【摘要】：為了使設(shè)計施工聯(lián)合體工程總承包項目中優(yōu)化收益的分配更加公平合理,在設(shè)計方與施工方平等合作的基礎(chǔ)上,引入風(fēng)險偏好和公平關(guān)切理論,構(gòu)建設(shè)計方與施工方的不完全信息博弈模型。通過對模型的求解,比較分析引入風(fēng)險偏好和公平偏好前后,最優(yōu)努力水平和最優(yōu)收益分配比例的變化情況,得出風(fēng)險偏好對雙方最優(yōu)努力程度沒有影響,但是優(yōu)化收益最優(yōu)分配比例會隨著各自風(fēng)險偏好程度的增加而減少;而引入設(shè)計方公平關(guān)切后,設(shè)計方在自身效用最大化下付出的最優(yōu)努力水平有所減少,優(yōu)化收益最優(yōu)分配比例有所增加,且優(yōu)化收益最優(yōu)分配比例隨著設(shè)計方公平關(guān)切程度和外生因素的增大而增大。最后通過Matlab數(shù)值仿真模擬對結(jié)論進行數(shù)值驗證,以確保結(jié)論的準(zhǔn)確性。
[Abstract]:In order to make the optimal income distribution in the general contracting project of design and construction complex more equitable and reasonable, risk preference and fair concern theory are introduced on the basis of equal cooperation between the designer and the constructor. The game model of incomplete information between designer and constructor is constructed. By solving the model, this paper compares and analyzes the changes of the optimal level of effort and the proportion of optimal income distribution before and after the introduction of risk preference and fair preference, and draws the conclusion that risk preference has no effect on the optimal effort degree of both parties. However, the optimal proportion of income distribution will decrease with the increase of risk preference. After introducing the fair concern of the designer, the optimal effort level of the designer under the maximization of its own utility is reduced, and the proportion of the optimal distribution of the optimized income is increased. And the optimal proportion of optimal income distribution increases with the increase of the degree of concern and exogenous factors of the designer. Finally, the conclusion is verified by Matlab simulation to ensure the accuracy of the conclusion.
【作者單位】： 淮陰師范學(xué)院城市與環(huán)境學(xué)院;河海大學(xué)工程管理研究所;
【分類號】：TU71
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本文編號：2400666