民辦高校教師和學(xué)校的契約設(shè)計(jì)博弈分析
[Abstract]:Taking the relationship between teachers and schools in private colleges and universities as the research object, this paper discusses the particularity of teachers and schools in private colleges and universities in China. In this paper, the author analyzes the relationship between the two sides by using marketing theory. It shows that private colleges and universities purchase educational services from teachers to students, and obtains three properties of this relationship: instability, reciprocity and contract. The asymmetry of information not only affects the quality of teachers and the responsibility and obligation, but also affects the quality and basic rights and interests of teachers. In this paper, the principal-agent theory is used to deeply analyze the supply-demand relationship between teachers and schools in private colleges and universities, which is essentially a kind of dual principal-agent relationship, and a "win-win" is designed between the two sides of educational service supply and demand. "Win-win" education service transaction optimal contract. This paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the research background and significance, the current research situation at home and abroad, the research methods and the first arrangement structure of the content. The second chapter summarizes the marketing theory, the contract theory and the principal-agent theory. The third chapter analyzes the nature of the relationship between private university teachers and schools from the particularity of private university teachers and schools: instability reciprocity and contract. In chapter 4, the author establishes the optimal contract model between teachers and schools by using the principal-agent theory, and analyzes the optimal contract design under the condition that one party is the center and the other party has private information. The coordination of two optimal contracts and the mechanism of multi-period dynamic adjustment after coordination are explained. Finally, a contract game solution with identifying and selecting function, self-execution and time adjustment mechanism is obtained. The conclusion of the study shows that both parties can fulfill their contractual obligations and have binding contractual relationship under the contractual mechanism, and may also "win-win" and "win-win" relationship.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:云南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號】:G647
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