企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略、高管薪酬和經(jīng)營績效之間關(guān)系研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-03-01 02:04
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略 高管薪酬 經(jīng)營績效 層序聚類分析 出處:《太原理工大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:生產(chǎn)能力體系與經(jīng)濟(jì)契約關(guān)系的有機(jī)統(tǒng)一是企業(yè)的本質(zhì)屬性,而經(jīng)營績效作為管理領(lǐng)域所研究的重要變量,也同樣是企業(yè)核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的體現(xiàn)。能把人力資源戰(zhàn)略與企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略緊密有機(jī)的結(jié)合在一起是高績效企業(yè)最明顯的特征,人力資源能對(duì)企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略產(chǎn)生高達(dá)43%的整體影響力,幾乎是其它任何因素影響力的2倍。為此,2014年8月29日,中共中央政治局召開會(huì)議,審議通過了《中央管理企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人薪酬制度改革方案》。由此可見,薪酬管理成為了未來研究的方向。本文以委托代理理論、權(quán)變理論以及競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略理論為指導(dǎo),對(duì)研究高管薪酬和經(jīng)營績效之間關(guān)系、企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略和高管薪酬之間關(guān)系以及企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略、高管薪酬和企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效三者之間關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了概括梳理,提出了實(shí)施產(chǎn)品差異化戰(zhàn)略企業(yè)比實(shí)施成本領(lǐng)先戰(zhàn)略企業(yè)使用更高比例的績效薪酬和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略和績效薪酬的不相匹配將會(huì)對(duì)績效產(chǎn)生消極影響這兩個(gè)假設(shè)。然后以504家制造業(yè)上市公司為研究對(duì)象,采用層序聚類分析法,對(duì)樣本企業(yè)進(jìn)行了企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略分類,結(jié)果得到了116家產(chǎn)品差異化企業(yè)和388家成本領(lǐng)先企業(yè)。隨后利用權(quán)變方法和兩階段法,研究了高管薪酬和企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略之間的匹配程度對(duì)企業(yè)績效的影響情況。在實(shí)證研究分析中,通過層序聚類分析、描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、變量測(cè)定以及回歸分析等定量分析方法驗(yàn)證了所提出的兩個(gè)假設(shè),即產(chǎn)品差異化企業(yè)比成本領(lǐng)先企業(yè)使用更高比例的績效薪酬;企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略和高管績效薪酬的不相匹配將會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效產(chǎn)生消極影響。論文的實(shí)證研究結(jié)果顯示:描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)和回歸分析結(jié)果都表明,實(shí)施產(chǎn)品差異化戰(zhàn)略的企業(yè)同實(shí)施成本領(lǐng)先戰(zhàn)略的企業(yè)相比,傾向于支付給高管更高比例的績效薪酬;從相關(guān)性分析可以看出,高管薪酬與企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效有顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系。同時(shí),回歸分析也表明,高管薪酬與企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效是顯著相關(guān)的;不匹配的戰(zhàn)略和高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效是顯著負(fù)相關(guān)的。最后,根據(jù)本文對(duì)企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略、高管薪酬和企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效之間關(guān)系的實(shí)證研究結(jié)果提出如下建議:(1)設(shè)置合理的薪酬制度。注重報(bào)酬結(jié)構(gòu)的合理性與報(bào)酬形式的多樣性的同時(shí),注意發(fā)揮退休金計(jì)劃、醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)、職務(wù)補(bǔ)貼等激勵(lì)手段的激勵(lì)作用,防止這些激勵(lì)手段被流于形式。此外,還要注意增加股權(quán)激勵(lì)等長期激勵(lì)機(jī)制,改善退休保障措施,從而有效防止高管人員的短期行為。(2)高管薪酬制度要與企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略相匹配,不要讓薪酬制度成為企業(yè)獲得良好經(jīng)營績效的絆腳石。(3)建立合理的高管績效評(píng)價(jià)體系,適當(dāng)引入非財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo),使高管薪酬與管理績效達(dá)到合理匹配,從而真實(shí)、合理地評(píng)價(jià)高管的經(jīng)營成果。本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)主要有兩點(diǎn):(1)在借鑒前人的研究基礎(chǔ)上,選取五個(gè)指標(biāo),利用層序聚類方法將樣本企業(yè)所實(shí)施戰(zhàn)略分為產(chǎn)品差異化戰(zhàn)略和成本領(lǐng)先戰(zhàn)略兩類,提出了一種對(duì)企業(yè)所實(shí)施戰(zhàn)略進(jìn)行分類的可行方法。(2)研究了企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略、高管薪酬和經(jīng)營績效三者之間的關(guān)系。目前,我國還沒有學(xué)者和專家對(duì)企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略、高管薪酬與經(jīng)營績效三者之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。并且,對(duì)于高管薪酬和企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略的研究,前人的研究大多為理論研究,很少為實(shí)證研究,而本文利用實(shí)證分析方法,在研究企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略與高管薪酬之間關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)上,研究了企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略、高管薪酬和企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效三者之間的關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:The organic unity between production system and economic contract is the essential attribute of enterprises, and the business performance management as an important variable field of research, is also the embodiment of the core competitiveness of enterprises. The human resources strategy and enterprise strategy closely together is the most obvious characteristic of high performance business, human resources can produce up to 43% of the overall impact on corporate strategy, almost 2 times as much as any other influence factors. Therefore, in August 29, 2014, held a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, passed the "central management of enterprises pay system reform program. It is responsible for people, salary management has become the future direction of the research. Based on the principal-agent theory, contingency theory and the theory of competitive strategy, to study