本文選題：成本粘性　切入點(diǎn)：管理者預(yù)期　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：成本習(xí)性作為成本與管理會(huì)計(jì)的一個(gè)重要概念和內(nèi)容,主要是指企業(yè)成本總額的變動(dòng)與業(yè)務(wù)量之間的依存關(guān)系。而成本粘性關(guān)于成本與業(yè)務(wù)量之間不對(duì)稱(chēng)的變動(dòng)關(guān)系研究不僅有助于揭示企業(yè)的成本管理行為這一“黑箱”,而且為管理會(huì)計(jì)與財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)之間的交叉研究建立起一座橋梁。國(guó)外對(duì)成本粘性的研究比較早,而近年來(lái)國(guó)內(nèi)開(kāi)始對(duì)成本粘性進(jìn)行研究,本文從理論出發(fā),主要根據(jù)國(guó)內(nèi)國(guó)外對(duì)成本粘性現(xiàn)有研究的不足,并且結(jié)合我國(guó)的實(shí)際國(guó)情,探索和研究我國(guó)上市公司管理者預(yù)期、盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性的影響,對(duì)于管理會(huì)計(jì)、財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)和公司治理等學(xué)科具有重要的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 國(guó)內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的不足主要表現(xiàn)在： (1)首先,國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)界對(duì)于成本習(xí)性的研究大多集中在成本粘性的存在性、動(dòng)機(jī)、影響程度、不同行業(yè)之間的對(duì)比等方面,鮮有文章涉及成本粘性與其他學(xué)科或領(lǐng)域相結(jié)合的研究。 (2)其次,我們知道成本粘性的產(chǎn)生與管理者行為是非常緊密的,在國(guó)外,已經(jīng)從管理者預(yù)期角度出發(fā)對(duì)成本粘性影響進(jìn)行研究,然而在國(guó)內(nèi)的成本粘性的成因研究中,缺少?gòu)墓芾碚咧饔^因素角度出發(fā)對(duì)成本粘性進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。 (3)很多證據(jù)都表明了代理問(wèn)題是導(dǎo)致管理者減少成本來(lái)達(dá)到避免虧損、盈余下降和滿足分析師的預(yù)測(cè)的關(guān)鍵。然而,管理者通過(guò)減少成本來(lái)達(dá)到避免虧損和業(yè)績(jī)下降的動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性的影響還鮮有被研究。 本文為了彌補(bǔ)現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的不足,從管理者預(yù)期和盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)角度出發(fā),首先關(guān)注自利行為的管理者所做的決策,研究由于盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)的存在會(huì)使得管理者調(diào)節(jié)資源從而考察它對(duì)成本粘性程度的影響情況。接著研究因管理者對(duì)銷(xiāo)售需求有不同預(yù)期,從而會(huì)對(duì)成本粘性產(chǎn)生影響,最后考慮在管理者對(duì)銷(xiāo)售需求的不同預(yù)期下,避免虧損、避免業(yè)績(jī)下降和達(dá)到分析師預(yù)測(cè)的動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性及其程度的影響,在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了5個(gè)基本假設(shè),拓展了原有模型,建立了三個(gè)基本模型,把我國(guó)2003-2012年的1859家上市公司作為研究樣本進(jìn)行回歸分析。最后得出了相關(guān)的結(jié)論以及對(duì)成本粘性未來(lái)研究的展望。 本文的主要內(nèi)容結(jié)構(gòu)如下： 第一章,緒論。主要闡述了研究背景,分析研究的理論和實(shí)踐意義,說(shuō)明了研究?jī)?nèi)容和主要框架,從而分析出可能存在的創(chuàng)新之處,并為下文研究打下基礎(chǔ)。 第二章,文獻(xiàn)綜述。從成本粘性、盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)及管理者預(yù)期角度出發(fā)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究進(jìn)行梳理做出文獻(xiàn)評(píng)述。 第三章,理論基礎(chǔ)與研究假設(shè)的提出。明確了成本粘性的概念和基本特性,介紹了盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī),對(duì)管理者預(yù)期進(jìn)行界定,結(jié)合相關(guān)理論知識(shí)提出了盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)與成本粘性、管理者預(yù)期與成本粘性以及管理者預(yù)期、盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)與成本粘性5個(gè)基本假設(shè)。 (1)業(yè)務(wù)量下降時(shí),管理者有盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)(盈利目標(biāo)和達(dá)到分析師預(yù)測(cè))會(huì)使得他們更多地削減成本。 (2)有盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)時(shí)會(huì)使管理者有意地資源調(diào)節(jié)從而弱化成本粘性。 (3)對(duì)未來(lái)樂(lè)觀預(yù)期管理者會(huì)強(qiáng)化企業(yè)成本粘性。 (4)對(duì)未來(lái)悲觀預(yù)期管理者會(huì)弱化企業(yè)成本粘性,甚至出現(xiàn)反粘性的成本習(xí)性。 (5)相比于樂(lè)觀管理者,悲觀預(yù)期的管理者在有盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)時(shí)對(duì)成本粘性的影響比較大。 第四章,實(shí)證研究設(shè)計(jì)。主要是相關(guān)變量的定義和確定,并根據(jù)已提出的5個(gè)基本假設(shè)建立相關(guān)模型,為下文進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析做基礎(chǔ)。 第五章,實(shí)證結(jié)果分析。本文主要以我國(guó)2003至2012年的1859家上市公司作為研究的樣本,利用CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)資料,并且利用STATA統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件對(duì)樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析以及回歸分析,最后進(jìn)行相關(guān)檢驗(yàn),利用實(shí)證結(jié)果以檢驗(yàn)假設(shè)的合理性。 第六章,研究結(jié)論與局限性。本章主要分為三個(gè)部分,第一部分是在對(duì)全文相關(guān)研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行總結(jié)得出結(jié)論,第二部分提出本文研究中存在的不足,第三部分對(duì)未來(lái)企業(yè)成本粘性的研究進(jìn)行了展望。 本文擴(kuò)展ABJ模型和BCM模型對(duì)相關(guān)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究,得出以下結(jié)論： (1)盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)的存在對(duì)成本粘性程度產(chǎn)生影響。通過(guò)理論分析,我們知道由于代理問(wèn)題的原因,避免虧損、避免業(yè)績(jī)下降和達(dá)到分析師預(yù)測(cè)的動(dòng)機(jī)會(huì)使管理者在銷(xiāo)售下降的時(shí)候加快削減成本,并且弱化成本粘性。我們通過(guò)建立模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn),不管是滿足盈利目標(biāo)動(dòng)機(jī)還是達(dá)到分析預(yù)測(cè)的動(dòng)機(jī),γ1大于0且在0.01的水平上顯著,γ1+γ2也大于0且在0.01的水平上顯著,所以我們可以得出結(jié)論,在銷(xiāo)售下降的時(shí)候,盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)在存在會(huì)使管理者更多地削減成本,并且盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)的存在會(huì)弱化成本粘性,甚至出現(xiàn)反成本粘性。因此我們?cè)趯?duì)企業(yè)成本管理行為中,不僅要考慮管理成本問(wèn)題還應(yīng)該考慮相關(guān)的財(cái)務(wù)管理問(wèn)題,將兩者結(jié)合起來(lái)。 (2)管理者預(yù)期對(duì)成本粘性會(huì)產(chǎn)生影響。我們通過(guò)理論分析把管理者對(duì)未來(lái)的不同預(yù)期分為樂(lè)觀預(yù)期和悲觀預(yù)期,不同的預(yù)期對(duì)成本粘性會(huì)產(chǎn)生不同的影響,在樂(lè)觀預(yù)期時(shí),成本粘性程度Y：—h會(huì)大于ABJ模型中的β2,所以得知樂(lè)觀管理者會(huì)強(qiáng)化成本粘性,而悲觀預(yù)期時(shí),成本粘性程度γ4—γ2會(huì)小于ABJ模型中的β2,所以得知悲觀管理者則會(huì)弱化成本粘性,因此我們?cè)趯?duì)企業(yè)成本管理中,要考慮到管理者自身的行為因素,對(duì)未來(lái)的態(tài)度不同做出不同的決策。 (3)在對(duì)管理者預(yù)期、盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性的影響研究中,通過(guò)模型建立與檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果,我們檢驗(yàn)出γ3-γ1會(huì)小于γ4—γ2,所以盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性的影響在悲觀預(yù)期的時(shí)候強(qiáng)于樂(lè)觀預(yù)期的時(shí)候的假設(shè)成立。綜合考慮了管理者對(duì)未來(lái)的預(yù)期、有存在達(dá)到盈利目標(biāo)和分析師預(yù)測(cè)的動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性產(chǎn)生的影響,在企業(yè)進(jìn)行成本決策時(shí),管理者作為主觀因素,不僅應(yīng)考慮未來(lái)的預(yù)期,由于代理問(wèn)題還應(yīng)該考慮其自利行為對(duì)管理者決策產(chǎn)生重大影響,為企業(yè)成為管理決策提供了理論的參考和依據(jù)。 