本文選題：航班高延誤率 + 高速鐵路�。� 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),隨著我國(guó)2030年“八縱八橫”高速鐵路中長(zhǎng)期規(guī)劃方案的出臺(tái),我國(guó)高速鐵路進(jìn)入了高速發(fā)展階段。高速鐵路的快速發(fā)展給我國(guó)民航運(yùn)輸業(yè)帶來(lái)了不小的沖擊。而隨著近年來(lái)的航班延誤率的持續(xù)升高,航班延誤率這一指標(biāo)因素也在影響著我國(guó)高速鐵路與民航之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系。而本文基于此背景,研究了航班高延誤率下的我國(guó)高速鐵路與民航之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系。本文簡(jiǎn)要介紹了高速鐵路與民航競(jìng)爭(zhēng)之間的相關(guān)理論知識(shí),構(gòu)建了航班高延誤率下的旅客出行效用函數(shù)、客流分擔(dān)率模型以及高速客運(yùn)運(yùn)營(yíng)商收益函數(shù),并將博弈論理論運(yùn)用于航班高延誤率下的我國(guó)高速鐵路與民航競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的場(chǎng)景中,主要分析了航班延誤率這一指標(biāo)因素對(duì)旅客出行選擇的影響,同時(shí)構(gòu)建了航班高延誤率下的高鐵路與民航競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的雙矩陣博弈模型,并將構(gòu)建的雙矩陣博弈模型轉(zhuǎn)化為二次規(guī)劃模型,同時(shí)運(yùn)用Lemke-Howson算法來(lái)對(duì)模型進(jìn)行求解分析。本文將航班延誤率這一指標(biāo)進(jìn)行靈敏度分析,研究了航班不同延誤率下的高鐵與民航之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)博弈關(guān)系。最后本文選取京滬客運(yùn)通道作為實(shí)例驗(yàn)證了本文所建立的模型,并為高速客運(yùn)運(yùn)營(yíng)商的運(yùn)營(yíng)策略提供了參考。論文的主要工作如下:(1)根據(jù)實(shí)際的高速客運(yùn)市場(chǎng)運(yùn)營(yíng)情況,考慮到我國(guó)高速鐵路與民航的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)會(huì)受現(xiàn)實(shí)條件下的航班延誤因素的影響,在考慮高速鐵路與民航技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)特征、布局分析的基礎(chǔ)上綜合分析了我國(guó)高速鐵路與民航之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系。本文基于航班延誤率這一指標(biāo)因素建立了旅客出行效用函數(shù)和高速客運(yùn)運(yùn)營(yíng)商(高速鐵路運(yùn)營(yíng)商和民航運(yùn)營(yíng)商)的客流分擔(dān)率模型,同時(shí)建立了高速客運(yùn)運(yùn)營(yíng)商(高速鐵路運(yùn)營(yíng)商和民航運(yùn)營(yíng)商)的收益函數(shù)。(2)基于航班延誤問(wèn)題建立了高速鐵路與民航競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的雙矩陣博弈模型,為了便于求解,本文將其轉(zhuǎn)化為二次規(guī)劃模型,并運(yùn)用Lemke-Howson算法來(lái)求解轉(zhuǎn)化后的二次規(guī)劃模型。本文還將航班延誤率這一指標(biāo)因素進(jìn)行靈敏度分析,探討了在航班不同延誤率下的高鐵與民航之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)博弈關(guān)系。最后運(yùn)用京滬客運(yùn)線作為實(shí)證分析來(lái)對(duì)本文建立的模型進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證。最后實(shí)證分析結(jié)果表明了本文所建立的博弈模型是科學(xué)的,同時(shí)本文的研究對(duì)高速客運(yùn)運(yùn)營(yíng)商的策略調(diào)整也具有實(shí)際指導(dǎo)意義。(3)本文考慮了航班高延誤率下的我國(guó)高速鐵路與民航之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系,論述了在這種現(xiàn)實(shí)運(yùn)營(yíng)條件下的高速客運(yùn)運(yùn)營(yíng)商應(yīng)該如何調(diào)整策略來(lái)增大自己的收益,即高鐵運(yùn)營(yíng)商在航班延誤時(shí)應(yīng)如何采取相關(guān)策略增大收益,而民航運(yùn)營(yíng)商又會(huì)根據(jù)高速鐵路運(yùn)營(yíng)商采取的策略來(lái)對(duì)自己的運(yùn)輸產(chǎn)品策略進(jìn)行調(diào)整,以此來(lái)達(dá)到自己的收益最大。本文分析了高速鐵路與民航運(yùn)輸之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)博弈模型,最終博弈達(dá)到一個(gè)均衡的局面,以此來(lái)為高速客運(yùn)運(yùn)營(yíng)商提供相關(guān)的策略參考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the coming out of the medium and long term plan of "eight vertical and eight horizontal" high-speed railway in China in 2030, China's high-speed railway has entered the stage of high-speed development. The rapid development of high-speed railway has brought great impact to the civil aviation transportation industry of our country. With the increase of flight delay rate in recent years, the index factor of flight delay rate is also affecting the competition between high-speed railway and civil aviation in China. Based on this background, this paper studies the competitive relationship between China's high-speed railway and civil aviation under the high flight delay rate. This paper briefly introduces the relevant theoretical knowledge between high-speed railway and civil aviation competition, and constructs the passenger travel utility function, passenger flow sharing rate model and revenue function of high-speed passenger transport operators under the high flight delay rate. The game theory is applied to the competition between