本文選題：政府投資項目　切入點：代建制　出處：《大連交通大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：政府投資項目多為公益性項目且作為我國固定資產(chǎn)投資的重要組成部分,其取得良好的社會效益成為了項目建設(shè)的主要目的。然而,政府投資項目在建設(shè)的過程中,由于監(jiān)管方式的不規(guī)范與體制的不完善使得項目面臨著各種不同程度的風(fēng)險,如“釣魚工程”,“三超”等,這不僅損害了政府的投資效益同時也損害了整個社會的公共利益。為此國務(wù)院出臺了對政府投資項目實施“代建制”的決定,代建制實現(xiàn)了工程項目“投資、建設(shè)、監(jiān)管、使用”的四位分離,有效地避免了工程項目建設(shè)中的風(fēng)險。但代建制管理模式下所形成的委托代理關(guān)系也相應(yīng)增加“新風(fēng)險”發(fā)生的機率,制約著政府投資項目良好效益的取得。為此,對代建制下政府投資項目進行有效的監(jiān)管及風(fēng)險防范成為了影響代建市場發(fā)展以及投資項目取得良好效益的重要因素。在此背景下,如何通過建立科學(xué)的風(fēng)險防范機制以及采取有效的監(jiān)管方式,降低代建項目風(fēng)險的損失,提高政府投資項目建設(shè)管理水平和投資效益,成為了值得研究的問題。首先,介紹了本文研究的背景、目的及意義,對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究進行分析,提出本研究問題,指明本研究所用的方法,給出研究結(jié)構(gòu);接著,對政府投資代建制項目的監(jiān)管及風(fēng)險防范進行理論分析,介紹政府投資項目以及代建制的概念與內(nèi)涵并指出政府投資代建制項目監(jiān)管與風(fēng)險防范的必要性,明確了影響有效監(jiān)管的風(fēng)險因素,闡述主要的支撐理論;第三,對政府投資代建制項目監(jiān)管與風(fēng)險防范的機理進行研究,主要分析了監(jiān)管過程中存在的問題、風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生的機理,明確風(fēng)險防范的類型;第四,針對政府投資代建制項目的逆向選擇風(fēng)險進行博弈研究,建立招標(biāo)的博弈模型并對主要的參數(shù)進行分析,提出防范風(fēng)險的監(jiān)管策略;第五,針對政府投資代建制項目委托方道德風(fēng)險問題進行博弈研究,在證明了激勵機制可行性的基礎(chǔ)上,設(shè)計錦標(biāo)制度對委托方的道德風(fēng)險進行防范,提出監(jiān)管策略;第六,針對政府投資代建制項目代建方道德風(fēng)險問題進行博弈分析,分別進行顯性激勵機制與隱性激勵機制的設(shè)計,通過對主要參數(shù)分析以及算例檢驗,得出防范道德風(fēng)險的監(jiān)管策略;最后,結(jié)論與展望,總結(jié)本次研究的主要研究成果,并提出本次研究的局限和對后續(xù)研究的展望。通過對政府投資代建制項目進行有效監(jiān)管及風(fēng)險防范的研究,有助于豐富相關(guān)理論的應(yīng)用,提高政府投資代建制項目的監(jiān)管水平,對于推動我國政府投資代建制項目發(fā)展具有重要的研究價值和實際意義。
[Abstract]:Government investment projects are mostly public welfare projects and as an important part of fixed assets investment in China, the main purpose of project construction is to obtain good social benefits.However, in the process of construction of government investment projects, due to the non-standard supervision and imperfect system, the project faces various risks, such as "fishing project", "Sanchao" and so on.This not only damages the investment benefit of the government, but also the public interest of the whole society.As a result, the State Council has issued a decision to implement the "agent system" for government investment projects, which realizes the separation of the four positions of "investment, construction, supervision and use" and effectively avoids the risks in the construction of engineering projects.However, the principal-agent relationship formed under the mode of agent management also increases the probability of "new risk", which restricts the good benefit of government investment projects.Therefore, the effective supervision and risk prevention of the government investment projects under the agent construction system has become an important factor affecting the development of the agency construction market and the good benefit of the investment projects.In this context, how to establish a scientific risk prevention mechanism and adopt effective supervision to reduce the risk loss, improve the level of government investment project construction management and investment efficiency, has become a problem worthy of study.Firstly, this paper introduces the background, purpose and significance of this study, analyzes the related research at home and abroad, puts forward the research problems, points out the methods used in this study, and gives the research structure.This paper makes a theoretical analysis on the supervision and risk prevention of the government investment agency project, introduces the concept and connotation of the government investment project and the agent system, and points out the necessity of the supervision and risk prevention of the government investment agent system project.It clarifies the risk factors that affect the effective supervision, and expounds the main supporting theory. Thirdly, it studies the mechanism of supervision and risk prevention of government investment agent construction projects, mainly analyzes the problems existing in the process of supervision and the mechanism of risk generation.Make clear the type of risk prevention; fourth, the risk of adverse selection of government investment agent system project to carry out a game study, establish a bidding game model and analysis of the main parameters, put forward the risk prevention supervision strategy; fifth,On the basis of proving the feasibility of incentive mechanism, this paper designs the gold medal system to guard against the moral hazard of the proxy project and puts forward the supervision strategy.Based on the game analysis of the moral hazard of the agent in the government investment agent construction project, the explicit incentive mechanism and the implicit incentive mechanism are designed, and the main parameters are analyzed and the examples are tested.Finally, the conclusion and prospect, summarize the main research results of this study, and put forward the limitations of this study and future research prospects.Through the effective supervision and risk prevention research on the government investment agent system project, it is helpful to enrich the application of relevant theories and improve the supervision level of the government investment agent system project.It has important research value and practical significance for promoting the development of agent construction project invested by our government.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F283;F224.32

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