本文關鍵詞：制造商主導下的供應鏈聯(lián)合信貸融資模型研究　出處：《中國科學技術大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 供應鏈金融 貿易信貸融資 銀行信貸融資 信用擔保 信貸比例

【摘要】：近些年來,隨著市場經營的不確定性,中小企業(yè)很難從銀行獲得貸款,因為他們產生不良貸款和貸款違約的可能性高。而作為銀行信貸的替代品,貿易信貸為中小企業(yè)提供了供應鏈融資的機會。在無法獲得銀行信貸的情況下,為零售商提供延期延遲是制造商刺激銷售和減少庫存的有效途徑,因為它某種意義上代表著促銷。截至2015年12月31日,沃爾瑪全部應付賬款大概占資產負債表總額的60%,大約有385億美元規(guī)模。這些都反映了貿易信貸廣泛的使用。因此供應鏈金融已成為學者和實踐從業(yè)者都迫切希望研究的領域�；谶@樣的背景下,本文主要研究聯(lián)合貿易信貸融資和制造商擔保下的銀行信貸融資條件下,制造商如何為資金約束的零售商選擇融資方式,從而使得制造商自身利潤最大。本文涉及三個問題:(1)單融資模式下,制造商和零售商的最優(yōu)決策和信貸決策;(2)聯(lián)合融資模式下,制造商和零售商的最優(yōu)決策和信貸決策;(3)貿易信貸利率和銀行信貸利率大小關系對結果的影響。為了解決以上三個問題,本文考慮了單個制造商和單個零售商組成的二層供應鏈系統(tǒng),并構成斯坦科爾伯格博弈。制造商資金充足占主導地位,零售商資金受約束,是追隨者。制造商可以為零售商決策選擇哪種融資方式。主要包括兩種融資方式:(1)貿易信貸融資,即零售商預付一部分資金,制造商允許零售商剩余未付款項在銷售結束后結算;(2)制造商擔保下的銀行信貸融資,即零售商從銀行獲得銀行貸款,然后由制造商為融資提供信用擔保,如果期末零售商破產無法償還貸款資金,那么由制造商幫助零售商歸還剩余貸款資金。另外零售商決策自身訂貨量。銀行不參與博弈過程,銀行也沒有資金損失的風險。本文采用理論與實證相結合的研究方法,首先通過理論證明研究了在貿易信貸利率低于銀行信貸利率情況下,單信貸融資和雙信貸融資下零售商和制造商的最優(yōu)決策。并發(fā)現(xiàn)當生產成本滿足一定條件下,聯(lián)合兩種信貸融資可以顯著提高制造商的期望利潤。然后,再通過實證研究在貿易信貸利率高于銀行信貸利率,聯(lián)合兩種信貸模式對制造商最優(yōu)決策利潤的影響。最后,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)在雙信貸融資模式下,當生產成本較低時,制造商采取利率更低的信貸模式為最優(yōu);當生產成本較高時,制造商采取利率更高的信貸模式最優(yōu)。并且本文從管理啟示的角度,給出模型的實踐意義,為中小企業(yè)運營和融資提供對策參考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the uncertainty of market operation, it is difficult for SMEs to obtain loans from banks because they are highly likely to generate non-performing loans and default on loans, and as a substitute for bank credit. Trade credit provides supply chain financing opportunities for SMEs. In the absence of bank credit, delay delay for retailers is an effective way for manufacturers to stimulate sales and reduce inventories. Because it represents sales in a way, as of December 31st 2015, Wal-Mart 's total accounts payable accounted for about 60% of its total balance sheet. These reflect the widespread use of trade credit. Therefore, supply chain finance has become an area that scholars and practitioners are eager to study. This paper mainly studies how the manufacturer chooses the financing method for the funded retailers under the condition of joint trade credit financing and bank credit financing under the guarantee of manufacturer. This paper deals with the optimal decision and credit decision of manufacturer and retailer under the single financing model. (2) the optimal decision and credit decision of manufacturer and retailer under the mode of co-financing; In order to solve the above three problems, a two-tier supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is considered. And constitute Steinkelberg game. Manufacturers have sufficient capital to dominate, retailer funds are constrained. A follower. The manufacturer can decide which financing method to choose for the retailer. It mainly includes two financing ways: 1) Trade credit financing, that is, the retailer prepaid part of the funds. The manufacturer allows the retailer to settle the remaining outstanding payments after the end of the sale; A bank credit facility guaranteed by the manufacturer, in which the retailer obtains a bank loan from the bank and then the manufacturer provides a credit guarantee for the financing, if the end retailer fails to repay the loan. Then the manufacturer helps the retailer to repay the remaining loan funds. In addition, the retailer decides to order its own quantity. The bank does not participate in the game process. Banks also have no risk of capital loss. This paper uses a combination of theoretical and empirical research methods, first of all through theoretical proof in the case of trade credit interest rate is lower than the bank credit rate. The optimal decision of retailer and manufacturer under single credit financing and double credit financing. It is also found that when the production cost meets certain conditions, the combination of two credit financing can significantly improve the manufacturer's expected profit. Then through the empirical study in the trade credit interest rate higher than the bank credit interest rate, the combination of two credit models on the manufacturer's optimal decision-making profit. Finally, this paper found that under the dual-credit financing model. When the cost of production is low, the manufacturer adopts the credit model with lower interest rate as the best; When the production cost is high, the manufacturer adopts the credit mode with higher interest rate, and this paper gives the practical significance of the model from the angle of management enlightenment, and provides the countermeasure reference for the operation and financing of small and medium-sized enterprises.
【學位授予單位】：中國科學技術大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274;F832.4

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