本文證實(shí)了中國(guó)上市公司管理者預(yù)期、盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性的影響,但是不管從理論還是實(shí)證來(lái)看這僅僅只是個(gè)開(kāi)始,還需要后續(xù)相關(guān)的學(xué)者進(jìn)行完善和補(bǔ)充,對(duì)成本粘性的未來(lái)研究進(jìn)行展望： (1)首先在理論方面,管理者預(yù)期背后存在著對(duì)管理者進(jìn)行心理分析的復(fù)雜經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論系統(tǒng),然而本文僅僅運(yùn)用了最簡(jiǎn)單基本的理論進(jìn)行初步的界定和判斷。后續(xù)學(xué)者可以借鑒相關(guān)的理論成果和研究方法,進(jìn)一步豐富關(guān)于“管理者悲觀預(yù)期”和“管理者樂(lè)觀預(yù)期”的理論,從而研究其對(duì)成本粘性的影響。 (2)其次在實(shí)證研究方面,本文對(duì)盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)方面僅用三個(gè)普遍的動(dòng)機(jī)作為相關(guān)變量對(duì)成本粘性管理進(jìn)行研究,然而盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)是復(fù)雜且多樣的,后續(xù)學(xué)者可以擴(kuò)展盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)方面的問(wèn)題,特別是在我國(guó)存在特殊盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性的影響進(jìn)行研究。 本文在借鑒和吸收已有的研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,在以下幾個(gè)方面有所貢獻(xiàn)： (1)驗(yàn)證了我國(guó)上市公司盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性的影響。如本文第二章分析,目前我國(guó)還沒(méi)有把成本粘性與財(cái)務(wù)管理問(wèn)題結(jié)合起來(lái)分析,本文通過(guò)對(duì)盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)的具體化,即避免虧損、避免業(yè)績(jī)下降以及達(dá)到分析師的預(yù)測(cè)作為盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性產(chǎn)生了如何的影響以及影響程度進(jìn)行了研究。 (2)在我國(guó)將管理者預(yù)期、盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)與成本粘性結(jié)合起來(lái)分析。對(duì)比ABJ模型,運(yùn)用擴(kuò)展的BCM模型,不僅研究了管理者預(yù)期對(duì)成本粘性的影響,還研究在不同預(yù)期情況下,盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性產(chǎn)生的影響是不同的。 本文研究了我國(guó)盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性的影響,并進(jìn)一步引入管理者預(yù)期進(jìn)行分析研究,雖然對(duì)理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)有一定的貢獻(xiàn),但由于主觀和客觀因素的存在,本文有以下不足： (1)本文用主營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)收入作為業(yè)務(wù)量的替代研究變量,有一定的局限性。因?yàn)橹鳡I(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)收入的變化不僅包括產(chǎn)量的變化還可能由于價(jià)格的變化所引起,所以主營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)收入變化與現(xiàn)實(shí)中企業(yè)業(yè)務(wù)量的變化不一定是一致的。在未來(lái)的研究中,如果能獲取企業(yè)內(nèi)部產(chǎn)量的相關(guān)資料來(lái)對(duì)成本粘性進(jìn)行研究,會(huì)比主營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)收入變量更具有代表性。 (2)盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī),本文僅用避免虧損和業(yè)績(jī)下降以及分析師預(yù)測(cè)這三個(gè)普遍存在的動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)成本粘性進(jìn)行研究,在我國(guó)還存在很多特別存在的盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī),所以得出的結(jié)論具有一定的局限性。
[Abstract]:As an important concept and content of cost and management accounting , the cost habit mainly refers to the dependence between the change of the total cost of the enterprise and the business volume .

