本文選題：財(cái)政分權(quán) + 晉升激勵(lì)��； 參考：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：地價(jià)快速上漲和土地財(cái)政一直是經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)的熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題,然而對(duì)土地市場(chǎng)的結(jié)構(gòu)性扭曲及其作用機(jī)理還缺少足夠的關(guān)注和研究。本文從商住用地和工業(yè)用地的相對(duì)價(jià)格入手,邏輯推導(dǎo)分稅制改革后財(cái)政分權(quán)體系驅(qū)使地方政府?dāng)U大對(duì)預(yù)算外收入的攫取,土地財(cái)政由此應(yīng)運(yùn)而生；而同時(shí)以經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)為主要政績(jī)考核指標(biāo)的政治晉升制度激勵(lì)地方官員對(duì)于外商投資的激烈爭(zhēng)奪,縱向財(cái)政分權(quán)和橫向晉升競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的雙重壓力導(dǎo)致了土地價(jià)格扭曲的形成。本文在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,利用2004-2010年中國(guó)35個(gè)主要大中城市的數(shù)據(jù),考察不同類(lèi)型土地與縱向分權(quán)和橫向競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的交錯(cuò)作用機(jī)理。研究結(jié)果表明： 第一,財(cái)政缺口和引資競(jìng)爭(zhēng)均對(duì)不同類(lèi)型用地價(jià)格扭曲存在顯著影響,并且財(cái)政缺口中約30%是由引資競(jìng)爭(zhēng)引致的。 (一)財(cái)政分權(quán)和晉升競(jìng)爭(zhēng)指標(biāo)的系數(shù)在不同變量組合的模型中均顯著為正,說(shuō)明財(cái)政分權(quán)和晉升競(jìng)爭(zhēng)都會(huì)加劇當(dāng)?shù)赝恋貎r(jià)格扭曲的程度。 (二)在引入財(cái)政分權(quán)和晉升激勵(lì)的交互項(xiàng)后我們發(fā)現(xiàn),交互項(xiàng)的系數(shù)為正,這表明晉升激勵(lì)確實(shí)通過(guò)財(cái)政分權(quán)產(chǎn)生了作用,地方政府間的晉升競(jìng)爭(zhēng)越激烈,財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)土地價(jià)格扭曲的影響越大。同時(shí),在控制了財(cái)政分權(quán)與晉升激勵(lì)的交互項(xiàng)后,財(cái)政分權(quán)指標(biāo)的系數(shù)下降了大約30%,這說(shuō)明在土地財(cái)政名義下產(chǎn)生的地價(jià)扭曲,30%左右并非源于土地財(cái)政本身,而是由于地方晉升激勵(lì)間接產(chǎn)生的,即以低價(jià)出讓工業(yè)用地作為重要引資手段的晉升競(jìng)爭(zhēng),會(huì)導(dǎo)致地方政府通過(guò)進(jìn)一步抬高商住用地的價(jià)格來(lái)彌補(bǔ)其中的機(jī)會(huì)成本,從而加劇分權(quán)對(duì)地價(jià)扭曲的影響程度。由此表明,除了現(xiàn)行的分稅制財(cái)政政策以外,地方政府間的晉升競(jìng)爭(zhēng)也是導(dǎo)致各地土地財(cái)政進(jìn)而引起房?jī)r(jià)持續(xù)上漲的重要因素之一。 第二,限制土地供給對(duì)工業(yè)用地影響非常小,供給約束主要通過(guò)財(cái)政分權(quán)渠道抬高商住用地價(jià)格。 土地出讓面積對(duì)于地價(jià)扭曲的影響顯著為負(fù)。此外,我們還可以發(fā)現(xiàn),土地出讓面積約束,對(duì)晉升激勵(lì)的影響很小,但是對(duì)財(cái)政分權(quán)的影響較大,這說(shuō)明無(wú)論用地規(guī)模如何限制,地方政府的行動(dòng)邏輯是首先保證滿足工業(yè)項(xiàng)目用地要求,然后從商住用地上找回收支缺口。這從另一個(gè)側(cè)面證實(shí)土地約束主要是推高商住用地價(jià)格,其作用途徑主要是通過(guò)財(cái)政分權(quán)渠道實(shí)現(xiàn)的。 第三,財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)于地價(jià)扭曲在一線城市有著正向的影響,主要是因?yàn)槠湄?cái)政收支缺口的壓力及天然的區(qū)位優(yōu)勢(shì)所造成高商住用地價(jià)格所致；財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)地價(jià)扭曲在二線城市有著負(fù)的影響,主要是由于其地方政府對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的過(guò)度追求所導(dǎo)致的工業(yè)地價(jià)被壓低而形成；財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)于地價(jià)扭曲的影響由于政府轉(zhuǎn)移支付的存在和本身房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的落后而在三線城市表現(xiàn)不明顯。
[Abstract]:The rapid rise of land price and land finance have been hot issues in economic society. However, the structural distortion of land market and its mechanism of action are still lack of enough attention and research. Starting with the relative price of commercial and residential land and industrial land, this paper deduces logically that the fiscal decentralization system after the reform of the tax sharing system drives the local government to expand the grab of the extra-budgetary income, thus the land finance emerges as the times require; At the same time, the political promotion system, which takes economic growth as the main performance evaluation index, encourages local officials to compete for foreign investment, and the double pressure of vertical fiscal decentralization and horizontal promotion competition leads to the formation of land price distortion. On the basis of theoretical analysis, using the data of 35 major cities in China from 2004 to 2010, this paper investigates the staggered mechanism between different types of land and