【摘要】：出租車行業(yè)已經(jīng)成為城市交通的重要組成部分，但隨著出租車行業(yè)的快速發(fā)展，也出現(xiàn)了各種難以解決的問題。其中以出租車運(yùn)營主體之間利益訴求難以協(xié)調(diào)的問題最為突出。目前解決該問題的主要思路是政府規(guī)制措施本身是否合理，缺少在既定規(guī)制措施下各利益主體之間矛盾協(xié)調(diào)問題的研究。無論從理論上還是現(xiàn)實(shí)中看，在既定管制措施下各主體利益矛盾的核心問題就是管理費(fèi)的取值大小。因此，論文基于出租車運(yùn)營主體的利益博弈對管理費(fèi)的合理范圍進(jìn)行測算，為解決相關(guān)主體之間利益矛盾提供決策依據(jù)。 目前的管理費(fèi)測算通常是按照出租車公司的成本時(shí)間分?jǐn)偧右源_定。該方法無法直接體現(xiàn)各主體的利益博弈關(guān)系。為此，本文從博弈角度，在明晰各主體利益博弈關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行管理費(fèi)的測算。為體現(xiàn)各主體的利益均衡博弈，論文以管理費(fèi)為主變量，通過博弈次序、博弈主體的策略集合以及各策略選擇的收益函數(shù)共同建立起完全信息動態(tài)博弈模型。根據(jù)該模型的求解可以得到管理費(fèi)與博弈均衡解的相互關(guān)系，并以此關(guān)系為基礎(chǔ)，，通過對均衡解的分析可知，若該均衡不是最優(yōu)均衡則參與主體之間會因管理費(fèi)設(shè)置不合理而產(chǎn)生矛盾，所以論文將該均衡變?yōu)樽硬┺募{什均衡確定出管理費(fèi)合理范圍的表達(dá)式。同時(shí)，為豐富博弈過程的策略選擇，管理費(fèi)變量設(shè)定包含理想值與非理想值，所以要想最終測算出管理費(fèi)的合理范圍就需要知道管理費(fèi)的理想值。論文通過合作博弈的Shapley值得出關(guān)于單車收入的理想分配比例，進(jìn)而求得管理費(fèi)的理想值，并將該理想值帶入管理費(fèi)合理范圍表達(dá)式明確的測算出管理費(fèi)的合理范圍。 論文最后通過西安市出租車管理費(fèi)合理范圍的實(shí)證測算，對模型加以驗(yàn)證，表明模型可信。研究結(jié)論為更深入、合理確定出租車管理費(fèi)提供了方法依據(jù)，對緩解出租車運(yùn)營各利益主體的矛盾有積極作用。
[Abstract]:Taxi industry has become an important part of urban transportation, but with the rapid development of taxi industry, a variety of difficult problems have emerged. Among them, the interest demand between taxi operators is difficult to coordinate the most prominent problem. At present, the main idea to solve this problem is whether the government regulation measures are reasonable or not, and there is no research on the contradiction and coordination among the various stakeholders under the established regulation measures. Whether in theory or in reality, the core problem of interest contradiction of each subject under the established control measures is the value of management fee. Therefore, the paper calculates the reasonable scope of management fee based on the interest game of taxi operators, and provides the decision-making basis for solving the interest contradiction between the relevant subjects. Current management cost estimates are usually determined according to the taxi company's cost-time sharing. This method can not directly reflect the interest game relationship of each subject. Therefore, this article from the game point of view, on the basis of clarifying the relationship between the interests of each main body, the management costs are calculated. In order to reflect the interest equilibrium game of each subject, this paper sets up the complete information dynamic game model through the game order, the strategy set of the game main body and the profit function of each strategy choice by taking the management fee as the main variable. According to the solution of the model, the relationship between the management fee and the equilibrium solution of the game can be obtained, and on the basis of this relation, the analysis of the equilibrium solution can be seen. If the equilibrium is not the optimal one, there will be contradiction between the participants because of the unreasonable setting of the management fee. Therefore, the equilibrium will be transformed into the Nash equilibrium of sub-game to determine the expression of reasonable range of management fee. At the same time, in order to enrich the strategy choice of the game process, the management fee variable includes ideal value and non-ideal value, so it is necessary to know the ideal value of the management fee in order to finally calculate the reasonable range of the management fee. In this paper, the Shapley of cooperative game is worthy of the ideal distribution ratio of bicycle income, and then the ideal value of management fee is obtained, and the ideal value is brought into the reasonable range of management fee to calculate the reasonable range of management fee clearly. Finally, through the empirical calculation of the reasonable range of taxi management fee in Xi'an, the model is verified, which shows that the model is credible. The research conclusion provides a method basis for further and reasonable determination of taxi management fee, and plays a positive role in alleviating the contradiction among various stakeholders in taxi operation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長安大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F572;F224.32

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本文編號：2452011