【摘要】：作為重要基礎設施的高速公路需求快速增長與供應不足的矛盾催生了各種融資方式的產(chǎn)生,BOT (Built-Operate-Transfer)模式作為地方政府一種行之有效的融資途徑和方法被各地政府廣泛應用到高速公路建設運營中。高速公路BOT項目自立項建設、運營至移交,一般會經(jīng)歷一個比較長的特許權期,在此期間隨著經(jīng)濟的高速發(fā)展和消費者出行需求不斷擴大,隨之高速公路的通行車流量也會逐年增多,所以政府在規(guī)劃設計和建設高速公路時,對高速公路的建設規(guī)格和投資規(guī)模應具有一定的超前意識。高速公路在建設完成開始運營后,由于高速公路的超前性的投資建設,運營前期高速通行車流量處于較低水平,BOT項目公司收取的總高速通行費用也較低;但隨著社會經(jīng)濟的增長和人民出行需求的擴大,高速公路的通行車流量會逐年增加,如果高速公路等級標準和建設規(guī)格過低,最大通行能力達不到消費者快速出行的要求,政府和項目公司出于社會效益和項目收益的提高,不得不對高速公路進行改擴建或修建另一條高速公路,而這些建設費用遠遠高于一次建設到位的費用,并且在短時間內(nèi)不可能修建好一條高速公路,導致在此期間社會效益受損。并且項目公司進行投資建設前普遍會向政府取得一個限制競爭保證,保證在其一定時期內(nèi)政府在同一區(qū)域內(nèi)不會修建另一條高速公路,以避免其他高速公路的競爭,以此比較準確預測車流量,降低項目風險,進行投資規(guī)模的決策,并增強項目公司的信心。在現(xiàn)實中許多高速公路都存在投資規(guī)模過大或過小的問題。投資規(guī)模過大,導致項目公司的維護成本過高和社會資源閑置;投資規(guī)模過小,導致項目公司運營后期不能滿足通行要求,使項目公司利潤降低,使得社會效益受損。本研究在相關研究基礎之上,采用數(shù)學模型確定了在限制競爭保證下高速公路BOT項目的合理的投資規(guī)模,得出在政府在項目收支平衡下給予的特許權期是最優(yōu)特許權期,這時的高速公路投資規(guī)�？梢允鬼椖可鐣偢＠畲蠡@一結論。確定了最優(yōu)政府限制競爭保證時間、高速公路達到最大通行能力時間點、達到最小單位效用時的時間點、高速公路經(jīng)濟壽命、高速公路社會壽命,并對其高速公路的項目公司的經(jīng)濟效益、政府經(jīng)濟利益、項目社會效益等進行了進一步的分析。
[Abstract]:The contradiction between the rapid growth of highway demand and the shortage of supply, as an important infrastructure, has given birth to various financing methods. As an effective way and method of financing for local governments, bot (Built-Operate-Transfer) model has been widely used by local governments. Applied to highway construction and operation. Highway BOT project construction, operation to transfer, will generally go through a relatively long concession period, during this period with the rapid development of the economy and consumer travel needs continue to expand, The traffic volume of expressway will also increase year by year, so the government should have a certain sense of ahead of the highway construction specification and investment scale when planning and designing and constructing expressway. After the completion of the expressway construction and operation, due to the ahead of the highway investment construction, the high speed traffic flow in the early stage of operation is at a lower level and the total high speed transportation cost charged by the bot project company is also relatively low. However, with the growth of the social economy and the expansion of the people's travel demand, the traffic flow of the expressway will increase year by year. If the highway grade standard and construction specifications are too low, the maximum traffic capacity will not reach the requirement of rapid travel by consumers. The government and project companies have had to rebuild or expand highways or build another highway because of increased social benefits and project revenues, and these costs are much higher than the cost of once in place. And it is impossible to build a good highway in a short period of time, resulting in the damage of social benefits during this period. And before the project companies invest in construction, they generally obtain from the government a restrictive competition guarantee that the government will not build another highway in the same area for a certain period of time, in order to avoid competition on other highways. It can accurately predict vehicle flow, reduce project risk, make investment scale decision, and enhance the confidence of project company. In reality, many expressways have the problem of too large or too small investment scale. The investment scale is too large, the maintenance cost of the project company is too high and the social resources are idle, the investment scale is too small, the project company can not meet the prevailing requirements in the later period of operation, the profit of the project company is reduced, and the social benefit is damaged. On the basis of relevant research, this paper uses mathematical model to determine the reasonable investment scale of expressway BOT project under the guarantee of restricted competition, and draws the conclusion that the concession period given by the government under the condition of the balance of income and expenditure of the project is the optimal concession period. At this time, the scale of highway investment can maximize the total social welfare of the project. Determined the optimal government limit competition guarantee time, the expressway reaches the maximum traffic capacity time point, reaches the minimum unit utility time point, the highway economic life, the highway society life span, The economic benefit, government economic benefit and project social benefit of the project company of its expressway are further analyzed.
【學位授予單位】：西南交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F283;F542.3

