本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股票期權(quán)激勵(lì) 人力資本 公司績(jī)效　出處：《山東建筑大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著現(xiàn)代企業(yè)經(jīng)營管理模式中所有者和經(jīng)營者的分離,在委托代理的理論基礎(chǔ)之上,為了更好的解決所有者與管理者之間目標(biāo)不一致的問題,進(jìn)而使得企業(yè)所有者和管理者形成一個(gè)利益共同體,股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度隨之應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)理論產(chǎn)生于上個(gè)世紀(jì)50年代,最早在歐美地區(qū)得到了廣泛的應(yīng)用,并在西方發(fā)達(dá)國家上市公司的實(shí)施過程中取得了巨大的成功。我國對(duì)于股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的研究較晚,于上個(gè)世紀(jì)90年代才開始引入股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)理論,在借鑒歐美等地區(qū)的成功與失敗經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)之上,眾多學(xué)者和企業(yè)家們紛紛探索適合中國企業(yè)管理的股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)應(yīng)用模式。隨著2005年伊始的我國股權(quán)分置改革的不斷推進(jìn),和中國證監(jiān)會(huì)于2006年頒布的《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法(試行)》,股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度在我國廣泛實(shí)施的法律環(huán)境保障已經(jīng)初步形成,股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度在我國上市公司中的廣泛實(shí)施掀開了新的篇章。截至到目前,在不斷改善股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的道路上,股票期權(quán)制度在我國得到了成功運(yùn)行,并在一定程度上取得了不小的成功。但是,要想走向更大的成功,徹底將股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度轉(zhuǎn)化為我國企業(yè)在新一輪經(jīng)濟(jì)態(tài)勢(shì)中得以騰飛的助推器,仍需對(duì)于在實(shí)施股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的過程中出現(xiàn)的問題做出進(jìn)一步地研究改善。因此,本論文基于改善股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的迫切性需要,分為五個(gè)章節(jié),首先闡述了股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的理論基礎(chǔ),并在此基礎(chǔ)之上大量翻閱并總結(jié)了國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的研究進(jìn)展。緊接著,從我國上市公司中實(shí)施股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的實(shí)際出發(fā),分析我國上市公司股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀,主要表現(xiàn)為股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)比例低、激勵(lì)有效期短、激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的考核指標(biāo)單一、實(shí)施企業(yè)尤以非國有企業(yè)為主,這為后續(xù)的檢驗(yàn)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的有效性做好了全面的準(zhǔn)備。其次,以我國滬深A(yù)股實(shí)施股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的上市公司為研究樣本,選取樣本上市公司自2010年至2016年的數(shù)據(jù),綜合運(yùn)用主成分分析和回歸分析,對(duì)高管的持股比例、員工的知識(shí)層次和股權(quán)性質(zhì)與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系分別進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),得出,在我國現(xiàn)行的股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃下,高程度的高管的持股比例和較高程度的員工知識(shí)水平可以更加有效地提升企業(yè)的公司績(jī)效,同時(shí)在對(duì)實(shí)施股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的股權(quán)屬性分析中可以得出,非國有企業(yè)的實(shí)施范圍更加廣泛,但是非國有企業(yè)并沒有取得比國有企業(yè)更加優(yōu)異的績(jī)效。最終在此基礎(chǔ)之上,為更好的完善股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度和更有效的實(shí)施股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)提出建設(shè)性意見,從而在一定程度上促進(jìn)我國股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)在應(yīng)用中取得更大的成功。
[Abstract]:With the separation of owners and managers in modern enterprise management mode, on the basis of principal-agent theory, in order to better solve the problem of inconsistent objectives between owners and managers. As a result, the owners and managers of enterprises form a community of interests, and the stock option incentive system emerges as the times require. The theory of stock option incentive came into being in -50s. It has been widely used in Europe and America, and has achieved great success in the process of implementation of listed companies in western developed countries. In -10s, stock option incentive theory began to be introduced, on the basis of the successful and failed experience of Europe and the United States and other regions. Many scholars and entrepreneurs have explored the application mode of stock option incentive which is suitable for the management of Chinese enterprises. With the development of the split share structure reform in China at the beginning of 2005. And China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2006 promulgated the "listed companies equity incentive management measures (trial)", the stock option incentive system has been widely implemented in China, the legal environment has been initially formed. The extensive implementation of stock option incentive system in Chinese listed companies has opened a new chapter. Up to now, the stock option system has been successfully operated in our country on the way of continuously improving the stock option incentive system. To a certain extent, it has made great success. However, in order to achieve greater success, the stock option incentive system will be transformed into a booster for Chinese enterprises to take off in the new round of economic situation. We still need to further study and improve the problems in the process of implementing stock option incentive. Therefore, this paper is divided into five chapters based on the urgent need to improve the stock option incentive system. First of all, the theoretical basis of stock option incentive is described, and on this basis, a large number of review and summary of domestic and foreign scholars on the stock option incentive system research progress. Based on the practice of stock option incentive system in listed companies in China, this paper analyzes the actualization status of stock option incentive system of listed companies in China. It mainly shows that the proportion of stock option incentive is low and the incentive period is short. The evaluation index of incentive plan is single, and the implementation of enterprises is mainly non-state-owned enterprises, which makes a comprehensive preparation for the follow-up test of the effectiveness of stock option incentive. Secondly. Taking the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares to implement stock option incentive as the research sample, the data of the sample listed companies from 2010 to 2016 are selected, and the principal component analysis and regression analysis are used synthetically. The paper empirically tests the relationship between the proportion of senior managers' shareholding, employees' knowledge level and the nature of ownership and corporate performance, and draws a conclusion that under the current stock option incentive plan in China. A high level of executive ownership and a higher level of employee knowledge can improve corporate performance more effectively, and at the same time, it can be concluded in the stock ownership attribute analysis of the implementation of stock option incentive plan. The scope of implementation of non-state-owned enterprises is wider, but non-state-owned enterprises have not achieved better performance than state-owned enterprises. Finally, on this basis. In order to perfect the incentive system of stock option and implement the incentive of stock option more effectively, this paper puts forward some constructive suggestions, thus promoting the application of stock option incentive in our country to a certain extent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東建筑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.5

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