發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-03 22:34

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：中小板上市公司管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的實(shí)證研究　出處：《華北電力大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 中小企業(yè)板 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī) 回歸分析

【摘要】：本文主要研究了2006年以來中小企業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施的效果,論證股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度是否對(duì)中小板上市公司管理層進(jìn)行有效激勵(lì),進(jìn)而對(duì)推動(dòng)企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)的提升。 本文在總結(jié)前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,介紹了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的概念、發(fā)展情況、理論基礎(chǔ)和股權(quán)激勵(lì)的形式,并著重對(duì)近年來中小企業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施情況和特征進(jìn)行了描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析。結(jié)合相關(guān)理論和研究,利用主成分分析法建立企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)綜合性評(píng)價(jià)模型,利用回歸分析法構(gòu)建關(guān)于企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)和股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例之間關(guān)系的模型,并對(duì)樣本的選取情況進(jìn)行說明。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文依據(jù)利益趨同假說和管理者防御假說,針對(duì)中小企業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施的情況,提出三個(gè)假設(shè),并利用前文所構(gòu)建的模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,對(duì)假設(shè)進(jìn)行論證。實(shí)證分析結(jié)果顯示,已實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī)要明顯好于未實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī),且股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)之間存在正的線性相關(guān)關(guān)系。最后,針對(duì)目前我國證券市場(chǎng)股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在的一系列問題,本文提出相關(guān)建議。
[Abstract]:This paper mainly studies the effect of equity incentive implementation of SME board listed companies since 2006, and demonstrates whether the equity incentive system can effectively motivate the management of small and medium-sized board listed companies. Then promote the promotion of enterprise performance. On the basis of summarizing the previous studies, this paper introduces the concept, development, theoretical basis and the form of equity incentive. And focus on the small and medium-sized enterprises listed companies in recent years on the implementation of equity incentives and characteristics of descriptive statistical analysis, combined with relevant theory and research. The principal component analysis method is used to establish a comprehensive evaluation model of enterprise performance, and the regression analysis method is used to build a model about the relationship between enterprise performance and equity incentive ratio. On the basis of this, according to the interest convergence hypothesis and the manager defense hypothesis, this paper puts forward three hypotheses for the implementation of equity incentive of SME board listed companies. The empirical results show that the performance of the enterprises that have implemented equity incentive is obviously better than that of the enterprises without equity incentive. And there is a positive linear correlation between the proportion of equity incentive and corporate performance. Finally, in view of a series of problems existing in equity incentive in China's securities market, this paper puts forward some relevant suggestions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前4條

1 李曜,管恩華;上市公司股票增值權(quán)激勵(lì)效果的實(shí)證研究[J];商業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理;2005年10期

2 樂琦;蔣巒;藍(lán)海林;;中國企業(yè)集團(tuán)管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)、公司地位與集團(tuán)績(jī)效[J];商業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理;2009年04期

3 周彥伶;;中小板上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效關(guān)系實(shí)證研究[J];現(xiàn)代商貿(mào)工業(yè);2010年12期

4 李梓嘉;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)性的實(shí)證研究[J];中國證券期貨;2011年02期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 葛軍;股權(quán)激勵(lì)與上市公司績(jī)效關(guān)系研究[D];南京農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué);2007年

，

本文編號(hào)：1375925