The deficiencies of the existing literature at home and abroad are mainly manifested in :

( 1 ) Firstly , the research on cost habit is mostly focused on the existence of cost viscosity , motivation , degree of influence , contrast between different industries , etc . , and there are few articles which relate to the combination of cost viscosity and other disciplines or fields .

This paper studies the effect of surplus management motivation on cost viscosity , and further introduces managers ' expectation for analysis and research , although it has certain contribution to theory and reality , but due to the existence of subjective and objective factors , this paper has the following disadvantages :

( 3 ) There is a lot of evidence that the agency problem is the key to reducing the cost of managers to avoid losses , declining surpluses and meeting analysts ' forecasts . However , managers have little incentive to avoid losses and lower performance by reducing costs .

In order to make up for the shortcomings of the current literature , from the perspective of manager ' s expectation and surplus management motive , the paper first pays attention to the decision made by the manager of self - profit behavior , and then studies the influence of the motivation on the cost viscosity due to the existence of surplus management motivation . Then , the paper puts forward five basic assumptions , expands the original model , establishes three basic models , and then returns the 1859 listed companies in 2003 - 2012 as the research samples . Finally , the conclusion is drawn and the prospect of future research on cost sticky .

The main contents of this paper are as follows :

The first chapter introduces the research background , analyzes the theoretical and practical significance of the research , explains the research content and the main frame , and analyses the possible innovations and lays the foundation for the study below .

Chapter 2 . Literature review . From the viewpoint of cost viscosity , surplus management motivation and manager ' s expected angle , the paper reviews the related research at home and abroad .

In the third chapter , the theory foundation and the research hypothesis are put forward . The concept and basic characteristics of the cost viscosity are clarified , the earnings management motive is introduced , the expectation of the manager is defined , and the surplus management motivation and the cost viscosity are put forward based on the relevant theoretical knowledge , and the manager ' s expectation and cost stickiness and the manager ' s expectation , the surplus management motivation and the cost sticky 5 basic assumptions are put forward .

( 1 ) When traffic falls , managers have earnings management incentives ( earnings targets and analyst forecasts ) that make them more cost - cutting .

( 2 ) When there is a surplus management motive , the manager intends to adjust resources to weaken the cost stickiness .

( 3 ) To be optimistic about the future , managers will strengthen the enterprise ' s cost viscosity .

( 4 ) In the future , pessimistic expectation managers will weaken the enterprise cost stickiness , and even have the anti - adhesive cost habit .

( 5 ) In contrast to the optimistic manager , the pessimistic expectation managers have a greater impact on the cost viscosity when there is a surplus management motivation .

The fourth chapter , the empirical research design , is mainly the definition and determination of the relevant variables , and establishes the correlation model according to the proposed five basic assumptions , which is the basis for the empirical analysis below .

In chapter 5 , the empirical results are analyzed . In this paper , 1859 listed companies from 2003 to 2012 are used as samples of the study , and the relevant data of CSMAR database are used , and the statistical analysis and regression analysis of the sample data are carried out by STATA statistical software . Finally , relevant tests are carried out , and the rationality of the hypothesis is verified by using the empirical results .

Chapter 6 , research conclusions and limitations . This chapter is divided into three parts , the first part is based on the research results of the whole - text , the second part presents the deficiency existing in this paper , and the third part looks forward to the future research of enterprise cost viscosity .

In this paper , ABJ model and BCM model are extended to study the related problems , and the following conclusions are drawn :

( 1 ) The existence of earnings management motivation has an impact on the degree of cost viscosity . By theoretical analysis , we know that because of the reason of agency problem , avoiding the loss , avoiding the decline of performance and meeting analyst ' s forecast , we can conclude that , whether it is the motive for meeting the profit motive or the analysis forecast , 緯1 + 緯2 is more than 0 and the level of 0.01 is significant , so we can draw the conclusion that in the behavior of cost management of the enterprise , not only should the management cost problem be considered , but also the related financial management problem should be taken into consideration , and the two will be combined .

( 2 ) The managers expect to have an impact on the cost stickiness . By theoretical analysis , we divide the managers into optimistic expectations and pessimistic expectations for the different expectations of the future . Different expectations have different effects on the cost stickiness . When the optimistic expectations are optimistic , the cost viscosity degree Y : 鈥，

本文編號(hào)：1699586