萬科深鐵并購重組對(duì)中小股東權(quán)益的影響研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-07-22 13:30
【摘要】：2015年10月以寶能系為中心發(fā)起的與萬科集團(tuán)的股權(quán)爭奪大戰(zhàn)躍入公眾視野,萬科集團(tuán)為了抵御寶能系而發(fā)起的和深圳地鐵集團(tuán)的資產(chǎn)并購交易,成為了股權(quán)爭奪的重心。資本市場(chǎng)的興盛促進(jìn)并購交易的飛速發(fā)展,發(fā)起并購交易的主體和覆蓋范圍日益廣泛,并購的交易方式也變得多樣化,不同并購方式給公司及其利益相關(guān)體帶來的影響也會(huì)不一樣,而中小股東處在最弱勢(shì)的地位受到的影響自然更大。本文的研究重點(diǎn)為并購交易對(duì)中小股東產(chǎn)生的影響,以及如何從制度層面保障中小股東的權(quán)益。本文以萬科集團(tuán)與深鐵集團(tuán)的并購交易作為案例,通過對(duì)萬科集團(tuán)發(fā)起并購的動(dòng)因,并購交易對(duì)價(jià)、并購交易方式和并購結(jié)果的分析,研究了并購交易對(duì)并購公司中小股東權(quán)益的影響。在萬科集團(tuán)發(fā)起并購到宣布終止并購預(yù)案的一年時(shí)間中,萬科集團(tuán)經(jīng)歷了萬科A股長達(dá)198天的停牌,最終原萬科大股東華潤集團(tuán)與深鐵集團(tuán)以協(xié)議交換股份的方式合作,深圳地鐵集團(tuán)成為萬科集團(tuán)新的大股東。通過案例研究發(fā)現(xiàn),萬科與深鐵定向增發(fā)方式的并購給萬科A帶來了負(fù)面的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng),相反股份協(xié)議轉(zhuǎn)讓的并購帶來了正面的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)。萬科集團(tuán)管理層采用資本成本率最高的增發(fā)股份方式支付并購對(duì)價(jià)是為了捍衛(wèi)自身的公司控制權(quán),實(shí)質(zhì)上是損害中小股東權(quán)益的行為。在并購交易過程中存在信息不對(duì)稱的情況也影響了中小股東的權(quán)益。本文認(rèn)為,萬科深鐵的并購合作決策受萬科控股股東和管理層的控制,由于信息披露的不充分和相關(guān)法律的不完善,萬科中小股東在并購過程中的知情權(quán)被限制,決策權(quán)被變相侵占,中小股東收益權(quán)也因此受到侵害。文章從公司內(nèi)部治理制度和外部監(jiān)管制度的完善出發(fā),從保障中小股東知情權(quán)、決策權(quán)、收益權(quán)的制度方面提出了建議。目前關(guān)于中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)的研究較少的從具體的企業(yè)行為進(jìn)行分析,深鐵萬科并購的案例作為資本市場(chǎng)較為典型的并購案例具有一定的代表性。本文的研究在對(duì)以往實(shí)證研究的相關(guān)發(fā)現(xiàn)提供了進(jìn)一步的證據(jù)的同時(shí),也對(duì)完善中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)提供了相關(guān)建議。本文對(duì)正在逐步完善的中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)相關(guān)政策和法規(guī)制度的制定也有一定的啟示作用。
[Abstract]:The battle between Vanke Group and Baoneng Group, launched in October 2015, jumped into public view, with the asset merger and acquisition with Shenzhen Metro Group as the center of contention for equity ownership, launched by Vanke Group in order to defend against Baoneng Group. The prosperity of the capital market promotes the rapid development of M & A transactions. The main body and coverage of the M & A transactions are becoming more and more extensive, and the ways of M & A transactions have become diversified. Different ways of mergers and acquisitions will bring different impacts on the company and its stakeholders, and the impact of minority shareholders in the most vulnerable position is naturally greater. This paper focuses on the impact of M & A transactions on minority shareholders, and how to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders from the system level. This paper takes the M & A transaction between Vanke Group and Shenzhen Railway Group as an example, through the analysis of the motivation, the consideration of M & A transaction, the mode of M & A transaction and the result of M & A. This paper studies the influence of M & A transactions on the rights and interests of minority shareholders of M & A companies. During the year between the launch of the merger and acquisition of Vanke Group and the announcement of the termination of the merger plan, Vanke Group went through 198 days of suspension of trading in Vanke A shares, and eventually China Resources Group, the former major shareholder of Vanke, cooperated with Shenzhen Railway Group in the form of an agreement to exchange shares. Shenzhen Metro Group has become a new major shareholder of Vanke Group. Through the case study, it is found that the M & A of Vanke and Shenzhen Railway brings negative market reaction to Vanke A, on the contrary, the merger and acquisition of share agreement transfer brings positive market reaction. The management of Vanke Group pays the M & A consideration by means of additional shares with the highest capital cost rate in order to defend its own corporate control rights and in essence to damage the rights and interests of minority shareholders. The information asymmetry in the process of M & A also affects the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This paper holds that the decision of Vanke Sham Railway M & A cooperation is controlled by the controlling shareholder and management of Vanke. Due to the insufficiency of information disclosure and the imperfection of relevant laws, the right to know of the medium and small shareholders of Vanke in the process of M & A is restricted. The decision-making power is encroached on in disguise, and the minority shareholders' right to profit is also infringed on as a result. Starting from the perfection of the internal governance system and the external supervision system of the company, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the system of