本文選題：公共自行車 + 新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)��； 參考：《深圳大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：公共自行車由于其具有低碳、高效、健康的綠色屬性,使得它對于構(gòu)建低碳交通、改善城市環(huán)境、緩解交通擁堵起到了舉足輕重的作用,它的發(fā)展與普及也是構(gòu)建資源節(jié)約型、環(huán)境友好型社會的必然需求。本文將公共自行車系統(tǒng)分為有樁公共自行車系統(tǒng)和無樁公共自行車系統(tǒng)兩種,其中有樁公共自行車系統(tǒng)是指市政支持的公共自行車系統(tǒng),無樁公共自行車系統(tǒng)指的是最近市面上出現(xiàn)的共享單車。有樁公共自行車系統(tǒng)與無樁公共自行車系統(tǒng)中皆存在信息不對稱現(xiàn)象,且有樁與無樁兩類公共自行車系統(tǒng)存在的問題有所差異,這里分別從新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中的委托代理與不完全契約的視角對二者進(jìn)行分析。在有樁公共自行車系統(tǒng)中,公共自行車服務(wù)主要涉及到公眾、政府和運(yùn)營企業(yè)三個參與主體,他們之間存在著雙重委托代理關(guān)系。在公眾和政府的隱性委托代理關(guān)系中,公眾由于群體過于分散沒有監(jiān)督政府的激勵,而政府具有擴(kuò)大規(guī)模占用更多資源的趨勢。在政府與企業(yè)的委托代理關(guān)系中,由于二者的效用函數(shù)不同導(dǎo)致了他們之間對于補(bǔ)貼額的多少存在分歧。企業(yè)作為信息優(yōu)勢方具有“敲竹杠”的動機(jī),以便向政府索取更多的補(bǔ)貼。針對這種信息不對稱的問題,本文進(jìn)行了分析討論并提出了相關(guān)措施來加以解決。在無樁公共自行車系統(tǒng)中,企業(yè)自行融資,自負(fù)盈虧,獨(dú)自承擔(dān)風(fēng)險。與有樁公共自行車系統(tǒng)不同的是此時三方委托代理關(guān)系消失,取而代之的是企業(yè)與消費(fèi)者之間的直接市場關(guān)系,政府轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槭袌鲋刃虻木S護(hù)者和調(diào)控者。公眾不再是政府的委托人,政府也不再是公眾的代理人,公眾與政府之間的委托代理關(guān)系不復(fù)存在。同樣,企業(yè)與政府間的委托代理關(guān)系也自然消失,政府不再給予企業(yè)補(bǔ)貼。企業(yè)在運(yùn)營過程中,實(shí)質(zhì)上是與消費(fèi)者簽訂了短期租賃合同,消費(fèi)者為信息優(yōu)勢方,企業(yè)為信息劣勢方。消費(fèi)者為了使得自身利益最大化具有違約的動機(jī),而這會對企業(yè)的盈利結(jié)果造成影響。在對企業(yè)的利潤進(jìn)行分析之后發(fā)現(xiàn),單車非正常損失率(消費(fèi)者的違約行為所引起)嚴(yán)重影響了企業(yè)的正常運(yùn)營。最后根據(jù)上述分析提出相關(guān)建議,企業(yè)和政府都需要采取措施來減少消費(fèi)者對企業(yè)的損害,以促進(jìn)共享單車行業(yè)更好的發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Because of its low carbon, high efficiency and healthy green property, public bicycle plays an important role in constructing low-carbon traffic, improving urban environment and alleviating traffic congestion. The inevitable demand of an environment-friendly society. In this paper, the public bicycle system is divided into two kinds: the public bicycle system with a pile and the public bicycle system without a pile, among which the public bicycle system with a pile is the public bicycle system supported by the municipal government. The pile-free public bicycle system refers to the recent emergence of shared bikes on the market. The information asymmetry exists in the public bicycle system with and without piles, and the problems between the public bicycle system with and without piles are different. This paper analyzes the new institutional economics from the perspective of principal-agent and incomplete contract. In the public bicycle system, the public bicycle service mainly involves the public, the government and the operating enterprises, and there is a double principal-agent relationship between them. In the implicit principal-agent relationship between the public and the government, the public does not supervise the incentive of the government because the group is too dispersed, and the government has the tendency to enlarge the scale and occupy more resources. In the principal-agent relationship between government and enterprise, there are differences on the amount of subsidy between them because of their different utility functions. As an information advantage, companies have an incentive to "rip off" in order to demand more subsidies from the government. This paper analyzes and discusses the problem of information asymmetry and puts forward some relevant measures to solve it. In the pile-free public bicycle system, the enterprise self-financing, bear the risk alone. What is different from the public bicycle system is that the tripartite principal-agent relationship disappears and is replaced by the direct market relationship between enterprises and consumers, and the government turns into the maintainer and regulator of market order. The public is no longer the principal of the government, the government is no longer the agent of the public, and the principal-agent relationship between the public and the government no longer exists. Similarly, the principal-agent relationship between business and government naturally disappears, and the government no longer subsidizes business. In the process of operation, the enterprise actually signs a short-term lease contract with the consumer, the consumer is the information advantage party, the enterprise is the information inferior party. Consumers have the incentive to default in order to maximize their own interests, which can have an impact on corporate earnings. After analyzing the profit of the enterprise, it is found that the abnormal loss rate of bicycle (caused by the default of consumers) seriously affects the normal operation of the enterprise. Finally, according to the above analysis put forward the relevant recommendations, enterprises and governments need to take measures to reduce consumer damage to enterprises, in order to promote the sharing of bicycle industry better development.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：深圳大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F572

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