【摘要】：收費公路是重要的交通基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施之一。隨著收費公路規(guī)模不斷的擴大與市場化的深入，產(chǎn)生了很多問題影響其產(chǎn)業(yè)效率與績效，主要原因是收費公路原有的產(chǎn)權(quán)、競爭與規(guī)制體制等的不適應(yīng)性加劇，因此收費公路的規(guī)制等問題日益受到政府重視。在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上，，本文從先前研究的不足出發(fā)，從制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)的角度，尋找規(guī)制改革的新方法或者新思路，嘗試彌補原有規(guī)制體制的不足。其意義在于，這可以為我國收費公路產(chǎn)業(yè)規(guī)制在制度上的改革提供幫助，修正原有產(chǎn)權(quán)、市場化與規(guī)制體制改革思路的不足，為有關(guān)部門從根源解決規(guī)制改革的問題。 本文最大的新意在于大膽嘗試使用制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)的觀點，對收費公路產(chǎn)業(yè)規(guī)制改革基礎(chǔ)問題進(jìn)行初步探索。本文將試圖運用制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)相關(guān)理論，運用文獻(xiàn)研究法、規(guī)范與實證分析結(jié)合的方法，得到規(guī)制改革的新思路或新觀點。 本文使用了產(chǎn)權(quán)、交易成本以及制度變遷等制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)核心理論，將制度的作用內(nèi)生化。首先，從產(chǎn)權(quán)、競爭與規(guī)制的角度，主要側(cè)重點是國有化與民營化問題，分析收費公路效率的來源以及產(chǎn)權(quán)、規(guī)制、競爭與效率之間的關(guān)系。研究認(rèn)為，產(chǎn)權(quán)、競爭對效率均有影響，并且規(guī)制也是影響產(chǎn)權(quán)、規(guī)制提升效率的重要因素。其次，在前文基礎(chǔ)上分析收費公路國有化與市場化供給與規(guī)制的交易成本。研究認(rèn)為交易成本的存在會影響政府、市場供給的決策，兩者在供給方面存在一定的邊界，也證實普遍的市場化供給或運營的規(guī)制改革思路當(dāng)前是不可行的。再次，從制度變遷角度，分析收費公路產(chǎn)業(yè)制度安排變遷過程、績效與發(fā)展路徑。研究認(rèn)為當(dāng)前制度安排變遷受政府主導(dǎo)，缺乏自主性，績效較差，難以滿足收費公路發(fā)展的需要，主要原因是部門利益的作祟。本文從地方政府與經(jīng)營企業(yè)的角度證實部門利益的存在，同時指出收費公路運營的市場化是“偽市場化”，對部門利益進(jìn)行制度分析并提出改革意見。 最后，論文通過對上文的總結(jié)與進(jìn)一步分析，認(rèn)為在部門利益的干擾下，收費公路規(guī)制體制存在著不協(xié)調(diào)的情況，并提出收費公路制度安排平行適應(yīng)漸進(jìn)改革路徑與具體改革意見，作為最終的收費公路政府規(guī)制改革思路（結(jié)論）。
[Abstract]:Toll roads are one of the most important transportation infrastructures. With the expansion of toll road scale and the deepening of marketization, there are many problems affecting its industrial efficiency and performance. The main reason is the aggravation of the original property right, competition and regulation system of toll road. Therefore, the regulation of toll roads and other issues are increasingly taken seriously by the government. On the basis of previous studies, this paper, from the point of view of institutional economics, looks for new methods or new ideas of regulatory reform, and tries to make up for the deficiencies of the original regulatory system. The significance lies in the fact that it can provide help for the reform of the regulation system of toll road industry in our country, correct the deficiency of the original property right, marketization and regulation system reform, and solve the problem of regulation reform from the root of the relevant departments. The most new idea of this paper is to try to use the viewpoint of institutional economics to explore the foundation of regulation reform of toll road industry. This paper will try to use the relevant theories of institutional economics, the method of literature research, the combination of normative and empirical analysis, to get a new idea or new viewpoint of regulatory reform. This paper uses the core theories of institutional economics, such as property rights, transaction costs and institutional changes, to internalize the role of institutions. First of all, from the angle of property right, competition and regulation, the main focus is on nationalization and privatization, and analyzes the source of toll road efficiency and the relationship between property right, regulation, competition and efficiency. The research holds that property right and competition have an influence on efficiency, and regulation is also an important factor to influence property right and enhance efficiency. Secondly, the paper analyzes the transaction cost of nationalization of toll road and market supply and regulation. The research shows that the existence of transaction cost will affect the decision-making of government and market supply, and that there are certain boundaries in supply between them, and it also proves that the general idea of regulation reform of market-oriented supply or operation is not feasible at present. Thirdly, from the perspective of institutional change, this paper analyzes the process of institutional arrangement, performance and development path of toll road industry. The research shows that the current institutional arrangement changes are dominated by the government, lack of autonomy, poor performance, difficult to meet the needs of the development of toll roads, the main reason is the interests of the departments. This paper proves the existence of departmental interest from the angle of local government and management enterprise, and points out that the marketization of toll road operation is "pseudo-marketization". Finally, through the summary and further analysis of the above, the paper thinks that under the interference of the departmental interests, the regulation system of toll road is not coordinated. The author also puts forward the suggestion of parallel adapting to the gradual reform path and concrete reform as the final idea of government regulation reform of toll road.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長安大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F542

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 王運召;;從制度變遷的角度分析公司法改革路徑[J];商;2014年25期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 張曉輝;高速公路上市企業(yè)社會責(zé)任研究[D];長安大學(xué);2015年

本文編號：2227955