本文關(guān)鍵詞： 高管薪酬 公司績效 薪酬粘性 激勵(lì)　出處：《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)出現(xiàn)了所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)的分離，導(dǎo)致所有者與高級管理經(jīng)營者之間的利益目標(biāo)發(fā)生沖突，公司的管理重點(diǎn)漸漸地從物質(zhì)資本傾斜于人力資本。合理的薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制能提高高級經(jīng)營者的積極性和工作效率，虔誠地履行相關(guān)職責(zé)，有效避免一些不良現(xiàn)象如人才流失，短期行為等。近年來，高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效的不對稱關(guān)系即薪酬的粘性特性，已漸漸引起學(xué)者們的廣泛關(guān)注。所謂高管薪酬粘性就是指當(dāng)公司業(yè)績上升時(shí)，高管薪酬水平大幅上升，而公司業(yè)績下降時(shí)，高管薪酬未下降或下降的程度很小，即高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感性不對稱。本文從高管薪酬粘性這個(gè)視角出發(fā)，以深滬上市的房地產(chǎn)公司為研究對象，研究高管薪酬的粘性特征對企業(yè)未來業(yè)績的影響，對改善高管薪酬激勵(lì)效果具有重要意義。 本文在相關(guān)理論的基礎(chǔ)上探討房地產(chǎn)上市公司高管薪酬粘性及其有效性問題。首先，從高管薪酬與企業(yè)業(yè)績關(guān)系、成本粘性和薪酬粘性以及高管薪酬的影響因素三個(gè)方面對國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行回顧和評述。其次，對委托代理理論與信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、人力資本理論和薪酬激勵(lì)理論進(jìn)行回顧。最后，以2009-2012年深滬A股房地產(chǎn)上市公司為研究對象，分析房地產(chǎn)上市公司高管薪酬與公司績效之間的關(guān)系，對薪酬業(yè)績關(guān)系和粘性問題進(jìn)行回歸檢驗(yàn)，在此基礎(chǔ)之上分析該種粘性對未來業(yè)績的影響。本文采取滯后一期的數(shù)據(jù)，對薪酬業(yè)績進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)，，以保證研究結(jié)果的可靠性和準(zhǔn)確性。 結(jié)合理論分析和實(shí)證研究結(jié)果，本文分析結(jié)論如下：（1）2009-2012年，采用扣除非經(jīng)常性損益后的凈利潤DNP作為績效衡量指標(biāo)，結(jié)果顯示我國房地產(chǎn)上市公司高管薪酬與當(dāng)年業(yè)績之間存在強(qiáng)正相關(guān)關(guān)系。（2）我國房地產(chǎn)上市公司高管的薪酬存在明顯的不對稱特征，業(yè)績下降時(shí)薪酬的減少幅度顯著低于業(yè)績上升時(shí)薪酬的增加幅度，即存在粘性。相較業(yè)績下降時(shí)高管薪酬下降的幅度，業(yè)績上升時(shí)薪酬的增長幅度是其3.51倍。（3）我國房地產(chǎn)上市公司的高管薪酬粘性與公司的未來業(yè)績成負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，對高管沒有起到激勵(lì)作用。（4）在職消費(fèi)有助于增強(qiáng)高管薪酬粘性。（5）對所有制類型不同的企業(yè)進(jìn)行分別回歸，發(fā)現(xiàn)國有企業(yè)較非國有企業(yè)高管薪酬與業(yè)績具有更強(qiáng)的相關(guān)性，且國有企業(yè)存在顯著高管薪酬粘性，而非國有企業(yè)不存在粘性現(xiàn)象。
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and control in modern enterprises leads to conflicts of interests between owners and senior managers. The management focus of the company is gradually tilted from material capital to human capital. Reasonable salary incentive mechanism can improve the enthusiasm and work efficiency of senior managers and perform the related duties devoutly. In recent years, the asymmetric relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, that is, the viscous characteristics of compensation, is an effective way to avoid some undesirable phenomena such as brain drain, short-term behavior and so on. The so-called executive pay stickiness means that when the company's performance rises, the executive compensation level rises significantly, and when the company's performance falls, the executive pay does not fall or fall to a very small extent. From the perspective of executive pay stickiness, this paper takes real estate companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai as the research object to study the impact of the viscous characteristics of executive compensation on the future performance of enterprises. It is of great significance to improve the incentive effect of executive compensation. On the basis of relevant theories, this paper discusses the stickiness and effectiveness of executive compensation in real estate listed companies. Firstly, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance is discussed. The cost stickiness and salary stickiness as well as the influencing factors of executive compensation are reviewed and reviewed. Secondly, the principal-agent theory and information economics are discussed. Human capital theory and compensation incentive theory are reviewed. Finally, the real estate listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2009-2012 are taken as the research object. This paper analyzes the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in real estate listed companies, and tests the relationship between compensation performance and viscosity. Based on the analysis of the influence of the stickiness on the future performance this paper adopts the lag data to test the salary performance to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the research results. Combined with theoretical analysis and empirical research results, the conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) in 2009-2012, the net profit (DNP) after deducting non-recurrent gains and losses is used as the performance measure. The results show that there is a strong positive correlation between executive compensation and current performance of listed real estate companies in China. The decrease of salary when the performance drops is significantly lower than the increase of the salary when the performance rises, that is, there is stickiness. Compared with the decline of the executive pay when the performance drops. The increase range of compensation is 3.51 times when performance rises.) the stickiness of executive compensation of listed real estate companies in China is negatively related to the future performance of the company. On the executive does not play an incentive role. 4) on the job consumption helps to enhance the executive pay stickiness. 5) to the different ownership type enterprise carries on the regression separately. It is found that there is a stronger correlation between executive compensation and performance in state-owned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises, and there is significant stickiness in executive compensation in state-owned enterprises, but not in non-state-owned enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F299.233.4

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