the relationship between executive compensation and performance, the relationship between competitive strategy and executive compensation to And the enterprise competition strategy, and summarizes the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of the three documents, put forward the implementation strategy of enterprise product differentiation than the implementation of cost leadership strategy enterprises to use a higher proportion of performance compensation and competitive strategy and performance salary does not match will have a negative impact on the performance of these two assumptions. Then in 504 manufacturing listed companies as the research object, using the hierarchical cluster analysis method, the sample enterprises for the enterprise competition strategy classification results of 116 product differentiation enterprises and 388 leading enterprises. Then using contingency cost method and two stage method, studied the matching degree between executive compensation and corporate strategy the impact on corporate performance. In the empirical analysis, through hierarchical cluster analysis, descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, determination and return variables Regression analysis quantitative analysis verified the proposed two hypotheses, namely product differentiation enterprises than cost leading enterprises to use a higher proportion of performance compensation; the enterprise competition strategy and executive performance salary does not match will have a negative impact on the business performance. The empirical results show: the results of descriptive statistics and analysis the regression shows that the implementation of product differentiation strategy of enterprises with the implementation of cost leadership strategy than companies tend to pay a higher proportion of executive performance salary; from the correlation analysis shows that there is a significant correlation between executive pay and corporate performance. At the same time, the regression analysis also shows that the executive compensation and corporate performance. Correlation is significant; matching strategy and executive compensation and corporate performance is negatively related. Finally, according to the enterprise competition strategy, high Guan Xinchou The results of empirical research and the relationship between business performance and puts forward the following suggestion: (1) setting a reasonable salary system. Pay attention to the diversity of rationality and the form of payment for compensation structure at the same time, pay attention to the role of pension plans, health insurance, job subsidies and other incentives incentives, to prevent these incentives are a mere formality. In addition, pay attention to increase the long-term incentive mechanism of equity incentive, improve retirement security measures, so as to effectively prevent short-term behavior of executives. (2) the executive compensation system to match the enterprise competition strategy, not to let the salary system become a stumbling block to the enterprise to obtain the good performance. (3) establish reasonable executive performance evaluation system, appropriate the introduction of non-financial indicators, the executive compensation and performance management to achieve a reasonable match, so true, reasonable evaluation of executive business results. The main innovations of this paper are Two points: (1) based on the previous research, this paper selects five indicators, using sequence clustering method to sample the enterprise strategy is divided into product differentiation strategy and cost leadership strategy two, put forward a feasible method to classify the strategic implementation of enterprise. (2) research on enterprise competition strategy and the relationship between executive compensation and the performance of the three. At present, China has no scholars and experts on the enterprise competition strategy, to study the relationship between executive compensation and the performance of the three. And, for the study of executive compensation and the enterprise competition strategy, previous research is mostly theoretical research, few empirical studies. This paper uses the empirical analysis method, based on the study of the relationship between competitive strategy and executive compensation, the enterprise competition strategy, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of the three.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:太原理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2016
【分類號(hào)】:F271;F272.92;F275
【相似文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 李虹;關(guān)于企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略的有關(guān)思考[J];環(huán)渤海經(jīng)濟(jì)w,
本文編號(hào):1549905
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/renliziyuanguanlilunwen/1549905.html
最近更新
教材專著