【摘要】：隨著我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展,城鎮(zhèn)一體化進(jìn)程加速,城市間交通出行需求日趨旺盛,尤其是城市群內(nèi)部的客運(yùn)交通需求�？瓦\(yùn)通道市場作為城市群內(nèi)部客運(yùn)出行的最主要運(yùn)輸消費(fèi)市場,市場內(nèi)客源較為穩(wěn)定和消費(fèi)需求旺盛,一直是客運(yùn)經(jīng)營者的經(jīng)營重點(diǎn)和主要利潤來源。如何最大程度的獲得最大的市場份額,如何在市場中獲得最大的市場收益,是客運(yùn)經(jīng)營者最為關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。而對于客運(yùn)通道市場管理者來說,旺盛的市場需求和激烈的市場競爭容易造成客運(yùn)經(jīng)營者唯利是圖,采用不正當(dāng)手段獲得更多的超額利潤,如何規(guī)范市場競爭、管理好市場競爭并維持市場的穩(wěn)定發(fā)展,是市場管理者的目前面臨的最大難題。 本文在分析和總結(jié)國內(nèi)、外相關(guān)研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,對客運(yùn)通道市場的特點(diǎn)和存在的博弈關(guān)系經(jīng)行了分析,并重點(diǎn)就其中的“管理——競爭”博弈和“市場競爭”博弈進(jìn)行了較為深入的分析,構(gòu)建了相關(guān)的博弈模型： 1.以博弈論中“二人有限非零和對策”(亦稱“雙矩陣對策”)相關(guān)理論為基礎(chǔ),結(jié)合對管理方和競爭參與者的策略和得益分析,建立了“管理——競爭”博弈模型,并給出了求解思路； 2.以博弈論中經(jīng)典的貝特蘭德模型為理論基礎(chǔ),依托非集計(jì)模型相關(guān)理論和對運(yùn)輸企業(yè)經(jīng)營成本的簡單分析,針對競爭參與者市場競爭策略的選擇問題構(gòu)建了“市場競爭”博弈模型,并給出了主要求解思路。 上述模型建立的基礎(chǔ)上,就客運(yùn)通道長度的變化、市場物價(jià)和消費(fèi)水平的變化以及國家政策的傾斜三個(gè)方面對博弈結(jié)果的影響進(jìn)行了靈敏度分析,并在此基礎(chǔ)上對客運(yùn)通道市場競爭管理方和參與方就如何規(guī)范管理和參與市場競爭提出了相關(guān)建議、對策。 最后,本文以成渝客運(yùn)通道為背景,構(gòu)建了成渝客運(yùn)通道市場競爭策略選擇博弈模型,對文章研究的基本理論進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證性計(jì)算,給出了競爭參與方競爭策略選擇結(jié)果,取得了較好的結(jié)果。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of our economy and the acceleration of the process of urban integration, the demand for intercity transportation is becoming more and more vigorous, especially the demand for passenger transport within the urban agglomeration. As the main transportation consumption market in urban agglomeration, the passenger channel market is stable and the consumption demand is exuberant, which is always the key point and the main profit source of the passenger transport operators. How to obtain the largest market share and how to obtain the largest market income in the market is the focus of the passenger transport operators. However, for the market managers of passenger transport channels, the exuberant market demand and fierce market competition are apt to cause the passenger transport operators to be profit-oriented, to obtain more excess profits by improper means, and how to regulate the market competition. It is the biggest problem for market managers to manage the market competition and maintain the stable development of the market. On the basis of analyzing and summarizing the domestic and foreign related research results, this paper analyzes the characteristics of the passenger transport channel market and the existing game relations. The paper also analyzes the "management-competition" game and the "market competition" game, and constructs the relevant game model: 1. Based on the theory of "two-person finite non-zero sum game" (also called "two-matrix game") in game theory, combining with the strategy and benefit analysis of management and competition participants, a "management-competition" game model is established. The idea of solving the problem is also given. 2. Based on the classic Bertrand model in game theory, the paper relies on the disaggregate model theory and the simple analysis of transportation enterprises' operating cost. In this paper, a game model of "market competition" is constructed for the choice of market competition strategy of competition participants, and the main solutions are given. On the basis of the above model, the influence of the length of passenger passage, the market price and consumption level and the inclination of national policy on the game result is analyzed. On the basis of this, the author puts forward some suggestions and countermeasures on how to regulate the management and participate in the market competition. Finally, based on the background of Chengdu-Chongqing passenger transport channel, this paper constructs a game model of competitive strategy selection for Chengdu-Chongqing passenger transport channel, verifies the basic theory studied in this paper, and gives the result of competitive strategy selection for competitive participants. Good results have been obtained.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F542;F224.32

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