本文選題：擁擠收費(fèi) + 外部成本��； 參考：《重慶師范大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)城市化和機(jī)動(dòng)化的快速發(fā)展，城市中道路擁擠現(xiàn)象日益嚴(yán)重，城市道路交通需求超過(guò)交通供給能力，給城市生活的魅力大打折扣。交通擁擠問(wèn)題不但降低了城市的運(yùn)作效率，增加了出行成本，而且嚴(yán)重阻礙了城市經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，，成為制約我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的“瓶頸”。交通擁擠問(wèn)題已引起社會(huì)的廣泛關(guān)注，成為一個(gè)勢(shì)在必行亟需解決的難題。 交通擁擠的直接原因是道路的供給能力跟不上交通量的劇增，但是一味地滿(mǎn)足需求，增加道路的建設(shè)，最終只會(huì)陷入建設(shè)－需求增加－再建設(shè)的惡性循環(huán)中，只會(huì)引發(fā)更深的矛盾。傳統(tǒng)的增加道路建設(shè)的方法已經(jīng)不能解決當(dāng)前的交通擁擠問(wèn)題。 本文主要是從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度分析道路的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)屬性，以及交通擁擠產(chǎn)生的本質(zhì)原因，闡述了交通擁擠外部性的內(nèi)涵，利用邊際成本理論分析了交通擁擠收費(fèi)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)原理，并對(duì)交通擁擠的外部成本的組成部分進(jìn)行量化分析，提出實(shí)行交通擁堵收費(fèi)是能緩解交通擁堵的重要經(jīng)濟(jì)措施。 論文還疏理了現(xiàn)階段國(guó)內(nèi)外擁擠收費(fèi)理論的理論模型，總結(jié)出最優(yōu)定價(jià)法和次優(yōu)定價(jià)法的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)，并提出了從博弈的角度出發(fā)，對(duì)單條道路高峰時(shí)段政府和出行者的出行行為進(jìn)行分析，找出政府調(diào)控目標(biāo)、擁擠稅價(jià)格、出行成本和提前出行概率之間的函數(shù)關(guān)系，并結(jié)合算例進(jìn)行說(shuō)明。此外論文還運(yùn)用斯坦科爾伯格模型和委托代理模型對(duì)多條路徑選擇下的出行者行為進(jìn)行分析，并結(jié)合算例來(lái)證明該模型的可行性。 從論文的分析中，可以得出政府應(yīng)該依據(jù)道路的交通流量，結(jié)合調(diào)控的目標(biāo)流量和出行者提前出行的概率來(lái)制定合適的擁擠稅價(jià)格的結(jié)論。只有制定的擁擠稅價(jià)格合理，才能取得緩解交通擁堵的良好效果。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of urbanization and motorization in China, the phenomenon of road congestion in cities is becoming more and more serious. The demand for urban road traffic exceeds the capacity of traffic supply, which greatly reduces the charm of urban life. Traffic congestion not only reduces the efficiency of urban operation and increases the travel cost, but also seriously hinders the development of urban economy and becomes the "bottleneck" that restricts the economic development of our country. The problem of traffic congestion has attracted wide attention of the society and has become a difficult problem that needs to be solved urgently. The direct cause of traffic congestion is that the supply capacity of roads can not keep up with the rapid increase of traffic volume, but blindly meeting the demand and increasing the construction of roads will only lead to a vicious circle of construction-demand increase and re-construction. It will only lead to deeper conflicts. The traditional method of increasing road construction can not solve the current traffic congestion problem. This paper mainly analyzes the economic attributes of roads and the essential reasons of traffic congestion from the angle of economics, expounds the connotation of traffic congestion externality, and analyzes the economic principle of traffic congestion pricing by using marginal cost theory. Based on the quantitative analysis of the components of the external cost of traffic congestion, it is pointed out that traffic congestion charging is an important economic measure to alleviate traffic congestion. The paper also summarizes the theoretical models of congestion pricing theory at home and abroad, summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of optimal pricing method and sub-optimal pricing method, and puts forward the point of view of game theory. This paper analyzes the travel behavior of the government and the traveler in the rush hour of a single road, and finds out the functional relationship between the government control target, the price of congestion tax, the travel cost and the travel probability in advance, and illustrates it with an example. In addition, the paper also uses the Steinkelberg model and the principal-agent model to analyze the behavior of travelers under the multi-path choice, and proves the feasibility of the model with an example. From the analysis of the paper, we can draw the conclusion that the government should make the appropriate congestion tax price according to the traffic flow of the road, combined with the regulated target flow and the probability of early travel. Only when the price of congestion tax is reasonable, can good effect be achieved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F224.32;F812.42;F572

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