vertical decentralization and horizontal competition. The results show that: Firstly, the financial gap and the competition for attracting capital have significant effects on the price distortion of different types of land, and about 30% of the gap is caused by the competition of attracting capital. (1) the coefficients of the index of fiscal decentralization and promotion competition are significantly positive in the models of different variable combinations, indicating that both fiscal decentralization and promotion competition will aggravate the distortion of local land prices. (2) after introducing the interactive term of fiscal decentralization and promotion incentive, we find that the coefficient of the interactive term is positive, which indicates that promotion incentive does work through fiscal decentralization, and the competition for promotion among local governments is more intense. The greater the impact of fiscal decentralization on land price distortions. At the same time, after controlling the interaction between fiscal decentralization and promotion incentive, the coefficient of fiscal decentralization index has decreased by about 30%, which shows that the distortion of land price under the name of land finance does not originate from the land finance itself. But because of local promotion incentive indirectly, that is to say, the promotion competition of selling industrial land at a low price as an important means of attracting investment will lead local governments to make up for the opportunity cost by further raising the price of commercial and residential land. Thus exacerbating the influence of decentralization on the distortion of land price. In addition to the current fiscal policy of tax sharing, the promotion competition among local governments is also one of the important factors that lead to the land finance in various places and then cause the house prices to rise continuously. Second, limiting land supply has little effect on industrial land, and supply constraints mainly raise commercial and residential land prices through fiscal decentralization channels. The effect of land transfer area on land price distortion is significantly negative. In addition, we can also find that the impact of land transfer area constraints on promotion incentives is very small, but the impact on fiscal decentralization is greater, which shows that no matter how limited the scale of land use, The logic of local government action is to ensure that the land requirements of industrial projects are met first, and then to recover the gap of income and expenditure from commercial and residential land. This proves from the other side that the land constraint is mainly to push up the price of commercial and residential land, and its function is mainly realized through the channel of fiscal decentralization. Third, fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on the distortion of land price in first-tier cities, mainly because of the pressure of the gap of revenue and expenditure and the high price of commercial and residential land caused by the natural location advantage. Fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on the distortion of land price in the second tier cities, mainly because the local governments' excessive pursuit of economic growth led to the depression of industrial land prices. The effect of fiscal decentralization on the distortion of land price is not obvious in the third tier city because of the existence of government transfer payment and the backwardness of its own real estate market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F301.4;F812.2;D630

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