酬相結(jié)合,從委托代理理論、薪酬契約理論、管理層權(quán)力理論入手,運(yùn)用規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,探討外部宏觀環(huán)境和高管超額薪酬對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的綜合影響,為改善我國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量提供相應(yīng)的政策建議。本文的研究?jī)?nèi)容共有五部分組成。第一部分為緒論,主要闡述在轉(zhuǎn)型時(shí)期經(jīng)濟(jì)背景下本文研究的理論意義和實(shí)踐意義以及研究思路和研究方法,回顧國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的研究成果,并對(duì)其進(jìn)行評(píng)述。第二部分為概念界定和理論基礎(chǔ),主要介紹宏觀環(huán)境、高管薪酬、高管超額薪酬和會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量等概念,并闡述委托代理理論、管理層權(quán)力理論、薪酬契約理論等。第三部分為制度背景、理論分析與研究假設(shè),首先對(duì)我國(guó)近年來(lái)面臨的宏觀環(huán)境與上市公司高管薪酬的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行描述與分析,然后論述宏觀環(huán)境、高管超額薪酬對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的作用機(jī)理,并據(jù)此提出本文的研究假設(shè)。第四部分為實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),本文選取2009—2015年滬深兩市A股上市公司11638個(gè)觀測(cè)值為研究樣本,采用OLS回歸方法,檢驗(yàn)本文提出的假設(shè)。第五部分為本文的研究結(jié)論與政策建議。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)宏觀環(huán)境與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量顯著正相關(guān),即宏觀環(huán)境越好,會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量越高,說(shuō)明宏觀環(huán)境作為外生變量對(duì)公司治理產(chǎn)生重要影響;(2)高管超額薪酬能顯著提升會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,即高管超額薪酬越高,會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量越好,高薪是高管能力的體現(xiàn),說(shuō)明薪酬契約理論在我國(guó)仍具有一定的適用性;(3)隨著宏觀環(huán)境的改善,高管超額薪酬對(duì)提升會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的作用越來(lái)越小,即宏觀環(huán)境減弱了高管超額薪酬對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的促進(jìn)作用;(4)與民營(yíng)企業(yè)相比,宏觀環(huán)境對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)高管超額薪酬之于會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的抑制作用更強(qiáng),這可能是由于國(guó)有企業(yè)擁有更為有利的發(fā)展環(huán)境以及薪酬約束機(jī)制的影響,說(shuō)明由產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)帶來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的差異值得深入研究。
[Abstract]:Economic information plays a crucial role in macroeconomic management, is a bridge between stakeholders and corporate communication, is an important means of enterprise and competitors, is the government's macro-control indispensable basis for decision-making. The development and perfection of market economy more and more support and guidance cannot do without economic information, and information quality is the guarantee of the rationality of setting up the mechanism of corporate governance, an important prerequisite for the effectiveness of resource allocation. Accounting information is an important part of economic information, plays an important role in the capital market. However, with the development of the stock market, many listed companies have exposed the scandal of the quality of accounting information, accounting information quality has also become popular topic of community discussion. Although continuously put forward and perfect the accounting information disclosure way, the Commission and other regulatory agencies, and norms The constraint of accounting information fraud, but this did not solve the problem of distortion of accounting information from the source. The internal and external factors is closely related to the quality of accounting information and company internal factors, have great influence of the senior management personnel professional level and moral qualities of the authenticity and reliability of accounting information; the external factors, as macro the survival of the enterprise environment can not be ignored. This paper will be the period of economic transformation in China's external macro environment and as an important part of the internal mechanism of corporate governance, executive compensation, excess compensation combination from the principal-agent theory, compensation theory, starting with the management power theory, using the method of combining normative research and empirical research. To discuss the effect of external macro environment, and executive compensation in excess of the quality of accounting information, to improve the quality of accounting information of Listed Companies in China To provide the corresponding policy recommendations. The research content of this paper consists of five parts. The first part is the introduction, mainly expounds the background of the economic transition period under the theoretical and practical significance of research and research ideas and research methods, research the literature review results, and carries on the review. The second part is the concept of the definition and theoretical basis, mainly introduces the macro environment, executive compensation, executive excess compensation and the quality of accounting information concept, and elaborates the principal-agent theory, managerial power theory, compensation contract theory. The third part is the system background, theoretical analysis and research hypothesis, first the current situation of executive compensation in our country is facing the macro environment in recent years the listed companies with the description and analysis, and then discusses the macro environment, the mechanism of executive compensation in excess of the quality of accounting information, and puts forward the research in this paper accordingly Hypothesis. The fourth part is the empirical test, this paper selects 2009 - 2015 Shanghai and Shenzhen two listed A shares 11638 observations as the research sample, using the OLS regression method, test the hypothesis proposed in this paper. The fifth part is the conclusions and policy recommendations. The study found that: (1) is significantly related to the macro environment and accounting the quality of information, namely the macro environment better, the higher the quality of accounting information, that the macro environment as an exogenous variable has an important impact on corporate governance; (2) executive excess compensation can significantly improve the quality of accounting information, namely the executive excess compensation is higher, the better the quality of accounting information, the money is reflected the executive ability, that compensation contract theory is still has certain applicability in our country; (3) with the improvement of the macroeconomic environment, the smaller the excess compensation of executives and to improve the quality of accounting information, the macroeconomic environment weakened the excess compensation for Executives The quality of accounting information and promote the effect; (4) compared with the private enterprises, the macro environment of the inhibition on state-owned enterprise executives pay excess on the quality of accounting information is stronger, this may be due to state-owned enterprises have a more favorable environment for development and pay restraint mechanism effect, worthy of in-depth study that the difference caused by property right the economic consequences.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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