本文選題：研發(fā)外包 + 道德風險�。� 參考：《科研管理》2017年12期

【摘要】：針對研發(fā)外包中服務商道德風險防范與激勵問題,在考慮服務商自有資金限制下,設計了獎勵成功、懲罰失敗、獎—懲混合的研發(fā)外包契約,并對三種契約的可行性與有效性進行了比較,得到各類契約的選擇條件。研究表明,獎-懲混合契約完全等價獎勵契約或者懲罰契約,而服務商資金實力是影響契約可行性與有效性的關鍵因素。具體而言,當服務商資金實力很差,具有較大負債時,獎勵與懲罰契約均不可行,客戶不應該把研發(fā)項目外包給此類企業(yè);而隨著服務商資金實力的增加,負債減少到一定程度時,首先是懲罰契約可行,此后當服務商資金實力繼續(xù)增加到一定程度,獎勵契約才可行,并且懲罰契約優(yōu)于獎勵契約;當服務資金實力強到一定程度后,獎勵契約與懲罰契約均可行,且二者等價。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the problem of moral hazard prevention and incentive of service providers in R & D outsourcing, under the consideration of the limitation of service providers' own funds, the paper designs a contract of rewarding success, punishing failure, rewarding and punishing mixed R & D outsourcing. The feasibility and effectiveness of the three kinds of contracts are compared, and the selection conditions of various kinds of contracts are obtained. The research shows that the mixed contract of reward and punishment is equivalent to the contract of reward or punishment and the financial strength of the service provider is the key factor that affects the feasibility and effectiveness of the contract. Specifically, when the financial strength of the service provider is very poor and has a large debt, neither the incentive nor the punishment contract is feasible, and customers should not outsource R & D projects to such enterprises; and as the financial strength of the service provider increases, When the debt is reduced to a certain extent, the penalty contract is feasible first, and then when the financial strength of the service provider continues to increase to a certain extent, the reward contract is feasible, and the penalty contract is superior to the reward contract; when the service capital strength reaches a certain level, Both the reward contract and the punishment contract can be applied, and they are equivalent.
【作者單位】： 電子科技大學經(jīng)濟與管理學院;重慶理工大學管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金項目“知識密集型服務外包中的知識共享激勵與知識資產(chǎn)爭端協(xié)調(diào)機制研究”(71301182,2014.01—2016.12);國家自然科學基金項目“新一代信息技術產(chǎn)業(yè)“聯(lián)盟組合”與創(chuàng)新能力研究:涌現(xiàn)、構型與治理”(71572028,2016.01—2019.12)
【分類號】：F273.1

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