本文選題：盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì) + 成本粘性　； 參考：《西安電子科技大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：成本粘性(sticky cost)是近年來(lái)成本管理領(lǐng)域的研究熱點(diǎn)之一,它指的是當(dāng)成本隨著業(yè)務(wù)量的變動(dòng)而變動(dòng)時(shí),其業(yè)務(wù)量增加時(shí)的成本增加量大于業(yè)務(wù)量等額減少時(shí)的成本減少量。企業(yè)成本粘性的影響因素包括調(diào)整成本、管理者樂(lè)觀預(yù)期和代理問(wèn)題三個(gè)方面,并可以從契約觀、效率觀和機(jī)會(huì)主義觀這三個(gè)視角對(duì)其進(jìn)行理論解釋。成本粘性的出現(xiàn)使我們認(rèn)識(shí)到,與以往管理會(huì)計(jì)中的線性模型不同,管理者的成本管理行為會(huì)對(duì)成本產(chǎn)生影響,使其不再是隨著業(yè)務(wù)量的變動(dòng)而機(jī)械地同比例變動(dòng)。然而由于管理者在做出成本管理決策時(shí)會(huì)考慮自身利益,進(jìn)而從事自利活動(dòng),對(duì)成本粘性產(chǎn)生影響。因此,為了更深入地了解管理者的成本管理行為,我們有必要進(jìn)行企業(yè)管理者行為與成本粘性之間的關(guān)系研究,這也有助于企業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)出更為合理高效的管理機(jī)制。本文從管理激勵(lì)的角度出發(fā),通過(guò)理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)兩方面研究了盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)對(duì)企業(yè)成本粘性的影響,這對(duì)于充分認(rèn)識(shí)管理者資源調(diào)整決策背后的自利動(dòng)機(jī),合理設(shè)定激勵(lì)目標(biāo),控制成本粘性意義重大。本文首先對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于成本粘性的相關(guān)研究進(jìn)行梳理,總結(jié)出成本粘性的成因、特征、影響因素及研究意義,在此基礎(chǔ)上指出當(dāng)前研究的不足,進(jìn)而提出本文的切入點(diǎn)和研究思路。然后基于國(guó)內(nèi)外已有研究成果和我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的特點(diǎn),從管理者行為角度提出支撐本文實(shí)證研究的基礎(chǔ)理論,在此基礎(chǔ)上將盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)分為避免虧損的激勵(lì)、避免盈余下降的激勵(lì)以及交替激勵(lì)(即避免虧損或避免盈余下降的各種激勵(lì)措施)研究具體因素對(duì)成本粘性的影響,循序漸進(jìn)地提出了本文的假設(shè)。接著定義了自變量、因變量和控制變量,在ABJ(2003)模型的基礎(chǔ)上逐步加入自變量及控制變量構(gòu)建出多元線性回歸模型,并選擇了我國(guó)上市非金融企業(yè)2000-2012年數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。研究結(jié)果表明:(1)我國(guó)上市企業(yè)存在成本粘性;(2)當(dāng)存在盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)時(shí),成本粘性的程度會(huì)降低;(3)當(dāng)業(yè)務(wù)量下降時(shí),盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)的存在導(dǎo)致管理者更大幅度地削減資源,從而降低了成本粘性程度;(4)前期的盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)會(huì)增加成本粘性程度,本期的盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)降低了成本粘性程度,而連續(xù)兩期都存在盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)時(shí),成本粘性變化不大;(5)當(dāng)管理者對(duì)未來(lái)需求預(yù)期樂(lè)觀時(shí),盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)的存在降低了成本粘性的程度;而當(dāng)管理者對(duì)未來(lái)需求預(yù)期悲觀時(shí),盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)的存在導(dǎo)致了成本反粘性。本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)主要表現(xiàn)在:(1)研究的首創(chuàng)性。本文首次研究了盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)對(duì)成本粘性的影響,從根源上指出盈利目標(biāo)激勵(lì)與管理者自利的關(guān)系;(2)樣本的廣泛性。本文選取我國(guó)上市公司2000-2012年的年度財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本進(jìn)行研究,期間較長(zhǎng),具有較好的樣本廣泛性;(3)研究的實(shí)用性。本文的研究為管理者進(jìn)行成本管理決策提供理論依據(jù)和參考,有助于股東采取恰當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)方式,設(shè)定合適的激勵(lì)目標(biāo),將成本粘性控制在合理的范圍內(nèi)。
[Abstract]:Cost Stickiness (sticky cost) is one of the hotspots in the field of cost management in recent years. It refers to the cost increase when the cost increases as the volume of business changes, and the cost increase when the volume of business increases is greater than the reduction in the amount of business equivalent. There are three aspects of agency problem, which can be explained theoretically from the three perspectives of contract view, efficiency view and opportunism view. The appearance of Cost Stickiness makes us realize that, unlike the linear model in the past management accounting, the manager's cost management behavior will affect the cost production, and make it no longer change with the volume of business. However, it is necessary to study the relationship between managers' behavior and Cost Stickiness in order to understand the cost management behavior of managers in order to understand the cost management behavior more deeply. From the perspective of management incentive, this paper studies the influence of profit target incentive on Enterprise Cost Stickiness from the perspective of management motivation, through two aspects of theoretical analysis and empirical test, which is to fully understand the self-interest motive behind the manager's resource adjustment decision, set the incentive target and control it. This paper first analyzes the related research on Cost Stickiness at home and abroad, summarizes the causes, characteristics, influence factors and research significance of cost stickiness, and points out the shortage of current research on this basis, and then puts forward the breakthrough point and research way of research, and then based on the existing research results at home and abroad and our national capital. The characteristics of this market, from the perspective of managers' behavior, put forward the basic theory to support this empirical study. On this basis, profit target incentive is divided into incentive to avoid loss, to avoid the incentive of earnings decline and to study the effect of specific factors on the Cost Stickiness of the alternative incentive (namely, the various excitations of avoiding loss or avoiding the decline of earnings). The hypothesis of this paper is put forward step by step. Then the independent variable is defined, and the multivariate linear regression model is constructed by adding independent variables and control variables on the basis of ABJ (2003) model, and the 2000-2012 year data of non-financial enterprises listed in China are selected for empirical analysis. The results show that: (1) our country is on the basis of empirical analysis. The city enterprise has the Cost Stickiness; (2) the degree of Cost Stickiness will be reduced when there is a profit target incentive. (3) when the volume of business falls, the existence of profit target motivate the managers to reduce the resources more substantially, thus reducing the degree of Cost Stickiness; (4) the initial profit target incentive will increase the cost stickiness, the profit goal of this period. The standard incentive reduces the cost stickiness, and the Cost Stickiness changes little when there are two consecutive periods of profit target incentive. (5) when the manager is optimistic about the future demand, the existence of profit target incentive reduces the degree of Cost Stickiness; and when the manager is pessimistic about the future, the existence of profit target incentive is caused by the manager. The innovation points of this paper are mainly manifested in: (1) the initiative of the study. This paper first studies the effect of profit target incentive on cost stickiness, and points out the relationship between the motivation of profit target and the self-interest of the manager from the root; (2) the universality of the sample. This paper selects the annual financial data of our company for 2000-2012 years as a sample. The study has a long period and has a good sample wide range; (3) the practicability of the study. This study provides a theoretical basis and reference for managers to make a cost management decision. It is helpful for shareholders to adopt appropriate incentive methods, set appropriate incentive targets, and control the Cost Stickiness within a reasonable range.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275.3

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