董事長和CEO共事時長與盈余管理關(guān)系研究
發(fā)布時間：2019-03-28 16:18
【摘要】：自從盈余管理出現(xiàn)在大眾視野,它一直都是理論界和實務界的關(guān)注焦點。高管團隊作為盈余管理的關(guān)鍵因素更是受到國內(nèi)外學者的追捧,他們從異質(zhì)性等不同視角展開了豐富的研究以期找到盈余管理的特征、癥結(jié)及解決方案。而對作為高管團隊核心人物的董事長和CEO這方面的研究文獻也頗豐,但對他們的共事時長及由此形成的價值觀等組織文化是否會對盈余管理產(chǎn)生影響以及影響內(nèi)在機理方面的研究極少見到,因此,本文的研究嘗試回答這個問題并作出解釋,這不僅是對盈余管理研究的一個有益補充,而且也對人力資源的配置方面提供了一個參考意見。這也正是本文研究意義所在。本論文從董事長和CEO的共事時長視角出發(fā),研究其與盈余管理的關(guān)系。首先從高管任期和盈余管理、公司治理和盈余管理兩個方面進行文獻綜述。其次,從理論層面分析了董事長和CEO的共事時長對盈余管理可能的影響和作用機制,并進一步對CEO權(quán)力及企業(yè)所有權(quán)性質(zhì)這兩個因素加以分析。接著提出假設,構(gòu)建回歸模型,最后通過提取我國滬深上市公司所有A股2010-2015年6年符合條件的數(shù)據(jù)予以實證檢驗,并對其進行回歸分析,探究董事長和CEO的共事時長對盈余管理的影響以及CEO權(quán)力相對大小、不同企業(yè)所有權(quán)性質(zhì)對它們關(guān)系的影響。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn),董事長和CEO的共事時長與盈余管理呈負相關(guān)關(guān)系。這可能是董事長和CEO在長期共事階段,相互融合,默契配合,追求自身與企業(yè)的長遠發(fā)展而減少了盈余管理。進一步考慮CEO權(quán)力較大的時候,董事長和CEO的共事時長與盈余管理的負相關(guān)關(guān)系較弱,這是否可以解釋為CEO權(quán)力過大會導致CEO有更大的影響力參與決策,客觀上增加了盈余管理的機會,為自身利益謀利從而引發(fā)盈余管理行為。再者,通過區(qū)分企業(yè)所有權(quán)性質(zhì),發(fā)現(xiàn)國有企業(yè)的董事長和CEO的共事時長越長,盈余管理程度更低。這可能是由于國有企業(yè)CEO評價機制多元化,董事長和CEO較多都為內(nèi)部提拔和任命,受組織文化影響更深,默契程度更高,更注重自身與企業(yè)的長遠發(fā)展。最后,根據(jù)以上研究結(jié)論,本文提出以下建議:第一,上市公司應適當延長董事長和CEO的共事時長;第二,加強和完善上市公司治理機制;第三,建立健全職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場;第四,健全企業(yè)CEO評價機制。
[Abstract]:Since earnings management appeared in the public view, it has always been the focus of theoretical and practical circles. As a key factor of earnings management, senior management teams have been pursued by scholars at home and abroad. They have carried out rich research from different perspectives such as heterogeneity in order to find out the characteristics, crux and solutions of earnings management. And there is also plenty of literature about the chairman and CEO, who are the core figures of the executive team. However, there are few studies on whether the organizational culture, such as the length of time they work with and the resulting values, have an impact on earnings management and the underlying mechanism. Therefore, the research in this paper attempts to answer this question and give an explanation. This is not only a useful supplement to the study of earnings management, but also provides a reference for the allocation of human resources. This is also the significance of this study. This paper studies the relationship between CEO and earnings management from the point of view of working time. Firstly, literature review is made from executive tenure and earnings management, corporate governance and earnings management. Secondly, from the theoretical level, this paper analyzes the possible influence and mechanism of the working time between the chairman and CEO on earnings management, and further analyzes the two factors of CEO power and the nature of enterprise ownership. Then put forward the hypothesis, build a regression model, and finally by extracting all the Shanghai-Shenzhen listed companies in China from 2010 to 2015 eligible data for empirical testing, and regression analysis. This paper explores the influence of the working time between the chairman and CEO on earnings management, the relative size of CEO power, and the influence of the nature of ownership of different enterprises on their relationship. In this paper, we find that there is a negative correlation between the working time between the chairman and CEO and earnings management. This may be because the chairman and CEO in the long-term phase of work, mutual integration, tacit cooperation, pursue their own and the long-term development of the enterprise and reduce earnings management. Further considering whether the negative correlation between the length of time spent working with CEO and earnings management is weak when the power of CEO is greater, can this be explained by the fact that the over-meeting of CEO power leads to greater influence in CEO's participation in decision-making? Objectively increased the opportunity of earnings management, profit for their own interests and thus lead to earnings management behavior. Moreover, by distinguishing the nature of ownership of enterprises, it is found that the longer the chairman of state-owned enterprises and CEO work together, the lower the degree of earnings management. This may be due to the diversification of the evaluation mechanism of CEO in state-owned enterprises, the promotion and appointment of the chairman and CEO are more internal, more deeply influenced by the organizational culture, the degree of tacit understanding is higher, and more attention is paid to the long-term development of themselves and enterprises. Finally, according to the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: first, the listed companies should properly extend the working time between the chairman and CEO; second, strengthen and improve the governance mechanism of listed companies; thirdly, establish and improve the professional manager market; Fourth, improve the enterprise CEO evaluation mechanism.
