【摘要】：本文通過一個(gè)房地產(chǎn)商違法占用集體土地開發(fā)高檔商品住宅項(xiàng)目,后被國土部門發(fā)現(xiàn)并遭到強(qiáng)制拆除和罰款的雙重行政處罰的案例,分析整個(gè)事件來龍去脈,進(jìn)而揭示我國目前土地管理工作中存在的重大問題并提出建議。案例中房地產(chǎn)商一方面為降低項(xiàng)目建設(shè)成本,沒有經(jīng)過合法用地審批,私自與農(nóng)村集體組織簽訂合同取得集體土地使用權(quán)；另一方面,所開發(fā)項(xiàng)目又是國土部門比較敏感的高檔住宅。被發(fā)現(xiàn)違法占地行為并上報(bào)國土資源部后,該項(xiàng)目被前來檢查的一名相關(guān)處級(jí)干部定性為國家明令禁止的別墅項(xiàng)目,繼而遭到國土、公安等部門的聯(lián)合執(zhí)法拆除。但是,以保護(hù)耕地為由強(qiáng)制收回違法占用的土地后,國土部門并沒有將其恢復(fù)為耕地,而是將其作為建設(shè)用地劃撥出去。 本文首先對(duì)房地產(chǎn)商的違法動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行分析,指出土地出讓金讓建房成本過高,損害了房地產(chǎn)商的利益；政府征地給農(nóng)民的土地補(bǔ)償太少,損害了農(nóng)民的利益；同時(shí)國家土地管理法規(guī)存在漏洞,幾方面原因共同促成了違法建設(shè)的出現(xiàn)。然后,通過博弈論等相關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)原理,分析強(qiáng)制拆除和罰款兩項(xiàng)行政處罰方式對(duì)違法者的震懾效果,得出結(jié)論：首先,強(qiáng)制拆除和罰款兩項(xiàng)處罰方式都不足以震懾違法者,但是相對(duì)來說強(qiáng)制拆除比罰款更有效,因?yàn)閺?qiáng)拆會(huì)給違法者造成強(qiáng)烈的負(fù)面輿論效應(yīng)；另外,政府的土地出讓金收入是違法占地背后的根本原因。地方政府過于依賴土地出讓金收入不但讓違法建設(shè)屢禁不止,還使公共權(quán)力趨于濫用。 而在筆者看來,違法建設(shè)實(shí)際上是一種制度創(chuàng)新。結(jié)合戴維斯和諾思的制度創(chuàng)新理論進(jìn)行分析,政府低價(jià)征地、高價(jià)賣地,使得理性的房地產(chǎn)商和農(nóng)民利益受損,不得不通過“違法”獲得不違法就得不到的大于零的潛在利潤。雙方各自追求利潤最大化的過程,也是創(chuàng)新制度的過程。 然而,國家還沒有準(zhǔn)備好接受這項(xiàng)制度創(chuàng)新,而是采取越來越嚴(yán)厲的態(tài)度打壓違建。所以,在現(xiàn)有土地管理制度下,筆者最后給出三個(gè)建議：首先,提高國家對(duì)失地農(nóng)民的補(bǔ)償；然后,國家行政部門工作人員需要提高素質(zhì),用好手中的公權(quán)力；最后,土地管理法律應(yīng)該明確出于“公共利益”征地的范圍,并且探索讓農(nóng)村建設(shè)用地合理流轉(zhuǎn)。
[Abstract]:In this paper, through a case in which a real estate developer illegally occupied collective land to develop high-grade commercial housing projects, and was later discovered by the land department and subjected to a double administrative punishment of forced demolition and fines, the whole incident was analyzed. Then it reveals the major problems existing in the current land management in China and puts forward some suggestions. In the case, on the one hand, in order to reduce the construction cost of the project, the real estate developer did not pass through the examination and approval of legal land use, and privately signed a contract with the rural collective organization to obtain the right to use collective land; On the other hand, the development of projects is more sensitive land sector high-grade housing. After being found to have illegally occupied land and reported to the Ministry of Land and Resources, the project was identified as a villa project explicitly prohibited by the state by a cadre at the relevant department level who came to inspect it, and was then dismantled by the joint law enforcement of the land, public security, and other departments. However, after the forced recovery of illegally occupied land on the grounds of protecting cultivated land, the land department did not restore it to cultivated land, but allocated it as construction land. This paper first analyzes the illegal motives of real estate developers, points out that land transfer fees allow the construction costs to be too high, which damages the interests of real estate developers, and the government expropriates land for farmers to compensate too little, harm the interests of farmers; At the same time, there are loopholes in the national land management laws and regulations, which together contributed to the emergence of illegal construction. Then, through game theory and other relevant economic principles, this paper analyzes the deterrent effect of compulsory demolition and fine on violators, and concludes that: first, both mandatory demolition and fines are not enough to deter violators. But the forced demolition is more effective than the fine, because the forced demolition will have a strong negative public opinion effect on the violator. In addition, the government's revenue from land sales is the fundamental reason behind the illegal occupation of land. Local governments rely too much on revenue from land sales not only to prevent illegal construction, but also to abuse public power. In my opinion, illegal construction is actually a system innovation. Based on Davis' and Norse's theory of institutional innovation, the low price land requisition and the high price land sale by the government make the interests of rational real estate developers and farmers suffer, and they have to obtain the potential profits above zero without breaking the law through "breaking the law". The process of both parties pursuing profit maximization is also the process of innovation system. However, the country is not yet ready to accept the system innovation, but increasingly stringent attitude to curb illegal construction. Therefore, under the existing land management system, the author finally gives three suggestions: first, to improve the compensation of the state to the land-lost farmers, then, the state administration staff need to improve the quality, use the public power in hand; Finally, the land management law should make clear the scope of land expropriation out of "public interest" and explore the rational circulation of rural construction land.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D922.29

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