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 王穎林;賴芨宇;傅夢;;基于實物期權理論的PPP項目限制競爭擔保研究[J];建筑經(jīng)濟;2015年02期

2 劉廣平;趙文忠;陳立文;;高速公路BOT項目特許權期決策研究[J];建筑經(jīng)濟;2015年01期

3 宋金波;靳璐璐;付亞楠;;公路BOT項目收費價格和特許期的聯(lián)動調整決策[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實踐;2014年08期

4 趙立力;游琦;;高速公路BOT項目調節(jié)基金決策機制研究[J];管理工程學報;2013年03期

5 譚志加;楊海;陳瓊;;收費公路項目Pareto有效BOT合同與政府補貼[J];管理科學學報;2013年03期

6 曹陽;趙淑芝;田慶飛;;基于社會福利最大化的城市軌道交通補貼決策[J];吉林大學學報(工學版);2012年03期

7 龐博;;個人所得稅改革對社會總福利的影響[J];時代金融;2011年23期

8 王東波;宋金波;戴大雙;李錚;;彈性需求下交通BOT項目特許期決策[J];管理工程學報;2011年03期

9 吳孝靈;周晶;洪巍;;基于有效運營期的BOT項目特許權期決策模型[J];系統(tǒng)工程學報;2011年03期

10 孫慧;范志清;石燁;;BOT公路排他性條件對定價及社會效益影響研究[J];系統(tǒng)工程學報;2011年01期

相關博士學位論文 前9條

1 張夢龍;基于公共物品屬性視角的鐵路改革結構特性研究[D];北京交通大學;2014年

2 吳孝靈;基于博弈模型的BOT項目利益相關者利益協(xié)調機制研究[D];南京大學;2011年

3 左廷亮;BOT項目公司的股東結構選擇及股東行為特征研究[D];西南交通大學;2011年

4 陽軍;不確定條件下最優(yōu)投資時機和投資規(guī)模決策研究[D];重慶大學;2010年

5 袁玉玲;我國公路建設資金及投融資政策研究[D];長安大學;2009年

6 高麗峰;基于委托—代理理論的BOT項目特許期研究[D];大連理工大學;2009年

7 趙立力;政府保證下基礎設施BOT項目中的決策問題研究[D];西南交通大學;2007年

8 楊衛(wèi)華;基于風險分擔的高速公路BOT項目特許定價研究[D];大連理工大學;2007年

9 李海東;高速公路經(jīng)濟論[D];四川大學;2004年

相關碩士學位論文 前2條

1 閆偉全;基礎設施BOT項目收益分配激勵機制研究[D];西南交通大學;2016年

2 汪力軍;BOT項目風險與政府保證[D];華中科技大學;2004年

，

本文編號：2203260