【學位授予單位】：浙江工商大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F271
本文編號：2449032
[Abstract]:Since earnings management appeared in the public view, it has always been the focus of theoretical and practical circles. As a key factor of earnings management, senior management teams have been pursued by scholars at home and abroad. They have carried out rich research from different perspectives such as heterogeneity in order to find out the characteristics, crux and solutions of earnings management. And there is also plenty of literature about the chairman and CEO, who are the core figures of the executive team. However, there are few studies on whether the organizational culture, such as the length of time they work with and the resulting values, have an impact on earnings management and the underlying mechanism. Therefore, the research in this paper attempts to answer this question and give an explanation. This is not only a useful supplement to the study of earnings management, but also provides a reference for the allocation of human resources. This is also the significance of this study. This paper studies the relationship between CEO and earnings management from the point of view of working time. Firstly, literature review is made from executive tenure and earnings management, corporate governance and earnings management. Secondly, from the theoretical level, this paper analyzes the possible influence and mechanism of the working time between the chairman and CEO on earnings management, and further analyzes the two factors of CEO power and the nature of enterprise ownership. Then put forward the hypothesis, build a regression model, and finally by extracting all the Shanghai-Shenzhen listed companies in China from 2010 to 2015 eligible data for empirical testing, and regression analysis. This paper explores the influence of the working time between the chairman and CEO on earnings management, the relative size of CEO power, and the influence of the nature of ownership of different enterprises on their relationship. In this paper, we find that there is a negative correlation between the working time between the chairman and CEO and earnings management. This may be because the chairman and CEO in the long-term phase of work, mutual integration, tacit cooperation, pursue their own and the long-term development of the enterprise and reduce earnings management. Further considering whether the negative correlation between the length of time spent working with CEO and earnings management is weak when the power of CEO is greater, can this be explained by the fact that the over-meeting of CEO power leads to greater influence in CEO's participation in decision-making? Objectively increased the opportunity of earnings management, profit for their own interests and thus lead to earnings management behavior. Moreover, by distinguishing the nature of ownership of enterprises, it is found that the longer the chairman of state-owned enterprises and CEO work together, the lower the degree of earnings management. This may be due to the diversification of the evaluation mechanism of CEO in state-owned enterprises, the promotion and appointment of the chairman and CEO are more internal, more deeply influenced by the organizational culture, the degree of tacit understanding is higher, and more attention is paid to the long-term development of themselves and enterprises. Finally, according to the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: first, the listed companies should properly extend the working time between the chairman and CEO; second, strengthen and improve the governance mechanism of listed companies; thirdly, establish and improve the professional manager market; Fourth, improve the enterprise CEO evaluation mechanism.
【學位授予單位】：浙江工商大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F271
【參考文獻】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 岑維;董娜瓊;;高管任期、盈余質(zhì)量與真實盈余管理[J];現(xiàn)代財經(jīng)(天津財經(jīng)大學學報);2015年06期
2 何威風;;高管團隊垂直對特征與企業(yè)盈余管理行為研究[J];南開管理評論;2015年01期
3 顧署生;劉楊暉;;管理層權(quán)力、高質(zhì)量審計與盈余價值相關(guān)性[J];江西社會科學;2014年11期
4 袁知柱;寶烏云塔娜;王書光;;股權(quán)價值高估、投資者保護與企業(yè)應計及真實盈余管理行為選擇[J];南開管理評論;2014年05期
5 周夏飛;周強龍;;產(chǎn)品市場勢力、行業(yè)競爭與公司盈余管理——基于中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];會計研究;2014年08期
6 時勘;韓曉燕;鄭丹輝;時雨;邱孝一;;組織文化圖式觀的研究述評[J];管理學報;2014年01期
7 姜付秀;朱冰;唐凝;;CEO和CFO任期交錯是否可以降低盈余管理?[J];管理世界;2013年01期
8 王雄元;何捷;;行政壟斷、公司規(guī)模與CEO權(quán)力薪酬[J];會計研究;2012年11期
9 劉陽;彭韶兵;;IPO、盈余管理與企業(yè)生命周期[J];廈門大學學報(哲學社會科學版);2012年05期
10 楊繼偉;汪戎;陳紅;;債權(quán)治理與盈余質(zhì)量:來自中國證券市場的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];管理評論;2012年09期
，本文編號：2449032
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/renliziyuanguanlilunwen/2449032.html
最近更新
教材專著
