本文選題：語(yǔ)言 + 意義�。� 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：自康德以來(lái),分析性就已經(jīng)作為哲學(xué)中的核心概念之一被哲學(xué)家們廣泛地使用。然而,自1951年以來(lái),由蒯因引發(fā)的對(duì)分析性的批判使得原本似乎很自然合理的分析性概念變的千瘡百孔。為了辯護(hù)分析性,哲學(xué)家們提出了各種方案,這也使得語(yǔ)言哲學(xué)在此取得了長(zhǎng)足的發(fā)展。但是,到目前為止,似乎仍沒(méi)有一種方案能令人滿意地反駁蒯因式的批判。 在此背景下,本文從眾多辯護(hù)分析性的方案中選取了最有希望的基蓮·羅素的多重意義方案,并對(duì)其進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步的批判和修正,以試圖說(shuō)明分析性問(wèn)題的真正困難并不是因?yàn)槲覀內(nèi)鄙僖环N關(guān)于命題(proposition)的恰當(dāng)理論,而是因?yàn)槲覀儗?duì)詞的作為特質(zhì)(character)的意義知之甚少。因此,在語(yǔ)言哲學(xué)和認(rèn)知科學(xué)可以使我們對(duì)詞的特質(zhì)有更進(jìn)一步地了解之前,我們對(duì)分析性的具體細(xì)節(jié)只能暫時(shí)保持沉默。雖然本文沒(méi)有給出分析性的具體定義,但是通過(guò)把分析性問(wèn)題歸結(jié)到詞的作為特質(zhì)的意義問(wèn)題,使語(yǔ)言獲得了相對(duì)于數(shù)學(xué)與邏輯以及經(jīng)驗(yàn)事實(shí)的獨(dú)立性。 本文在結(jié)構(gòu)上分為四章。第一章主要介紹哲學(xué)中討論的分析性問(wèn)題到底是什么,并對(duì)本文要具體討論的問(wèn)題做初步的介紹。第二章從思想發(fā)展的脈絡(luò)上介紹基蓮·羅素的多重意義理論,并對(duì)其理論本身的問(wèn)題進(jìn)行批判。第三章修正和重構(gòu)了基蓮·羅素的多重意義理論,并具體論證了在多重意義理論框架下,分析性的對(duì)象只可能是作為特質(zhì)的意義。而且,因?yàn)閷?duì)于特質(zhì)的具體理解有待于語(yǔ)言哲學(xué)和認(rèn)知科學(xué)的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展,所以分析性問(wèn)題應(yīng)該暫時(shí)懸置。第四章簡(jiǎn)要討論了多重意義理論框架下的分析性會(huì)導(dǎo)致的哲學(xué)后果,包括否認(rèn)意義幻覺(jué),否認(rèn)分析性與同義性的等同,以及肯定分析性相對(duì)于數(shù)學(xué)與邏輯的獨(dú)立性。
[Abstract]:Since Kant, analysis has been widely used by philosophers as one of the core concepts in philosophy. However, since 1951, Quine's criticism of the analytical nature has made the analytical concept, which seemed to be natural and reasonable, full of defects. In order to defend the analytical nature, philosophers put forward various schemes, which made the philosophy of language have made great progress. So far, however, there does not seem to be a satisfactory response to Quine's criticism. In this context, this paper selects the most promising multi-meaning scheme of Killian Russell from many analytical defense schemes, and further criticizes and modifies it. The real difficulty in trying to explain the analytical problem is not because we lack a proper theory about the proposition (proposition), but because we know little about the meaning of the word as a trait of (character). Therefore, until philosophy of language and cognitive science can give us a better understanding of the characteristics of words, we can only remain silent on the specific details of analysis for a while. Although this paper does not give a specific definition of analytical nature, it makes language independent of mathematics, logic and empirical facts by attributing the problem of analytic nature to the problem of meaning as a characteristic of words. The structure of this paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter mainly introduces what analytical problems are discussed in philosophy, and makes a preliminary introduction to the specific problems discussed in this paper. The second chapter introduces the theory of multiple meanings of Killian Russell in the context of ideological development, and criticizes the problems of the theory itself. Chapter three revises and reconstructs Killian Russell's theory of multiple meanings, and demonstrates that under the framework of multiple meanings theory, analytical objects can only be regarded as special meanings. Moreover, since the understanding of idiosyncrasy needs the further development of linguistic philosophy and cognitive science, the analytical problem should be suspended temporarily. The fourth chapter briefly discusses the philosophical consequences of analytic nature under the framework of multi-meaning theory, including the illusion of denying meaning, the equivalence between analytic and synonymous, and the independence of positive analyticism relative to mathematics and logic.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：H0-05

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

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本文編號(hào)：2087323