【摘要】：改革開(kāi)放以來(lái),中國(guó)展現(xiàn)了驚人的發(fā)展速度,打破了之前由日本、韓國(guó)等保持的戰(zhàn)后高速發(fā)展記錄。隨之而來(lái)的是人口老齡化、創(chuàng)新不足等諸多問(wèn)題,經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展面臨下行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我國(guó)政府制定出調(diào)整經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu),轉(zhuǎn)變發(fā)展方式的政策進(jìn)行應(yīng)對(duì),加大對(duì)高附加值的服務(wù)業(yè)的扶持和發(fā)展,近年來(lái)第三產(chǎn)業(yè)占比不斷加重,對(duì)GDP增加貢獻(xiàn)過(guò)半。隨著高新技術(shù)的不斷發(fā)展和應(yīng)用,服務(wù)業(yè)與互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)結(jié)合催生的共享經(jīng)濟(jì)平臺(tái)迅速崛起,其中國(guó)外以Uber和Airbnb為代表,國(guó)內(nèi)以滴滴等為代表。這些新的共享經(jīng)濟(jì)平臺(tái)在合理利用閑置資源,提高配置效率方面帶來(lái)了巨大的改變,給人們的生活帶來(lái)了便利,同時(shí)其先進(jìn)的定價(jià)方式也引起一定的爭(zhēng)議。文章首先分析了移動(dòng)打車平臺(tái)的參與者及運(yùn)行機(jī)制和平臺(tái)的定價(jià)策略,為后續(xù)模型的建立進(jìn)行鋪墊。建立模型研究壟斷平臺(tái)在統(tǒng)一定價(jià)和可變定價(jià)兩種定價(jià)策略下的最優(yōu)價(jià)格,對(duì)壟斷平臺(tái)的支付情況和對(duì)消費(fèi)者福利影響進(jìn)行了深入的研究,為政府等監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)提供管理建議,也為后續(xù)模型的拓展和對(duì)整個(gè)打車市場(chǎng)的進(jìn)一步研究打下基礎(chǔ)。其次,以Bertrand博弈模型為基礎(chǔ),對(duì)新興打車平臺(tái)企業(yè)和傳統(tǒng)出租車企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)定價(jià)決策進(jìn)行研究,分析新興打車平臺(tái)企業(yè)采用不同的定價(jià)策略時(shí)對(duì)傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)利潤(rùn)和市場(chǎng)份額的沖擊和影響。對(duì)現(xiàn)存打車市場(chǎng)的平臺(tái)和"司機(jī)"之間以及"司機(jī)"和消費(fèi)者之間存在的一些問(wèn)題和現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行討論,并給出了合理的解釋,同時(shí)為傳統(tǒng)出租車企業(yè)在面對(duì)新興企業(yè)的巨大挑戰(zhàn)時(shí)提供一定的應(yīng)對(duì)建議。最后,以國(guó)內(nèi)兩大打車平臺(tái)寡頭滴滴和快的為背景,采用多維博弈模型研究同時(shí)提供快車和出租車兩種服務(wù)的雙寡頭平臺(tái)之間的博弈,得出平臺(tái)采用不同定價(jià)策略時(shí)的均衡定價(jià)。分析發(fā)現(xiàn)平臺(tái)對(duì)快車服務(wù)采用可變定價(jià)時(shí),不僅能提高快車服務(wù)的利潤(rùn),同時(shí)也提高采用統(tǒng)一定價(jià)的出租車服務(wù)的利潤(rùn),為目前主流平臺(tái)企業(yè)所采用的定價(jià)方式找到理論支撐。此外,還討論了出租車和快車兩種服務(wù)之間的替代性對(duì)平臺(tái)定價(jià)和利潤(rùn)的影響,以及用戶粘性對(duì)平臺(tái)的影響,為之前滴滴和快的之間的補(bǔ)貼大戰(zhàn)給出了合理解釋。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China has shown an amazing pace of development, breaking the post-war record of rapid development maintained by Japan and South Korea. Followed by the aging population, insufficient innovation and many other problems, economic development is facing downside risks. The government of our country has formulated the policy of adjusting the economic structure, changing the mode of development and increasing the support and development of the service industry with high added value. In recent years, the proportion of the tertiary industry has been increasing continuously, and it has contributed more than half to the increase of GDP. With the continuous development and application of high and new technology, the shared economy platform, which is produced by the combination of service industry and Internet technology, is rising rapidly, including Uber and Airbnb in foreign countries and Didi in China. These new shared economic platforms have brought great changes in the rational use of idle resources and improved allocation efficiency, which has brought convenience to people's lives. At the same time, their advanced pricing methods have also caused some controversy. Firstly, this paper analyzes the participants of the mobile ride-hailing platform, its running mechanism and the pricing strategy of the platform so as to pave the way for the subsequent establishment of the model. This paper establishes a model to study the optimal price of monopoly platform under two pricing strategies of uniform pricing and variable pricing, and makes a deep study on the payment situation of monopoly platform and its impact on consumer welfare, and provides management advice for the government and other regulatory bodies. It also lays a foundation for the further research of the following model and the whole market of ride-hailing. Secondly, on the basis of Bertrand game model, this paper studies the competitive pricing decision between the emerging ride-hailing platform enterprises and the traditional taxi enterprises. This paper analyzes the impact of different pricing strategies on the profit and market share of the new ride-hailing platform. This paper discusses some problems and phenomena existing between the existing ride-hailing market and "drivers" and between "drivers" and consumers, and gives a reasonable explanation. At the same time, it provides some suggestions for the traditional taxi enterprises in the face of the huge challenges of emerging enterprises. Finally, based on the background of two domestic taxi hailing platforms: oligarch Didi and Kuaidi, the multi-dimensional game model is used to study the game between the duopoly platforms which provide both express and taxi services. The equilibrium pricing of the platform with different pricing strategies is obtained. It is found that when the platform adopts variable pricing for express service, it can not only increase the profit of express service, but also increase the profit of taxi service with uniform pricing, which provides theoretical support for the pricing methods adopted by mainstream platform enterprises. In addition, the influence of the substitution between taxi and express services on the pricing and profit of the platform and the impact of user stickiness on the platform are also discussed, which provides a reasonable explanation for the previous subsidy war between Didi and Kuaidi.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.6;F572
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本文編號(hào)：2272689