發(fā)布時間：2018-04-18 20:13

  本文選題：PPP + 鐵路��； 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：鐵路運輸作為我國交通運輸體系的中堅力量,對我國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展起著至關(guān)重要的促進(jìn)作用。目前我國鐵路建設(shè)主要由政府完成,建設(shè)資金缺口較大,急需擴展資金來源。PPP模式作為公私合作的途徑,已經(jīng)運用于國內(nèi)外的部分基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè),并取得了良好成效。論文通過對PPP模式及鐵路行業(yè)的介紹,分析了信用對鐵路PPP模式融資風(fēng)險的影響。在建立博弈模型分析的基礎(chǔ)上,對PPP鐵路融資風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生的機理以及項目參與者可能采取的應(yīng)對措施進(jìn)行了分析,從而為解決我國鐵路建設(shè)資金短缺問題提出建議。論文將鐵路PPP模式公共部門界定為鐵路基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的需求方,通過與社會資本合作投資鐵路建設(shè),共同分擔(dān)風(fēng)險分享收益,最終實現(xiàn)鐵路運輸服務(wù)的供給以及運輸服務(wù)質(zhì)量的提高,從而增加社會總收益。論文先介紹信息不對稱理論與機會主義行為理論,認(rèn)為鐵路PPP模式中存在這兩種情況。隨后論文分析了鐵路與市場環(huán)境的特點。在此基礎(chǔ)上,論文認(rèn)為項目參與方之間存在信息不對稱,同時市場需求變化、契約的不完全性等可能加劇公私雙方信息差異程度,激勵私人部門在項目進(jìn)行過程中采取機會主義行為,引發(fā)逆向選擇風(fēng)險、信用風(fēng)險及道德風(fēng)險。隨后對相關(guān)風(fēng)險的形成機理進(jìn)行分析并建立博弈模型,最后通過臺灣高鐵BOT項目的介紹,分析這些風(fēng)險在項目中的影響。本文通過研究得出,公共部門可以通過建立聲譽機制、懲罰措施、對私人部門進(jìn)行補貼以及增強超額收益分配比例公平性的方法來激勵私人部門參與PPP模式,增加投入,降低項目建設(shè)中的風(fēng)險,保證鐵路項目的順利完成。最后,希望這些結(jié)論和建議可以為我國鐵路項目引入社會資本提供參考和借鑒。
[Abstract]:As the backbone of China's transportation system, railway transportation plays a vital role in promoting the economic development of our country.At present, the railway construction in our country is mainly completed by the government, and there is a large fund gap in the construction. As a way of public-private cooperation, the PPP model is urgently needed and has been applied to some infrastructure construction at home and abroad, and has achieved good results.Through the introduction of PPP mode and railway industry, this paper analyzes the influence of credit on the financing risk of railway PPP mode.Based on the analysis of game model, this paper analyzes the mechanism of the PPP railway financing risk and the possible countermeasures taken by the project participants, so as to put forward some suggestions for solving the shortage of railway construction funds in China.In this paper, the public sector of railway PPP model is defined as the demand side of railway infrastructure construction.Finally, the supply of railway transportation service and the improvement of transportation service quality are realized, thus increasing the total social income.This paper first introduces the information asymmetry theory and the opportunistic behavior theory, and thinks that these two situations exist in the railway PPP mode.Then the paper analyzes the characteristics of railway and market environment.On this basis, the paper believes that the information asymmetry between the project participants, market demand changes, contract incompleteness and so on may aggravate the degree of information difference between public and private parties.The private sector is encouraged to adopt opportunistic behavior in the course of the project, which leads to adverse selection risk, credit risk and moral hazard.Then the formation mechanism of the related risks is analyzed and a game model is established. Finally, the influence of these risks on the BOT project is analyzed through the introduction of Taiwan High Speed Railway (BOT) project.This paper concludes that the public sector can encourage the private sector to participate in the PPP model and increase investment by establishing reputation mechanism, punishing measures, subsidizing the private sector and enhancing the fairness of the distribution of excess income.Reduce the risk in the construction of the project to ensure the smooth completion of the railway project.Finally, it is hoped that these conclusions and suggestions can provide reference for introducing social capital into railway projects in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F532;F283

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 姜東民;趙爭;;高速公路PPP項目投資風(fēng)險管理研究[J];價值工程;2017年11期

2 侯雅蓉;;鄭州市建筑垃圾處理產(chǎn)業(yè)化PPP項目風(fēng)險評估[J];市場研究;2017年02期

3 閆繼文;王海平;;城市軌道交通PPP項目風(fēng)險評估研究[J];價值工程;2017年02期

4 王一婷;;資產(chǎn)證券化在中國鐵路融資中的應(yīng)用[J];河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)學(xué)報;2016年06期

5 史永樂;;PPP項目融資結(jié)構(gòu)分析與風(fēng)險識別方法的研究[J];中國商論;2016年15期

6 何亞伯;徐冰;常秀峰;;基于改進(jìn)熵權(quán)灰色關(guān)聯(lián)模型的城市軌道交通PPP項目風(fēng)險評價[J];項目管理技術(shù);2016年03期

7 劉燕舞;;基于PPP模式的工程項目融資金融風(fēng)險管理研究[J];價值工程;2015年36期

8 馮靜生;;PPP模式中商業(yè)銀行的風(fēng)險管理[J];金融教學(xué)與研究;2015年06期

9 曹啟龍;盛昭瀚;周晶;李遷;;契約視角下PPP項目尋租行為與激勵監(jiān)督模型[J];科學(xué)決策;2015年09期

10 王謝勇;柴激揚;孫毅;;基于文獻(xiàn)研究方法的我國高速鐵路對經(jīng)濟發(fā)展影響綜述[J];經(jīng)濟與管理;2015年05期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 楊正澤;高速鐵路的國民經(jīng)濟屬性及投資效益研究[D];北京交通大學(xué);2015年

2 杭卓s，

本文編號：1769892