protecting the minority shareholders' right to know, to make decisions and to benefit. At present, the research on the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders is less from the specific enterprise behavior analysis, and the case of Shenzhen Railway Vanke M & A is representative as a typical case in the capital market. The research in this paper provides further evidence for the previous empirical findings, but also provides relevant suggestions to improve the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This article also has the enlightenment function to the establishment of the relevant policies and laws and regulations on the protection of minority shareholders' rights and interests.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F299.233.4;F572.6;F271
本文編號(hào)：2137617
[Abstract]:The battle between Vanke Group and Baoneng Group, launched in October 2015, jumped into public view, with the asset merger and acquisition with Shenzhen Metro Group as the center of contention for equity ownership, launched by Vanke Group in order to defend against Baoneng Group. The prosperity of the capital market promotes the rapid development of M & A transactions. The main body and coverage of the M & A transactions are becoming more and more extensive, and the ways of M & A transactions have become diversified. Different ways of mergers and acquisitions will bring different impacts on the company and its stakeholders, and the impact of minority shareholders in the most vulnerable position is naturally greater. This paper focuses on the impact of M & A transactions on minority shareholders, and how to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders from the system level. This paper takes the M & A transaction between Vanke Group and Shenzhen Railway Group as an example, through the analysis of the motivation, the consideration of M & A transaction, the mode of M & A transaction and the result of M & A. This paper studies the influence of M & A transactions on the rights and interests of minority shareholders of M & A companies. During the year between the launch of the merger and acquisition of Vanke Group and the announcement of the termination of the merger plan, Vanke Group went through 198 days of suspension of trading in Vanke A shares, and eventually China Resources Group, the former major shareholder of Vanke, cooperated with Shenzhen Railway Group in the form of an agreement to exchange shares. Shenzhen Metro Group has become a new major shareholder of Vanke Group. Through the case study, it is found that the M & A of Vanke and Shenzhen Railway brings negative market reaction to Vanke A, on the contrary, the merger and acquisition of share agreement transfer brings positive market reaction. The management of Vanke Group pays the M & A consideration by means of additional shares with the highest capital cost rate in order to defend its own corporate control rights and in essence to damage the rights and interests of minority shareholders. The information asymmetry in the process of M & A also affects the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This paper holds that the decision of Vanke Sham Railway M & A cooperation is controlled by the controlling shareholder and management of Vanke. Due to the insufficiency of information disclosure and the imperfection of relevant laws, the right to know of the medium and small shareholders of Vanke in the process of M & A is restricted. The decision-making power is encroached on in disguise, and the minority shareholders' right to profit is also infringed on as a result. Starting from the perfection of the internal governance system and the external supervision system of the company, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the system of protecting the minority shareholders' right to know, to make decisions and to benefit. At present, the research on the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders is less from the specific enterprise behavior analysis, and the case of Shenzhen Railway Vanke M & A is representative as a typical case in the capital market. The research in this paper provides further evidence for the previous empirical findings, but also provides relevant suggestions to improve the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders. This article also has the enlightenment function to the establishment of the relevant policies and laws and regulations on the protection of minority shareholders' rights and interests.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F299.233.4;F572.6;F271
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