【摘要】：高速公路BOT項目具有投資大、回收期長、風(fēng)險復(fù)雜等方面的特征,因此,為了使項目能夠順利進(jìn)行,應(yīng)當(dāng)對項目的風(fēng)險分擔(dān)進(jìn)行深入研究。目前對于高速公路BOT項目風(fēng)險分擔(dān)的研究,大多是在政府和投資者之間進(jìn)行的,隨著高速公路BOT項目在我國的實踐,運營商逐步從投資者中分離出來,本文主要是研究高速公路BOT項目中投資者和運營商之間的風(fēng)險分擔(dān)問題,并在此基礎(chǔ)上設(shè)立相應(yīng)的制度。 本文在以往政府和投資者之間風(fēng)險分擔(dān)的基礎(chǔ)上,采用博弈論中的委托代理模型對高速公路BOT項目的投資者和運營商的風(fēng)險分擔(dān)進(jìn)行研究,并在此基礎(chǔ)上設(shè)立了相應(yīng)的激勵制度和約束制度。 首先,在相關(guān)研究的基礎(chǔ)上,對BOT的概念進(jìn)行界定,并對高速公路BOT項目的風(fēng)險進(jìn)行識別和分析,在對一般風(fēng)險分析的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合高速公路BOT項目的風(fēng)險分擔(dān)主體,對基于主體的風(fēng)險因素進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步研究,從而確定了當(dāng)運營商從投資者中分離出來以后,高速公路BOT項目中風(fēng)險分擔(dān)的主體與客體,并研究了不同主體之間的相互關(guān)系,從而為模型的建立奠定基礎(chǔ)。 其次,在政府和投資者之間風(fēng)險分擔(dān)的基礎(chǔ)上,對這兩者的委托代理模型進(jìn)行改進(jìn),分析了高速公路BOT項目中投資者和運營商之間的風(fēng)險分擔(dān)模型,模型結(jié)果表明高速公路BOT項目風(fēng)險分擔(dān)和委托人和代理人的風(fēng)險規(guī)避程度有關(guān),并據(jù)此設(shè)立相關(guān)的風(fēng)險分擔(dān)制度,包括激勵制度和約束制度。 最后,選取了YM高速公路BOT項目作為案例進(jìn)行分析。在這個案例分析中,運用高速公路BOT項目投資者和運營商之間的博弈模型進(jìn)行分析,并確定在不對稱信息的情況下,激勵制度和約束制度的設(shè)立和風(fēng)險分擔(dān)密切相關(guān)。
[Abstract]:Expressway BOT project has the characteristics of large investment, long payback period, complex risk and so on. Therefore, in order to make the project carry on smoothly, the risk sharing of the project should be deeply studied. At present, the research on risk sharing of expressway BOT projects is mostly carried out between the government and investors. With the practice of expressway BOT projects in China, operators are gradually separated from investors. This paper mainly studies the problem of risk sharing between investors and operators in expressway BOT project, and establishes the corresponding system on this basis. Based on the previous risk sharing between the government and investors, this paper uses the principal-agent model in game theory to study the risk sharing between the investors and operators of expressway BOT project. And on this basis, set up the corresponding incentive system and restraint system. First of all, on the basis of relevant research, the concept of BOT is defined, and the risk of expressway BOT project is identified and analyzed. On the basis of general risk analysis, the main body of risk sharing of expressway BOT project is combined. The risk factors based on subject are further studied, so as to determine the subject and object of risk sharing in expressway BOT project after the operator is separated from investors, and the relationship between different subjects is also studied. Thus, it lays the foundation for the establishment of the model. Secondly, on the basis of risk sharing between government and investor, this paper improves the principal-agent model of these two models, and analyzes the risk sharing model between investor and operator in expressway BOT project. The model results show that the risk sharing of expressway BOT project is related to the degree of risk aversion of the principal and agent, and the related risk sharing system, including incentive system and restraint system, is established accordingly. Finally, the YM expressway BOT project is selected as a case study. In this case study, the game model between investors and operators of expressway BOT project is used to analyze, and it is determined that the establishment of incentive system and constraint system is closely related to risk sharing in the case of asymmetric information.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北方工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F542;F283;F224

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