本文選題：多式聯(lián)運(yùn) + 行為分析��； 參考：《蘭州交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：貨物運(yùn)輸系統(tǒng)組成復(fù)雜,多種多樣的貨物類型,各種組合的運(yùn)輸方式,以及影響運(yùn)輸?shù)母鞣N外部環(huán)境相互制約相互影響。伴隨著運(yùn)輸數(shù)量以及質(zhì)量需求的不斷變化,單一運(yùn)輸方式很難完成現(xiàn)今大運(yùn)量、快捷性運(yùn)輸?shù)囊?使用兩種及以上運(yùn)輸方式合作的方式,在一定的技術(shù)支持下,快速便捷安全地完成運(yùn)輸任務(wù)就是首要任務(wù)。本論文主要通過如下分析:(1)通過多式聯(lián)運(yùn)運(yùn)輸方式需求分析以及技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)特征分析,設(shè)計多式聯(lián)運(yùn)貨運(yùn)方式選擇最優(yōu)組合賦權(quán)可變模糊模型,對影響各種運(yùn)輸方式因素進(jìn)行綜合分析。(2)行為的產(chǎn)生都是為完成行為目標(biāo)而努力的,行為目標(biāo)最終作用者可能是個人,群體或者整個社會整體。分析了多式聯(lián)運(yùn)貨運(yùn)方式選擇利益相關(guān)者目標(biāo)及行為機(jī)理,為貨物運(yùn)輸方式選擇相關(guān)模型分析奠定了一定的理論基礎(chǔ)。(3)構(gòu)建了托運(yùn)人與承運(yùn)人貨運(yùn)方式選擇博弈模型,研究鐵路貨運(yùn)托運(yùn)人和承運(yùn)人運(yùn)輸方式選擇行為博弈,基于動態(tài)博弈過程提出多式聯(lián)運(yùn)貨運(yùn)發(fā)展建議。然后模擬用例,通過設(shè)計的基于最優(yōu)反應(yīng)動態(tài)的遺傳算法完成模型的快速求解,驗證了模型的可行性,證明了博弈論適用于貨物運(yùn)輸方式選擇分析與研究。(4)基于多式聯(lián)運(yùn)運(yùn)輸管理者提出了一種基于多Agent的多式聯(lián)運(yùn)運(yùn)輸方案動態(tài)規(guī)劃模型,重點(diǎn)設(shè)計了一種自主協(xié)商機(jī)制,討論了承運(yùn)人為獲得最大利潤,與運(yùn)輸管理者為實現(xiàn)運(yùn)輸成本最低進(jìn)行的博弈過程。其次,考慮自主性,設(shè)計了一種自主協(xié)商機(jī)制,采用拉格朗日松弛算法求解時間約束下的最短路徑問題,解決了多式聯(lián)運(yùn)路徑選擇問題。最后,通過模擬實驗,驗證了模型的可行性。(5)對多式聯(lián)運(yùn)貨物運(yùn)輸方式選擇過程中的利益相關(guān)者進(jìn)行雙層博弈分析,將聯(lián)運(yùn)管理者與承運(yùn)人之間的博弈過程,托運(yùn)人與承運(yùn)人之間的博弈過程,作為多式聯(lián)運(yùn)貨運(yùn)方式選擇雙層博弈模型的上下兩層,并對上下層博弈過程進(jìn)行模型分析,最后通過三步法,簡化模型求解難度,完成了雙層模型的快速求解,最后模擬用例,驗證了雙層博弈模型的求解過程。
[Abstract]:Cargo transport systems consist of complex, diverse types of goods, various combinations of modes of transport, and various external environments that affect transport, which interact with each other. With the continuous change of transportation quantity and quality demand, it is very difficult for a single mode of transportation to fulfill the requirements of large volume and rapid transportation, to use two or more modes of transportation cooperation, with the support of certain technology. The most important task is to complete the transportation task quickly, conveniently and safely. This thesis mainly through the following analysis: 1) through the multimodal transport mode demand analysis and the technical and economic characteristic analysis, designs the multimodal transport mode choice optimal combination weight variable fuzzy model, Comprehensive analysis of factors affecting various modes of transport. 2) the behavior of the generation is to achieve the goal of the behavior, the ultimate role of the behavior goal may be individuals, groups or the whole society as a whole. This paper analyzes the target and behavior mechanism of the multi-modal freight mode selection stakeholders, establishes a certain theoretical foundation for the analysis of the related model of freight transport mode selection, and constructs a game model of shippers' and carriers' freight mode selection. This paper studies the behavior game of railway freight shipper and carrier, and puts forward some suggestions on the development of multimodal freight transport based on the dynamic game process. Then, the feasibility of the model is verified by the design of the genetic algorithm based on the optimal response dynamics to complete the fast solution of the model. It is proved that game theory is suitable for the analysis and research of freight transport mode selection. (4) based on multimodal transport manager, a dynamic programming model of multimodal transport scheme based on multimodal transport is proposed, and an autonomous negotiation mechanism is designed. In order to obtain the maximum profit, the game process between the carrier and the transport manager to achieve the lowest transportation cost is discussed. Secondly, considering autonomy, an autonomous negotiation mechanism is designed. Lagrangian relaxation algorithm is used to solve the shortest path problem under time constraints, and the path selection problem of multimodal transport is solved. Finally, through simulation experiments, the feasibility of the model is verified. (5) the two-layer game analysis is carried out on the stakeholders in the process of selecting the multimodal transport mode of goods, and the game process between the manager of the combined transport and the carrier is put forward. The game process between shippers and carriers, as a multimodal transport mode, selects the upper and lower layers of the bilevel game model, and analyzes the upper and lower layers of the game process. Finally, through the three-step method, the difficulty of solving the model is simplified. The fast solution of the bilevel model is completed. Finally, the process of solving the bilevel game model is verified by simulating the use case.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F512.4

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