China's high-speed railway and civil aviation under the high flight delay rate, and the impact of flight delay rate on passenger travel choice is analyzed. At the same time, the two-matrix game model of high-speed railway and civil aviation competition under high flight delay rate is constructed, and the two-matrix game model is transformed into quadratic programming model, and Lemke-Howson algorithm is used to solve the model. In this paper, the sensitivity analysis of flight delay rate is carried out, and the competitive game relationship between high-speed rail and civil aviation under different flight delay rates is studied. Finally, this paper selects Beijing-Shanghai passenger transport channel as an example to verify the model established in this paper, and provides a reference for the operation strategy of high-speed passenger transport operators. The main work of this paper is as follows: (1) according to the actual operation of high-speed passenger transport market, considering that the competition between high-speed railway and civil aviation in China will be affected by the flight delay factors under the actual conditions, the technical and economic characteristics of high-speed railway and civil aviation are considered. On the basis of layout analysis, the competitive relationship between China's high-speed railway and civil aviation is comprehensively analyzed. In this paper, the passenger travel utility function and the passenger flow sharing rate model of high-speed passenger carriers (high-speed railway operators and civil aviation operators) are established based on the index factor of flight delay rate. At the same time, the revenue function of high speed passenger transport operators (high speed railway operators and civil aviation operators) is established. Based on the flight delay problem, a double matrix game model of competition between high speed railway and civil aviation is established, which is easy to solve. In this paper, the quadratic programming model is transformed into a quadratic programming model, and the Lemke-Howson algorithm is used to solve the transformed quadratic programming model. This paper also analyzes the sensitivity of flight delay rate and discusses the competitive game relationship between high-speed rail and civil aviation under different flight delay rates. Finally, the Beijing-Shanghai passenger line is used as an empirical analysis to verify the model established in this paper. Finally, the empirical results show that the game model established in this paper is scientific. At the same time, the study of this paper also has practical guiding significance for the strategy adjustment of high-speed passenger transport operators.) this paper considers the competitive relationship between China's high-speed railway and civil aviation under the high flight delay rate. This paper discusses how the high speed passenger transport operators should adjust their strategies to increase their income under such practical operating conditions, that is, how the high-speed rail operators should adopt relevant strategies to increase their profits when the flights are delayed. Civil aviation operators will adjust their transport product strategy according to the strategy adopted by high-speed railway operators, so as to achieve their own maximum revenue. This paper analyzes the competition game model between high-speed railway and civil aviation transportation, and finally reaches a balanced situation to provide the relevant strategic reference for high-speed passenger transport operators.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F532;F562

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